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Egypt	MR1
Turkey	MB1
Iraq	MH1
Syria	MD1
Lebanon	ME1
Historical Palestine	MF2

/For an account of the program of industrialization in countries of the Middle East after World War I up to 1945, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116 as follows: Turkey - pp. 274-284, Egypt - pp. 285-286, Iraq - pp. 287-289, Palestine - 289-290, Syria and Lebanon - pp. 290-291./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Of the exports of 'Iraq's natural produce, dates were the most consistently important, and supplied, as they do today, a high percentage of the world's needs; and although in preparation, packing, and the technique of marketing the date merchants were backward, yet the culture itself, favoured by every natural advantage, was highly developed, and the famous 'Iraq dates found their way copiously to America, Europe, India, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Rice was a considerable but variable export. Wheat and barley—especially the latter—failed to supply exportable surpluses only in years of drought or locust visitation; but the quantities varied widely, and the quality was reckoned among the world's lowest. A few tons of the seed-crops, some gums and gall-nuts from Kurdistan, liquorice-root from the Tigris banks, were smaller but characteristic exports.

The shipping of Arab horses to India was ancient but fluctuating. Hides and skins were sent to Istanbul and Western Europe, clarified fat to India and the Red Sea, mohair to Istanbul and Europe, intestine-linings for sausage-making to America, dog-manure (under its trade-name of 'pure') for tanning to Austria. Various grades of local wool were pressed for export to America and London. By land to Syria went 'Iraqi camels, sheep by way of Mosul to Aleppo, cattle for Egypt, buffaloes for Anatolia.

The forest areas of the mountain belt of northern 'Iraq offered a potential resource of some interest. Between one-tenth and one-fifth of the higher mountains was covered by fairly well grown and productive forest, and as much again by scrub not incapable of improvement. This, in a territory deficient in timber of all kinds and forced expensively to import it, might have seemed to call for development to meet 'Iraq's needs of building-timber, date-boxes, furniture, and fuel. In fact, unchecked quantities of charcoal and fuel, poles for roofing, and foliage for cattle fodder were taken yearly by Kurdish villagers as, without forethought or control, their local supply seemed to make possible. Protection against grazing, encroachment or fire were all equally unconsidered, re-afforestation was ignored, and the stripped hill-sides were offered to the force of winter rains; the resulting erosion would, by way of the descending rivers, deposit the Kurdish silt in the canals of lower 'Iraq and create there an unending problem of clearance. The trees of Kurdistan were oaks of more than one species—including the giver of gall-nuts—and, less numerous, the juniper, wild pear, pistachio nut, walnut, and maple: and, by stream banks on the lower levels, the poplar, willow, mulberry, plane, and tamarisk.

Agriculture was by far the greatest industry in the territory, and the occupation of four-fifths of its inhabitants; yet with all its

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

itself had rarely the knowledge, the physical control or the resources to initiate new methods or improve the old.

The cultivators themselves, mediocre in physique and discouraged by their circumstances, were resigned to accept the lowest subsistence level as the best which life could afford them. Their cultivation methods remained primitive. They had, indeed, their technique of small-scale water control, their wasteful but practicable methods of water-lift. They could be prompt to benefit from occasional rain or the wet silt of shrinking rivers, had mastered from early childhood their simplest of equipment. But there was no improvement in the quality of the few crop varieties grown, no experiment in new techniques, no ambition for purer seed-types which could have doubled the merchants' prices, no reluctance to offer adulterated or uncleaned produce. There was a dead or deadly conservatism, backed by centuries of habit and dull fatalism. Only on the Saniya estates were there signs that other standards might, without miracle, be achieved; with better security due to a favoured use of the *Zaptié*, modern buildings, regular silt-clearance, a minimum of helpful organization and financing, the Saniya lands offered a spectacle less mournful than the generality of 'Iraq agriculture—but had solved none of its major problems.

Of these, some were evident enough: problems of security both of tenure and of life, of the means to perform the communal functions of the countryside, of finance, of rural education, of taxation, and rent. Of the irrigation problem, vital to 'Iraq society and economics in every age, more must be said. 'Iraq, from this viewpoint, offered not only high hopes but grave difficulties, which in 1900 no attempt had been made to master. It was the chief of these that the Two Rivers vary more than tenfold seasonally in their discharge, whereby the beds sufficient for their discharge in the dry months are wholly inadequate to take their flood waters. The result must be wholesale flooding; and indeed great areas of land in central 'Iraq are below the high flood-level of the rivers. Secondly, the April flood season, when alone the river-levels have 'command' of riverain lands, begins too late to mature the spring grain crops, and ends before the ripening of the summer grains and vegetables. The basic requirements, therefore, were and are evidently five: protection against ruinous spring flooding: storage of flood water, for re-use in the low season: establishment of barrages to maintain river levels which will secure command by flow-canals at essential seasons: control of the canal-heads by regulators; and, finally, provision for main as well as local drainage, to prevent the otherwise inevitable and actually widespread salination.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

312 185 Although by 1900 these conditions were not unrealized either in Baghdad or Istanbul, they had not been formulated as connected problems for solution. Governmental activity in this sphere had consisted, at the caprice of Pashas, in no more than some measure of organization of petty local works. The Administration had in fact neither the knowledge nor control nor finance necessary to formulate or organize a comprehensive irrigation system. Heedless alike of present evils and of rich possibilities, the governors of 'Iraq were doing and planning nothing while irrigation in Egypt and India was making great and fruitful progress. Nor was the contribution of the public more promising; the shiftless tribal cultivators carried out with low efficiency such minimum of silt-clearance and flood-dyke repairs as was forced upon them, erected temporary canal-heads of reed-bundles or brushwood, multiplied their primeval devices of water-lift, wastefully prolonged or resited their canals, and ruined area after area with neglected salting.

An outstanding case of deterioration in irrigation conditions was occurring in these years on the middle Euphrates. Up to 1880 the Hilla branch had been maintained as the principal waterway, the Hindiya branch being a canal deriving from it. But the closing of the Saqlawiya head up-stream, and the operation of natural forces of silting and scouring, allowed the Hindiya branch to gain in width and discharge. The problem of maintaining the flow of the Hilla branch had become first critically difficult and finally impossible. French engineers in 1891 completed a masonry dam which still held precariously in 1900, but failed to arrest the increasing ruin of Hilla branch irrigation.

487 The ancient land routes of the territory had remained constant since many centuries. Camel caravans used the desert ways of Damascus and Aleppo, mule-trains the time-worn hill tracks into Luristan, Kirmanshah, Persian Kurdistan, and the Van wilaya.

491 Within 'Iraq the routes were fixed by custom based on convenience; but here there were signs of recent progress in the provision of wayside Khans, new toll-bridges of stone or brick or resting on fragile pontoons. The roads, varying by districts in surface and security, were everywhere unsurfaced and neglected, deep in summer dust or flooded to seas of mud by rain or the overflow of canals.

499 Railways had, for many years, been hailed from a distance by 'Iraqis of every class as the bringers of ease and progress, and schemes in plenty had been propounded—those of Chesney in the eighteen-thirties, of Andrew in the 'fifties, and later of the Austrian von Pressel, the Italian Tonetti, the Frenchman Cottard, the Russian Kapnist. A local company had been formed in the 'eighties to construct a Khaniqin–Baghdad line, which lack of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The 'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. Such was the territory which for four centuries the Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self-interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the important town families—and notably those of religious pretension—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khudhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee

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for Administrative Improvement set out in 1910 to overhaul the civil service, dismissed scores of officials, and was soon replaced by another body which reversed most of its decisions. The intrusion of political considerations into officialdom was redoubled after the revolution, and the domination of high officials by this or that faction of the local notables did not grow less. Missions of Inquiry from the capital, appearing in 'Iraq unannounced and with vague unwritten credentials, were unlikely to tackle basic problems. Nevertheless, some constructive steps were taken. The *Polis*—a specialized urban police force distinct from the *Zaptié*—were instituted early in the century. The gendarmerie were strengthened, their organization tightened, their old faults unmended. A school for Mudirs was established in 1912, the C.U.P. spirit being shown in the uniforms and drill parades forced upon these civil officials; the Mudirs would have preferred what they rarely obtained, the regular payment of their salaries. New regulations were issued governing land revenue, though the scandals of auctioned tithes and corrupt assessment continued. The Pious Requests administration was overhauled. Income tax (Tamattu') was introduced, in a simple form little damaging to the upper classes. An urban property tax made its appearance amid storms of protest. Census procedure was revised to make possible the new military service regulations, which were applicable since 1909 to Christians, Jews, and some of the exempted classes. The headquarters of the Hilla sanjaq was moved to Diwaniya; 'Ana qadhā was transferred from Baghdad wilaya to Dayr al-Zur. The three municipalities of Baghdad city were for a time united. The painful maladministrations of the Customs Department were not improved, though the rates of duty rose, by agreement of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent. in 1906, and to 14 in 1914. Courts of Appeal were established at wilaya headquarters, and on the eve of the war a dozen Qadhis selected for dismissal. The Baghdad Law School was founded in 1909. The vast Saniya properties reverted to State ownership on the fall of 'Abd al-Ḥamid, but their separate and superior administration continued to exist.

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The army, as ill-equipped, dispersed, and overworked as ever up to 1909, did not escape the invasion of politics in all ranks after the revolution. The Firman of July 1912, forbidding politics in the Army, had little effect; but the personalities of respected generals contrived to keep a semblance of discipline. The Army's endless tasks of tribal punishment remained far beyond its powers; it could not be active in all the districts all the time. The efforts of Nadhim Pasha and his successors did indeed result in some new barracks, military hospitals, improved transport, smarter uniforms, more modern arms. The Baghdad 'Abakhana (military clothing

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

personal followers were unpunishable. Three *causes célèbres* of the period should be mentioned. The first was the murder in Mosul of Shaykh Sa'id Barzinji of Sulaymaniya on the first day of 1909. It was an act of defiant violence against a figure of the greatest eminence; and the aftermath of the murder convulsed the Sanjaq of Sulaymaniya. The second case was the murder of Farid Beg, General and ex-Mutaṣarrif of the Muntafiq, in Baṣra bazaar in June 1913. The third was the murder of Aḥmad Bey, Commandant of Gendarmerie in Baghdad, in August 1913.

In the urban services there was fitful progress. New buildings of some pretension appeared towards South Gate in Baghdad, in the outskirts of Karbalā and Mosul, at the 'Ashar suburb of Baṣra. The Tigris-side towns, and some of the Kurdish, developed fast. Kirkuk and Arbil doubled in size from 1890 to 1914. Ḥalabja under its Jāf dynasty was further embellished. Military hospitals and a very few municipal dispensaries made their appearance. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias was opened in 1910, a new building for the C.M.S. in Baghdad was completed in 1913, while their Mosul hospital shut and reopened seasonally. But medical arrangements in general remained primitive, quarantine was still largely a bribe-extracting farce, and no efforts were made seriously to combat disease or malnutrition. Street lighting improved, hotels appeared in the larger towns under Armenian or Chaldean enterprise, a cinema was opened in Baghdad in 1911.

Cross-river steam-ferries, public gardens, wider streets, a zoo, improved steel bridges, tramways, electric lighting—all these had their place in the plans of incoming Walis and Mutaṣarrifs, and in fact some success in municipal improvement—in streets, gardens, offices, and amenities—emerged from this period, though the schemes even of a Nadhim Pasha remained nine-tenths abortive. The Kufa–Najf tramway was completed during this period. A company was formed in London in 1912 by a leading Baghdadi, Maḥmud Shahbandar, for electric tramways and lighting.

In trade and commerce there was some advance. The staple exports of the territory still varied annually according to the harvest and the level of inland security. The quantities of dates, grain, seeds, gall-nuts, gums, animals and animal products, and the transit items from Persia showed slight increases. The tonnage and value of imports had been more than doubled since 1900. The increase reflected largely the needs of railway construction, partly the increased use of irrigation and other machinery and paraffin, partly a perceptibly rising standard of urban life with its greater demands for cotton cloth, sugar, tea, and matches. The moderate inroads of Russia and Germany into the 'Iraq markets are elsewhere mentioned. The great bulk of import and export trade was

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and progressively deteriorated. The river now adopted its Hindiya channel to an extent of nine-tenths, leaving desolation at Ḥilla, Diwaniya, and Daghara. Government organized repair works, but without adequate funds or energy, and the greater efforts made under M. Cugnin in early 1909 proved unavailing. The Euphrates irrigation position remained menacing or disastrous.

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But help was, after all, at hand. The veteran irrigation engineer of Egypt, Sir William Willcocks, had studied the problems of 'Iraq water-control from 1902 onwards, and had submitted proposals to Istanbul through the British Ambassador. Late in 1908 he was appointed Consultant for 'Iraq irrigation, reached Baghdad in December and toured and studied with boundless energy, resolution, and intolerance, while the Mesopotamia Irrigation Survey pursued its work. By 1910 he had solved his problems. From the proposals in his report, most of which still held the field almost intact forty years later, there emerged the necessity for immediate large-scale works. To prevent flooding he demanded regulated flood escapes at key points, with strong embankments and the closing of existing breaches. The Euphrates escape would be at or near Ramadi, into Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Abu Dibis depression. The Tigris escape would be from the Samarrā area through miles of high ground into the Tharthar depression, unless the cost of so vast a scheme proved prohibitive. To raise low-season water-levels and provide reliable supplies to the off-taking canals, a barrage would be erected near Balad above Baghdad, and another at Kut al-Amara to restore the irrigable Gharraf (Ḥai) lands. The ancient Nahrwan canal was, by one of alternative methods, to be restored, and the waters of the Diyalā—and some of the Tigris—to be poured into it. The lower Euphrates swamps would be reclaimed by re-forming the main channels and by providing for flood escape. A barrage at Qarmat 'Ali would give controlled irrigation in Baṣra area. Large-scale drainage would be provided throughout the country by utilizing existing depressions, Tigris navigation would be safeguarded by controlling the great flood channels of the 'Amara district, the Buṭayra, Chahla, Majr Kabir, and Musharra.

Of this programme, grandiose and costly by any standards, criticism was not lacking on the grounds of deficient finances, tribal insecurity, lack of man-power, and chronic Turkish maladministration. But it was boldly adopted by the Turkish Government, with preference for the Hindiya Barrage as the first step. Willcocks witnessed from 1909 to 1911 the failure of further stop-gap attempts to repair the existing barrage, and was soon to experience his first taste of the greatest of all his problems—that of obtaining funds from the Turkish Government. Nevertheless

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312 work on the new Barrage began. Tenders for the complete con-
185 struction were called for in September 1910, and the contract
653 awarded to the British firm of Sir John Jackson & Co.

The construction of the Barrage, then and now one of the greatest works in 'Iraq, was carried out with extraordinary speed by a staff which included Turks, Indians, Armenians, and some 3,500 'Iraqis. The suspicion of certain elements in Turkish officialdom usually turned to gratified encouragement after a personal visit to Hindiya. Labour troubles were few. Transport, especially that on the Euphrates routes from Basra, presented extreme difficulties, with tribal blackmail and navigational obstacles: and the continual struggles needed to obtain funds from an empty Treasury in Istanbul and a harassed Daftardar in Baghdad were successful only after actual stoppage of the work seemed inevitable. The iron gates arrived in the late summer of 1913, and a crowded and triumphant ceremonial opening of the whole work was held in November of that year. Although the Barrage, which had cost less than £500,000, still lacked the canalization which it was designed to support downstream, it conferred immediately enormous benefits on the countryside which it served. These would have been a hundredfold greater if they could have included public security, an equitable land system, and some hope of new agricultural methods.

Elsewhere in 'Iraq, much of the earth-work of the Habbaniya Escape in its first phase was completed, and digging of the Saqlawiya Canal was begun but abandoned. Further surveys produced information of great future value, though no other major enterprise belongs to this period. A scheme for watering the Hawija, north-west of Kirkuk, from the Lesser Zab was begun without study and ended in fiasco and scandal. More important, and prophetic of a major development of the future, was the growing riverside use of oil engines for irrigation purposes. These increased from a mere dozen in 1900 to some scores in 1914. Meanwhile, flood-bank protection annually renewed followed its unsure and expensive course, rarely effective and always burdensome. The 'bunds' built by Nadhim Pasha for the safeguarding of Baghdad, though they failed partially in their first year, were an important work.

433 These last years of Turkish rule were marked by little industrial development. Some increase in local shipbuilding and the use of irrigation pumps, ice machines, wool and liquorice-presses called for the first time for mechanical repair facilities. The first motor-
494 car appeared in 'Iraq in 1908 from Aleppo; by 1914 less than a dozen were in use. These included a motor-bus service on the Ba'quba road, and the private cars of a few notables. Efforts to mechanize the Kufa tramway had failed.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

642 619 distant, hated, interfering bugbear and, to the shaykhs, the enemy whose every advance must be at the cost of their power and livelihood. This was no less true among the Kurds, who, hating the Turks, were unlikely to welcome the substitution of Arabs as rulers; indeed, a national consciousness of their own had already come, feebly, to birth. And on the Euphrates the theocratic Shi'i priesthood were likely under any régime to maintain their own pretensions, incompatible as these were with any secular Government. Nevertheless, the tendency of the period prior to 1914 642 had been on the whole towards extension of the authority of 185 Government, a proces likely or certain to continue under the newer-fashioned post-1909 Administration: for this, tactless and over-centralizing, was nevertheless more vital and more modern-minded than any previous Ottoman Government. Its administrative record even in the excessively embarrassed period of 1908 to 1914 contained creditable features: better attention was being paid to education, health services, town planning; the gendarmerie had been improved, town police perfected, the Army reorganized, the judicial system in part revised. And the international agreements of 1913 and 1914 between Turkey, Great Britain, and Germany seemed to clear away many obstacles to development.

In the latter field, indeed, there was room for fair hopes. Though many problems were untackled—those of improved agriculture, use of water resources, land tenure—yet a notable beginning had been made with irrigation works, and the Baghdad Railway was at last, it seemed, to be completed. River navigation was likely to be improved under the 1913 arrangements. The eventual opening up of productive areas and markets would encourage trade and agriculture, and perhaps create industry. A concession for the oil of Baghdad and Mosul wilayas had been promised, and that to parties well able to develop that wealth, if it existed.

000 Thus a prudent observer of 'Iraq in the midsummer of 1914 might have prophesied a future of increasing development of resources and communications. These, directed by a vigorous Government free at last from international strife, might have produced by degrees the wealth necessary to maintain stronger forces, to impose security, to pay an improving civil service, to remedy, in fact, the more glaring evils of the Administration. Society would almost inevitably progress towards higher standards. The movement of local nationalism was likely to gain further ground in the direction of a privileged, even an autonomous, status in the Empire; but a complete secession of the Arab provinces was unlikely because it was backed neither by any military force, nor by any especial sympathy of Europe such as the Balkan Christians had enjoyed, nor by any unity of aim among the Arabs.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) Mill Iraq Mill

kept him from trespassing into Ḥalabja and other 'Iraq-administered districts, and drove him frequently into Persia. He failed to secure the co-operation of the Jaf, was not uniformly successful in robbing their migratory sections, and desperately lacked funds to maintain his supporters. In Rawanduz area there was now no direct Turkish activity, and the cleavage in the Pishdar was ended by a reconciliation in favour of Babakr Aghā. On the northern frontier the significant feature of the period, apart from the Commission's visit and the immigration of Christians expelled from Turkey, was the influx of Kurdish refugees from the areas in which the Kurdish rebellion, headed by Shaykh Sa'id the Naqshbandi in February 1925 and at first widely successful, had led to firm or fierce Turkish reprisals. Escaping parties were led into 'Iraq by a son of Sayid 'Abd al-Qadir of Neri, and by a son and a brother of Shaykh Sa'id himself. These refugees were settled in 'Iraq territory in places remote from the frontier. In early 1926 further large bodies of trans-frontier Kurds sought refuge in Mosul wilaya. They included numbers of the Miran under Na'if Bey in February, who were settled in their own winter grazing area on the Tigris, and 7,000 of the Goyan in April. These were followed by a thousand Christians from the Tur 'Abdin area, and later by nearly 10,000, it was said, of the Artushi pouring into 'Amadiya area under the pressure of Turkish forces which had defeated and evicted them. The problem posed to the 'Iraq authorities by these unwanted and nearly destitute folk, whom the Turks refused to re-admit, was seriously embarrassing.

In general, the outlook at this period for the Kurdish area of 'Iraq seemed favourable. They were unaffected by the uprising and repression in Turkish Kurdistan. Normal administration of an elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish liwās, save in a small Persian-frontier area of Sulaymaniya. Reasonable allowance was being made, with a good grace, for Kurdish susceptibilities in matters of language, law, procedure, schools, and the appointment of officials. Hundreds of Kurds were serving the 'Iraq State in civil and military posts at every level. Every corner of their own countryside had been penetrated by the disciplined forces—Army, Levies, Police—of the Government. Roads had been built or improved and were patrolled, telegraphs were extended, the tobacco trade encouraged and organized. Municipal government was progressing, security was general. Kurds sat in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate, and in the Cabinet. Their complete integration in the 'Iraq State seemed a not impossible hope.

The often-debated Assyrian question was by the spring of 1926 still far from settlement to their satisfaction, but it had at least passed for ever out of one phase, that of attempted repatriation to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Dulaym, and the southern Desert. At Police headquarters, control of the specialized departments of criminal and 'special' investigation, of finger-prints, passports, and training passed in these years from British into 'Iraqi hands. The Police strength, less than 3,000 early in 1921, was to exceed 8,000 ten years later: during the same period British police officers were reduced from twenty-two to twelve, 'Iraqi officers increased from two to sixty. Great progress was made in the Department of Civil Jails where, under all-'Iraqi management after 1923, prison industries were developed.

The urban life of 'Iraq, which in these years was taking its modern form and showing its differences of scene and atmosphere from those of the Turkish era, was sadly hampered in its development by poverty. This limited the activities both of the municipalities and of those central Government departments whose work was chiefly urban. Nevertheless, the upkeep and cleanness, the lighting and watering of streets, the maintenance of municipal offices and institutions, and the honesty and energy of Baladiya staffs, all showed a pronounced improvement on Turkish standards. The wearing of the characteristic 'Iraqi urban head-dress—the *sidara*, which superseded the Turkish fez—became universal in the towns. European dress, impeccable in 'Iraqi upper-class and professional circles, was adopted by more and more townsmen and by many tribal leaders who frequented the capital. Mosul was transformed, with its new streets, bridge, water-supply, public buildings, and gardens. Basra, extended threefold by the legacy of war-time port and base development, and now uniting the suburbs of 'Ashar, Ma'qil, and Makina, boasted new bridges, improved streets, 'Iraq's finest hospital (the Maude Memorial), and new buildings domestic and commercial. Baghdad, whose municipality ranked as a separate province in the Government hierarchy under the Amin al-'Asima (Guardian of the Capital), could show new buildings—the imposing College of Al al-Bayt, the Royal Pavilion, the Maude statue, and others. It possessed a modern fire service, hotels of Western type, adequate shops including some European, an improved water-supply system, branches of three banks—the Eastern, Ottoman, and Imperial Bank of Persia—scores of agencies for European goods, clubs both British and 'Iraqi, municipal dispensaries, a municipal Court. Its streets, however unplanned and still unpaved, were well lighted, crowded with wheeled traffic, and attempting wider alignment and cleaner upkeep; the adaptation of the old Tramway Concession of 1912 was still under debate. In the smaller municipalities, inadequate as were their resources compared with their requirements as now conceived, there were signs of new life in completed or initiated schemes of electric lighting, street clearance, bridges, town gardens, and a host of minor projects for which local pride was clamoring.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

jects for which local pride was clamouring. Municipal administration was restored to the Turkish pattern of an elected Council and a nominated Mayor, but with the abolition of many of the old abuses and sinecures. As modern and exact cadastral town plans were prepared for all towns and many villages, largely based on specialized air photography, property rights were better established, with good effect on urban enterprise.

Educational and medical services were well conceived, and showed substantial advance on Turkish levels. They felt their way haltingly from the capital and cities to the villages, but were cramped as ever by shortage of funds and of trained teachers and practitioners. Over educational policy there was conflict of views between those, including A. L. F. Smith the British adviser, who felt that teaching must above all be sound and based on moral values, and those to whom more and more schools, however staffed and with whatever standards, were the panacea for backwardness. If it remained, indeed, a generation later, a reproach of the 'Iraqi intelligentsia against the British that too little was done during this decade for education, the defence must be that there could be small value in mass-produced literacy, even if money, buildings, equipment, and teachers had been available, which they were not. Meanwhile the Education Ministry was the first to be by 1923 all-'Iraqi in executive authority. Government primary schools multiplied from less than 100 to more than 200. Graduations from the few secondary schools, in the three cities, began in 1924. Evening classes were formed for the training of secondary-school teachers—the first phase of the later Higher Training College. Primary-school Teachers' Training Colleges were maintained in Baghdad for men and separately for women: in the former some students were specially trained for teaching in rural schools, but to a standard later found inadequate. There was as yet no girls' secondary education, other than private. Government boys' secondary schools were few; post-primary technical schools existed at Baghdad and Mosul only. An American secondary school for boys was opened, under Dr. Colin Staudt, in 1921, another for girls in 1925, both in Baghdad; the former, like Van Ess's school at Basra, was an enterprise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the latter of the United Mission of Mesopotamia. The College of Al al-Bayt, to which the King was devoted and for which the Awqaf Ministry found funds, offered a course only in Islamic theology. The Law School flourished. The immense archaeological wealth of 'Iraq was not neglected. Excavation was carried out in 1922 and later by British and American learned bodies at Ur, at Kish, and at Tirkalan near Kirkuk. The finds of the German excavations at Babylon were distributed. The Baghdad Museum,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

1. TREATY DEADLOCK

THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds; it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations. Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished. Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function, and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased, with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League. With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts. Its communications by land and air to foreign lands developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Meanwhile, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved, though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

goods from the trans-'Iraq route to Muhammara and the new Persian port of Bandar Shahpur all contributed to lessen the long-profitable transit trade, whose sentence of extinction could not, it seemed, be long delayed unless the Mediterranean route across Syria could be developed; and of this there were hopeful signs.

Banking continued in the hands of local *ṣarrafs* and the three British Banks: the Ottoman, Eastern, and Imperial Bank of Persia. The adoption of the decimal system was officially proclaimed in 1931, though twenty years later the *ḥuqqa*, the *taghar*, the *mann*, and the *dhira'* were still widely in use. Wholesale and retail trade followed familiar channels, with British firms predominating in the foreign element; 30 per cent. of the country's imports were of United Kingdom origin, though neither in this nor in any commercial operation did the Mandatary claim advantage over competitors. Imported goods found favour less by quality than by cheapness; this allowed Japanese competition for the first time to intrude, especially in cheap silk and cotton textiles. Woollen goods and steel came from Belgium, sugar from Holland, vehicles from America, wood from Scandinavia and Rumania, rice and tea from India, and most of the rest, notably cotton textiles, pumps and machinery, from Great Britain. The exports, as ever, were of dates, grain, hides and skins, wool, intestines, liquorice, and live animals. These at lowered prices held their own satisfactorily during the period of depression. Monetary conditions in Europe led, after 1930, to export of gold from 'Iraq, giving a temporary stimulus to its economy.

Until the hard times of 1929 to 1932, which they survived creditably, municipal development and the public services were expanding. A Municipal Law of 1929 superseded the Turkish regulations, municipal revenues were overhauled, and the hundred townships of every size and degree pursued their work of street improvement, bridge building, and provision of gardens, electric power plants, and sometimes officials' houses. In the major towns a period of rapid suburban development began, absorbing capital used hitherto in the transit trade. A 'New Baghdad' was planned on the right bank of the Tigris. The concession given in 1912 for electric power was amended and confirmed, after years of negotiation, in favour of the Baghdad Power and Light Company, and a new power-house came into operation; the tramway project was abandoned. Tolerable hotels appeared in the three cities and in Kirkuk, supplemented by Railway rest-houses at smaller towns. The technique of brick-making, the methods in the building industry, the types of modern dwelling-house, domestic equipment, the scale and resources of the shops: all these advanced incomparably beyond Ottoman standards. European dress was

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

operation under Tainsh was uneasy, but in practice tolerable; the transfer of ownership to a Railway Corporation of Anglo-'Iraqi membership was, as with the Port of Baṣra, provided in the 1930 Treaty. The service and maintenance of the 750 miles of line were hampered by abiding financial stringency due normally to road competition and the uncertainty of the pilgrim traffic, and abnormally to flood interruptions such as those of 1926 and 1930 and to the stagnation of trade in 1929–32. Two lines of railway development were followed, both of international interest: the first was the provision in 1930 of a link by motor convoy between Kirkuk and the Turkish railway at Nisibin, making possible direct bookings from Baṣra to Europe: the second was the prosecution in 1930–1 of the survey for a Baghdad–Haifa line—a project widely supported but destined, twenty years later, to be still as far from realization.

'Iraq's fortune was that of many contemporary nations in the rapid development of its air routes. A weekly mail service Baṣra–Baghdad–Cairo was inaugurated early in 1927, to be followed two years later by the England–'Iraq–India service of Imperial Airways. In the same year a first civil airport was ceded by the R.A.F., and the (German) Junkers Company initiated, but failed to sustain, a Baghdad–Teheran service. Soon afterwards aircraft of the (French) Air Union or Air France appeared, and those of the Royal Dutch (K.L.M.) line; 'Iraq's central position for air communications—the 'Clapham Junction' rôle asserted for it by Mr. Churchill in 1921—was fast revealing itself. A modern-equipped airport immediately outside Baghdad begun in 1931 was completed in two years, and civil landing-grounds were in use also at Baṣra, Ur, Ruṭba, and elsewhere.

The effect of the trans-desert route and the increasing east–west air services on postal communications was profound. Both were used as they came into being for letters, the former also for packages; communications with Europe and India were revolutionized. In 1929 'Iraq joined the International Postal Union. With the constant spread of the telegraph and trunk telephone network within 'Iraq went the increasing use of wireless. The Baṣra station already communicated directly with Europe; those of Ruṭba and Baghdad were ancillary to it.

If the uplifting of 'Iraqi standards of life could be assisted indirectly by these improvements, it must be sought more directly in the development of its old and some new resources. The efforts of the public and Government were active in this direction. No minerals, other than petroleum, were located. The Government salt monopoly could do no more than maintain itself. A gold concession granted in 1931 for the mid-desert Qa'ara Depression, near

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

185 654 135 433 Ruṭba, led to no discoveries. An experiment in the export of bitumen to India was short lived. Nor could industrial development proceed far, though it had its place in the programme of every Cabinet and in 1929 was encouraged by indulgent legislation in its favour. 'Iraqi capital, exploitable raw materials, a class of skilled artisans and local purchasing power: these were all lacking. The Government's Industrial Exhibition at Baghdad in 1932 had little to show. There had been local development of electric power and mechanized brick-making. Two ginneries, one British one 'Iraqi, stood ready for cotton that was slow to appear. Two wool mills dealt with the inferior local fleeces, small cigarette factories had transformed smokers' taste, a soap works and a tannery were indifferently successful. A cement factory was long projected, and in 1932 a concession was granted to Yasin Pasha and partners. To utilize 'Iraq's surplus products plans were made for a shoe factory, a fruit-canning plant, and date-sugar production. But the total of these could do little to solve the country's problems.

382 471 With the petroleum industry it was otherwise. Though oil export could not commence until late in 1934, it was established in 1927 that 'Iraq was to take its place among the world's great oil territories. The Turkish Petroleum Company's drilling campaign, inaugurated by the King with due ceremony in April of that year, was early rewarded by an oil strike of exceptional abundance at Baba Gurgur close to Kirkuk on 27 October; and while drilling at many locations proceeded with varying success, the dimensions and behaviour of the Kirkuk structure were confirmed by later tests as those of an oilfield of the very highest class, whatever others 'Iraq might prove to contain. The four years following were devoted, on the one hand, to preparing the Kirkuk field for production by drilling and scientific observation, and by the provision of necessary services—production installations, tankage, workshops, housing, and amenities—and on the other, to negotiating with Government for an extension of the period permitted for plot-choosing under the 1925 Convention, since much of northern 'Iraq had meanwhile been inaccessible to exploration: or, alternatively, for a recasting of that agreement itself. These negotiations ended with an agreement of March 1931 whereunder the Company (renamed 'Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929) renounced all its territory west of Tigris and south of latitude 33 but, within the retained area (which was the whole of north-eastern 'Iraq), could exploit not only chosen and limited plots but the whole territory. The Company promised to construct by 1935 pipelines to the Mediterranean of at least 3 million tons capacity, bifurcating at the Euphrates towards Haifa and Tripoli, and to pay annual lump sums of £400,000 (gold) a year to Government, pending production and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

182 563 795 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and outstanding differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tures; and the introduction of these, with the gradual rescue of agriculture from primitive method and low yield, was a certain feature of the future. 'Iraq's irrigation problems—flood-protection, conservation of dry-season water, distribution, drainage—had been partly solved at least on paper, and more than one important scheme was formulated in readiness for execution; smaller works had been carried out, others were imminent. The complex problem of stultifying and perverse forms of land tenure had been unravelled, the way was open for clearance and rebuilding, and Settlement Committees were already in the field. Mineral wealth had been sought—but found wanting, save in the vastly important presence of a single asset, petroleum. The development of this had begun well, its potentialities were unlimited, and its contribution to 'Iraq's finances could already be foreseen as essential to all its hopes. Industry, willingly fostered, had indeed lagged behind for lack of raw materials, markets, and aptitudes, but could be expected to find a modestly increasing place in 'Iraqi economy. Trade was at the level, and on the lines, indicated by tradition and by present needs, and had well survived a world-wide depression. The means of communication of every type had immensely developed in the last half-generation, and would certainly be improved to meet the needs of an expanding economy and social and international needs. At least the elements of well-conceived public services already existed, and if funds permitted would gradually increase the social area of their activity.

This security and these beneficent developments and social services had called and would call firstly for a reasonably efficient and comprehensive Administration, and secondly, for a sound and benevolent authority in the State itself, with a political life based on stable foundations. As to the first, the Administration which existed in 1932, while imperfect and in places rudimentary, not only was far superior to its Turkish predecessor, but seemed likely with time to shed the features which at present depressed it below the level of which the best 'Iraqi officials—keen, intelligent, honourable—were certainly capable. As to the second, the main bases of public life and legislation, there is more to be said.

'Iraq had adopted, as its form of government, representative parliamentary democracy. The choice could be criticized; but there had been no alternative. 'Iraq was no Najd, with full consent to a patriarchal tyranny: and no Persia or Turkey, which could throw up an efficient military dictator. It had as its only guide a political class which claimed to be liberal, wished to go on where the revolution of 1908 had left off, and was scornful of earlier forms; nor did it contain a personality capable of single rule, or a group capable of acceptable oligarchy. Neither to the British,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and his entourage, further corrupted by greater power, lost the respect of the better elements by their drunkenness and arrogance. His marriage to a Viennese dancing girl was frowned upon. His part in the murder of Dhiyā' Yunis, ex-Secretary of the Council of Ministers and friend of the exiled Yasin Pasha, was everywhere believed, and not less his directing hand in an assault made on a veteran Arab patriot and fighter (but critic of Bakr) Mawlud Pasha Mukhlis. The death in Damascus of Yasin himself in June 1937 rallied popular feeling to the side of this strong and sincere half-sinister, half-charming personality, whose services his country had so ill requited. The suicide of Ja'far Pasha's brother, the death of other friends simultaneously with that of Yasin, and the murder of a Baghdad notable, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Sinawi by a Kurd whom Bakr protected, led to grim jests at the General's expense.

The impatient demands for Army expansion were financially embarrassing to the Government, and much unwise spending, accompanied by the raising of funds 'for the forces' by public subscription, did not make them more popular with the political public. All officers concerned in the coup d'état of October 1936 were indemnified under a law of April 1937; but the sycophantic suggestion to erect a statue to Bakr Ṣidqi, as Hero of the Revolution, was not adopted. The conscription machinery still worked largely amiss, though against less resistance; and most units were below strength. Relations with the British Military Mission were for a time uncordial. The provision by Great Britain of armaments and equipment raised questions of particular difficulty; the time coincided with large-scale rearmament in the United Kingdom, and many 'Iraqi demands for guns, aircraft, and equipment remained, to their angry impatience, unsatisfied. This failure, exploited by the adroit propaganda of Herr Grobba, the German Minister, and on a passing visit by Dr. Schacht himself, was in pointed contrast to the flattering offers of German and Czech arms manufacturers, and led to the placing of 'Iraqi orders for armaments with the Krupp and Skoda Companies and elsewhere, and for aircraft—of types wholly unsuitable—with Italian suppliers. Some of the material so ordered was delivered; the rest, to a value of some £500,000, was countermanded when the Ministry fell.

It was not for the Army alone that funds were needed; Ḥikmat's ambition was to signalize his 'revolution' by the initiation of the important works so long projected—roads, buildings, the railway extension, and completion of the Kut Barrage. Messrs. Baring Bros., again approached, could offer £3 million on favourable terms, and Parliament in the spring of 1937 authorized this borrowing. The 'Iraq Petroleum Company, however, whose royalties were the proffered security, declined on principle to pay

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies, by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking. The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi *sidara* in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

British Government on the terms of transfer of railway ownership, as intended in the Treaty, were prolonged from 1932 to 1936. In the latter year agreement was reached; the railway as a going concern became the property of the 'Iraq Government for a payment of less than £500,000. Management was for twenty years to be the responsibility of a joint Board with 'Iraqi majority, and with British executives remaining in a few key posts. The transfer on these terms was ratified by Parliament in July 1936, not without some minority outcry; and one more controversy was laid to rest. The long-advocated project of a Baghdad–Haifa railway was, for the foreseeable future, rejected in the same year. But development northwards had become rather a certainty than a project when late in 1934 the French authorities extended the (Turkish) Aleppo–Nisibin line across the Syrian 'Bec de canard' to the 'Iraq frontier at Tall Kochek. Only the single gap Bayji–Mosul–Tall Kochek, all in 'Iraq, now remained in a complete Baṣra–Baghdad–Istanbul system—the old dream of the Bagdadbahn. The decision to construct the missing section at a cost of some £2 million was taken by the Government in November 1936; and the orders placed forthwith in Great Britain for material compelled the 'Iraq Treasury to incur its first foreign loan (p. 254). Earth-work began, the northern section being given priority amid the eager interest of the Mosulawis, the Shammar, and the frontier qaḍhās.

Air communications developed fast. British, French, and Dutch trans-continental lines crossed and served 'Iraq with increasing frequency of aircraft, linking the Far East, India, and 'Iraq itself to the Levant and Europe. Modern airports with full equipment came into being at Baghdad and Baṣra, and British flying-boats after 1937 used also Lake Ḥabbaniya and the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab. A French line offered a shuttle connexion between Baghdad and Damascus, and Misr Airways a Baghdad–Cairo service. Interested Baghdadis formed an Aeroplane Society in 1936. Civil aviation was in 1935, surprisingly, transferred to the control of the Ministry of Defence. The simultaneous development of telegraphs by land line and wireless to the Levant capitals and Cairo, with public services from Baghdad and Baṣra to Riyadh, Beirut, Palestine, and Egypt—and through them to the United Kingdom—placed and kept 'Iraq in the world network of telecommunications. Broadcasting from Baghdad made its first appearance, but was up to 1937 still experimental and occasional.

Good progress was made during these five years in the all-important sphere of land settlement. The three Committees set up under the legislation which followed the Dowson Report worked excellently, and a fourth was added for the Kirkuk area in 1933 and others later. The settlement carried out by these Committees and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

by their many successors in later years was criticized by some as too favourable to the shaykhs and half-absentee urban land-developers, and unjust to the actual cultivators. It was true, indeed, that thousands of these remained legally landless and as dependent as ever; that many shaykhs, whose agricultural functions had been always limited and ill performed, became the registered owners of personal heritable '*lazma* rights' of considerable areas: and that town-dwelling pump-land exploiters were over-rewarded, by similar grants, for their enterprise. The criticism is not baseless, but has been commonly exaggerated. The Committees created no rights; they recorded what rights they found to exist. Their members were officials of 'intelligentsia' type with no shaykhly sympathies (but rather the reverse), and they sought genuinely among the cultivating workers on the land for '*lazma* right' candidates who could produce valid claim to some years of continuous past occupancy or revenue-paying; in tens of thousands of cases they found and recognized them; and only in the absence of such claims were rights registered in the name of the shaykh and his family.

No title was ever assigned to an absentee shaykh, though the residence of some of the grantees might be intermittent and not on the precise lands concerned. Of the rich townsman who obtained title to broad acres, it was just to recall that, spending capital and accepting the grim risks of 'Iraqi agriculture and an uneasy partnership, he had developed lands hitherto desolate and could perform, as the single cultivator lacking wealth, knowledge, and authority could not, the functions of landlordship in organization, capitalization, and improvement. In northern 'Iraq, small-holding was the rule and was defined and stabilized by the settlement; in central 'Iraq, though the new security of tenure and the lessening of boundary squabbles did not wholly comfort the laborious, underprivileged, ever-indebted fallah, whose personal lot was little improved, they removed a large part of the adverse background of shifting rightless chaotic land tenure which had long afflicted 'Iraqi agriculture. The indignation of Abu al-Timman's group under the Ṣidqi régime at the remaining inequalities led to the suspension of *lazma* grants; but the procedure under the original law was soon restored. Meanwhile Government pursued schemes to construct model villages, good in conception but at present trifling in results; and the settlement of nomads was attempted on the Abu Ghurayb and Ḥawija canals.

Agriculture proceeded on its ancient lines, but with an increasing official consciousness of its inadequacy. The bad preparation, the dirt in and adulteration of produce were still the despair of merchants, as were the archaic and wasteful methods, inferior crop

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

241 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The
473 Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. A Com-
[656] mittee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

241 Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the
312 prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new
[45] element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped
[185] thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first
312 stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates
653 left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

185 The Ministry of Social Affairs, inspired by Dr. Sami Shawkat
657 on the orthodox lines of Axis philosophy, pressed for a higher birth-rate and legislated for the encouragement of lower dowries and earlier marriages. It urged the fuller development of trade unionism, and for the first time enforced the law which restricted certain trades (p. 246) to 'Iraqis. A bill was introduced to compel landowners in successive zones to build cottages for their cultiva-
172 tors. The Department of Antiquities, with Seton Lloyd as its Adviser from 1939, conducted excavations at Samarrā and at Jabal Sinjar in 1939, and at the site of Wasiṭ in 1939–41; a German expedition dug at Warqa also in 1939.

648* In politics the movement, from the early summer of 1940 onwards, was from doubt towards decision, from a pretended unity towards evident faction. As the war of inaction in Europe gave place to a series of German successes, with the collapse of France and the entry of Italy, many 'Iraqis could see in adhesion to Great Britain little but self-condemnation to the losing side. The Army leaders, pro-Axis by temperament and by absorbed propaganda, saw no case for hesitation; in every Anglophobe old rancours found anew the support of logic and of national interest; and the prudent or uneasy of most political colourings admitted the value of at least a tacit reinsurance with the probable victors. The failure of final efforts in the summer of 1940 to wring from the British some reassurance over Palestine, or some hopeful countenance to the 'liberation' of Syria, was exploited by the Mufti and his many friends. Syrian ministers visiting Baghdad late in the year—Jamil Mardam Bey, Sa'dullah Jabri, and Luṭfi Haffar—were fêted with enthusiasm as partners in the struggle against imperialism. Diplomatic relations with Denmark had been dutifully broken off when it was overrun by Hitler; but with Italy, whose Legation in Baghdad was now the centre of Axis activity, no breach was enforced when Mussolini entered the war on 10 June, and the British Ambassador's remonstrances went unheeded; the few Italians interned were soon liberated and returned to Italy. Nuri's influence failed on this and similar issues to carry the Cabinet with him, and one minister, Amin Zaki, resigned. The tone of the press passed from dubious neutrality to overt favour of the Axis, rather encouraged than restrained by the Prime Minister. Later in the year the difficulty or indeed impossibility found by Great Britain in supplying military equipment to 'Iraq, and her reluctance to provide dollars to buy arms for an ally so half-hearted, led to angry resentment in 'Iraq officialdom and the Army, and to the dispatch of an 'Iraqi purchasing mission to the United States.

The joint visit to Ankara of Nuri Sa'id and Naji Shawkat late in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important practical results could be expected from this move, which at best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse, did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship. Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements, the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and grain supplies provided.

Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of office to the Amin al-'Asima. The Health services continued to develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had served the country and their science now for twenty years, still played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls, and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

even the basic validity—of the oil concessions was a usual move of politicians in opposition.

In the greatest of 'Iraq's industries, that of agriculture, the war was a period of unusual activity, stimulated by the need to produce and by high prices. Agricultural machinery, thanks to lend-lease supplies, was seen almost for the first time in the northern liwās and those of Baghdad and Kut; in 1945 some scores of tractors, mechanical ploughs, cultivators, and combines were in operation, with great effect on 'Iraqi conceptions of agricultural possibilities. Projects for ambitious modern farming took shape among the educated and the owners of capital; a College of Agriculture had been founded in 1941; and a law was passed in 1944 authorizing the establishment of agricultural Co-operative Societies. But none of these measures prevented the increasing drift of countrymen in their hundreds or thousands towards the towns, where war-time employment was plentiful. In the field of land settlement, the committees, which had worked steadily and in increased numbers since 1933, were wisely kept at their all-important tasks throughout the war. Only minor attention was given as yet to southern 'Iraq, and little to Mosul, Arbil, Dulaym, Diwaniya, or Karbalā liwās; but much was done in the dispute-ridden agricultural lands of Kirkuk, Baghdad, Hilla, and Diyalā, where good progress was made with definition of land categories, the mapping of boundaries, and the recording of individual registrations over areas which now approached a million acres. Much was heard of plans both for model villages and for the allotment of small-holdings of Government land to single families—a sign that the evils of peasant insecurity, poverty, and lack of incentive were now fully realized. On the Dujayla Canal, dependent on the Kut barrage, work under a special law started in 1945 on a practical settlement of families on sixty-acre State-owned plots, with the incentive of free title to be gained after ten years of work; and meanwhile village institutions and amenities—school, farm offices, nurseries, dispensaries, and a co-operative store—were provided by the Directorate. The Dujayla Scheme was full of promise; it started with eighty carefully-chosen families, later to be multiplied tenfold, and it aroused keen competition for admission.

'Iraq's security after 1941 allowed its vital Irrigation services to continue their canal maintenance and flood protection, their studies and planning, though the intended major projects could not at present be initiated. The work interrupted in 1941 on the Habbaniya–Abu Dibis outlet was completed by 1943, and the intake-channel from the river (begun under Willcocks) and the return-channel to it, were redesigned but not yet undertaken. Pump irrigation was fully maintained.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

channels of international trade were under frequent exploration at 'Iraqi or foreign initiative; during 1945–50 approaches were made by Italian, Yugoslav, Czech, Spanish, Pakistani, and Japanese governmental or commercial bodies. The Persian transit trade by way of Khaniqin persisted, but on no scale comparable with that of a generation earlier and with small hope of increase; and both Persia and Turkey used routes through 'Iraq for the export of small quantities of their goods. The general aspect of 'Iraq's foreign trade was thus, at the end of 1950, on a scale which must seem paradoxically humble in quantity and value for the country's size and potentialities. It reflected the continuing precariousness and backwardness of its agriculture, the slightness of its industry, and the lack of marketable natural resources other than oil. But the new age of accelerated development which could be expected to date from 1951 would not, it was certain, fail to affect and increase both its production and its absorptive power.

Foreign and 'Iraqi Banks, and the *ṣarrafs*, whose numbers the exodus of Jews had diminished, offered the normal services to trade in the provision of credit and discounting of bills. Insurance facilities were given by branches or agents of many British companies, and an all-'Iraqi Insurance Company was in 1950 a project designed on patriotic lines to 'diminish economic dependence' on the world abroad. The currency issued and managed by the National Bank since July 1949 remained that of the 'Iraqi dinar based on sterling, to which bloc the country belonged—but not without a movement or outcry, favoured by some economists and patriots, to secede from it.

Agriculture must remain ever the country's chief resource, and was still the life's occupation of more than two-thirds of its people. Previous pages have referred to the essential problems of 'Iraqi farming and shown that, for all the efforts of a small department to solve them, little had so far been done to modify the country-wide ancient practices, ignorances, deficiencies, and dangers. But there were, by the mid-century, many hopeful signs. The problems were understood; the social as well as the economic importance of a prosperous countryside, and its connexion with security and with politics, were appreciated. Modern agriculture had attracted the interest and efforts of a part of the educated and capital-owning public; there were even those who preferred it to politics! Tribal shaykhs as well as town-dwelling landowners were found, here and there, to be mechanizing their holdings, abandoning ancient methods and, partnered with scientists, eagerly experimenting. New crop varieties were under trial, the power and range of pumping installations had multiplied, mechanization was diminishing dependence on the indifferent labour of crop-sharing peasants.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

241 The Laṭifiya was no longer the only large-scale modern estate in
• 185 operation. The Date Board, which had done much to modernize
473 and stabilize the production and marketing of dates—and not those of the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab only—had wisely retained the system of export monopoly, with suitable amendment of terms and prices, throughout the war and after it, but the three-year extension granted to Andrew Weir & Company in 1950 was likely to be the last; the National Date Trading Company founded in that year would probably assume the functions of the export monopolist. Of the Company's own shares, 49 per cent. were allotted to the Date Association, 26 to the public, and 25 to the foreign packers and exporters.

654 Government maintained a College of Agriculture with a three-
242 year course and main experimental estates at Abu Ghurayb (for
185 agronomy, animal husbandry, pests, and soils) and at Za'faraniya (for horticulture, fruit, and vegetables), with smaller stations at Bakrajo, Ḥawija, Nineveh, Aski Kellek, and Baṣra, a main forestry station at Arbil, and nurseries in every liwā. Its experts selected, tested, and issued new seed varieties designed for higher yield, quality, and resistance: combated pests, notably by locust campaigns in the technique of which 'Iraq claimed to lead the world: caused the erection of a grain silo at Baghdad, and proposed another and greater at Baṣra, with modern grain storage bins at many centres. The department was in touch with local industry which could use as raw materials 'Iraqi oil-seeds, cotton, dates, barley, beet, wool, and tobacco. It was planning large-scale experiments in estate-management, and seeking crop rotations which would diminish the use of a fallowing system now recognized as intolerably wasteful. It was encouraging the growth of rural co-operative societies under the 1944 law, increasing its departmental Inspectorate, and founding Chambers of Agriculture. It interested itself in rural education and established agricultural schools in every liwā. It was promoting village settlement, in which field the interesting and promising Dujayla smallholding community (p. 323) was extended and perfected, and the foundation of others in the Ḥawija and elsewhere was put in hand. The Development Board allotted in 1951 more than 4 million dinars for the provision, in six years, of artesian wells and drinking-water supplies. The mechanization of agriculture was fostered by a country-wide system of depots and repair shops, administered as a Government monopoly under a special law and a separate Directorate-General; indeed, all the importance of mechanization—even with its serious difficulties of proper maintenance and supply—was appreciated as part of a future 'Iraqi agriculture which with great new areas under controlled irrigation was likely to find not land or water but man-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

power as its chief limiting factor. Attention was being given to the increase and improvement of livestock, a major asset of the country; Ayrshire and Friesian bulls were imported and distributed, rams from a selected herd were sold to reliable farmers, laboratory work on wool was carried out. Yet other lines of progress were dairying, with experiments in cheese production, the breeding of improved mules and donkeys, the increase of egg production by improving poultry breeds. The allotment by the Development Board for the period 1951–6 was nearly 2 million dinars for agricultural research, 3½ million for small-scale reclamation schemes, 1¼ million for animal husbandry, and a million for swamp reclamation. The need for a measure of integration between animal husbandry and crop production, hitherto divorced, was realized, as well as the broad essential singleness of the effort which must be made in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, land settlement, rural education, and the provision of capital. It seemed certain as the nineteen-fifties opened that if this effort were made and sustained by public and Government, and in the absence of any general calamity, the prospects for agricultural development in this wide and favoured territory, within the ultimately fixed limits of its river-water and rainfall resources, exceeded those not only of any Middle Eastern country, but of any territory of comparable size elsewhere in the world; the growing of food for less fortunate nations could prove, indeed, to be the main part of 'Iraq's material contribution to humanity.

In the care of its forests not much had yet been accomplished beyond the limits of study, experiment, and the establishment of tree-nurseries; the wide but neglected forest areas (p. 29) of the north still lay untended and unimproved, lacking notably a modern forest code, a staff of trained foresters, and even detailed exploration. Some steps had indeed been taken to provide fire protection and to carry out by helicopter and air photography the first forest surveys, but few to prevent uncontrolled cutting, grazing, and trespass by the villagers. One million dinars were allotted by the Development Board for forestry development in 1951–6. The significance of these areas to soil erosion, silt deposit, and river flooding was understood, and plans were being prepared on these and allied matters; but only a beginning had been made to solve these problems or to move towards the large-scale action which must be involved, or to provide the 'Iraqi public with sources of fuel and timber at present lacking.

Although sea fishing, based on the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab, was but a limited resource, the rivers and swamps of the territory were the source of a fish catch estimated at many thousands of tons a year, and export of fish to the Levant—and in particular to the Jews in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Palestine—was common from 1932 until the mid-war period. It was probable that, with research and the establishment of a responsible authority not hitherto created, present production could be largely increased. Fishery development had in 1948 found its way into ministerial programmes; a trawler for use in the Shaṭṭ al-'Arab approaches was delivered in 1950, and a fish store was projected by the Agricultural Bank.

The history of 'Iraq's irrigation from 1946 to 1950 is one of rapid approach to, or even the partial realization of, prospects long desired and, through new-found wealth, by 1951 fully practicable. The call for heroic measures was the clearer since the disastrous floods of 1946 and 1948 and the acute grain shortage—in a territory of fabulous potential output!—in the latter year; and in 1946 the resources of the highly competent Irrigation Department were supplemented *ad hoc* by the appointment of a well-staffed Irrigation Commission under F. F. Haigh of the Indian Service of Engineers. Its object was to study and report on river control and irrigation, and to submit a programme. The Commission reported in June 1949.

The task of flood control and storage was to be carried out on the Euphrates by a completed and extended Ḥabbaniya–Abu Dibis project: on the Tigris, by the grandiose Wadi Tharthar project (in two stages), by the 'Gibraltar' dam on the Diyalā at its point of passage through the Jabal Ḥamrin, and by the Dukan dam on the Lesser Zab. These works, all pronounced practicable, would save 'Iraq from floods and would greatly increase its low-season resources. They would be accompanied by the development of irrigation in new areas by canals, headworks, barrages, and feeders on the middle Euphrates, the lesser Zab, the middle Tigris (in the areas commanded by the Ishaqi and Nahrwan canals), on the Diyalā river, and on the Gharraf and lower Tigris. Drainage was to be taken comprehensively in hand in both existing and projected irrigated areas, on lines which experiments made from 1940 to 1946 had shown to be practicable. Hydro-electric power was to be developed at the Samarrā headworks, the Wadi Tharthar outlet channel, and the Gibraltar and Dukan dams. Plans for the reclamation of the southern 'Iraqi swamps, and the re-formation of the lower Tigris, were suggested but not formulated. Of this gigantic programme, expected to cost some ID 90 million, about a quarter of the whole was to be undertaken immediately and finished within ten years: it would include the first part of the extended Ḥabbaniya and of the Wadi Tharthar schemes, the Gibraltar dam, drainage work, and the extension of existing irrigation in the Nahrwan and Gharraf areas and on the Euphrates. A large part of these plans was adopted by the Development

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Board[1] at its early meetings in 1951 and they were, with possible modifications, to form the basis of 'Iraq's future irrigation activity, whose full realization, however, must, for all the impatience of the public and the press, occupy not less than fifty years.

Works actually completed before the end of 1951 were the realigned Habbaniya inlet (Warrar channel) and the return outlet to the river (Sinn al-Dhibban channel), ensuring flood protection and making possible the use of stored flood water. The Wadi Tharthar inlet channel—a work of very great magnitude—was put to tender by the Development Board in 1951; the Samarrā barrage and headworks, and the greater Habbaniya scheme, were to follow later. Much detailed planning and designing remained to be done, even for the immediately following five years, before a programme, especially in lower 'Iraq—'Amara, Baṣra, and the Gharraf—could be established. The extent, however, to which the Willcocks plans of forty years earlier had stood all tests was indeed remarkable. Only the Faluja and Balad barrages (p. 63) had been abandoned, and development in the Baṣra–Hammar area might or might not in the end follow Willcocks's plans. The abiding problem of silt deposit appeared partly soluble, by improved headwork design and by mechanical clearance. Pump irrigation seemed by now to have reached its economic limit in much of the territory, but there was ample room for more intensive cultivation of the pump-lands.

The connexion of reasonable and stable forms of land tenure had long been recognized by Government in its land-settlement activity, and the latter had a creditable volume of achievement to show after eighteen years of sustained effort. Early criticism of the procedures adopted (p. 261) and the progress of the work itself throughout 'Iraq (p. 323) have been elsewhere described. Five more years' work since the end of the war had defined, delimited, and recorded the personal rights in other wide areas. The abiding problem of Muntafiq land rights had not yet been solved; in 'Amara an answer not very different from the *status quo*, but with longer-term security for the shaykhs and greater fragmentation was likely to be found. Elsewhere the hard case of the landless fallaḥ was little changed wherever he had been unable to establish a basis of title and, at the opposite extreme, the good fortune of

[1] The Board's six-year plan, legalized early in 1952, provided for year-by-year expenditure, from 1951–6 inclusive, on the Tharthar project, to a total of (in thousands of ID) 10,300: on the Habbaniya, 2,200: on the Diyalā dams and canalization, 6,750: on the Dukan dam, Ḥawija barrage, 'Udhaym barrage and canalization, 6,750: on the Bakhma dam, 8,700: on irrigation works in Mosul and Arbil liwās, 1,900: Tigris barrage and canalization, south of 'Udhaym mouth, 1,800: and main drainage, 4,100. New and re-formed canalization on the middle and lower Euphrates, lower Tigris and Gharraf, and Baṣra area were allotted 10,425.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Much progress had been made, under the care of a Hides Association, in the better treatment of local hides and skins, and well-tanned leather was produced. Boot and shoe manufacture, largely by electrically-operated machinery, had increased in scale and quality. The cement factory outside Bahgdad, using lime brought from near Ṭuz Khurmatu, came into important production in 1949 and was soon selling 250 tons a day. The three cotton ginneries erected before the war—one of them an Agricultural Bank enterprise at 'Aziziya—remained in being, with capacity to deal with much more than the available cotton crop. Printing presses, all small except one European-owned and that of the Government, remained substantially as before the war, save in their modernized equipment. The spinning and weaving industry, which in some cases also dyed and finished its fabrics, had by 1950 greatly increased its pre-war development and used in part local cotton; a factory in Mosul made also rayon cloth.

Other industrial projects more or less near to realization in 1950 were for rayon production from straw, for local production of fertilizers, and for sugar-refining. The treatment of tobacco leaf had been intensively studied, but remained defective. The industries likely, it was thought, to develop further, using 'Iraqi raw materials and diminishing the need for import, were those producing cement, soap, alcohol, vegetable oil, leather and shoes, cigarettes, beer, and textiles. The other industries would in all probability keep a lesser though perhaps a useful place; none was likely to produce a considerable surplus for export, unless, as some hoped, an industry could be founded to use, for fertilizers or otherwise, the abundant by-products of petroleum. The Development Board intended considerable expenditure on 'industrial and mining schemes' in the period 1951 to 1956, upon lines to be later revealed.

'Iraq's poverty in minerals other than petroleum seemed in part to have been corrected by the discovery, in the later forties, of interesting copper and copper pyrites deposits in the mountainous Qal'a Diza area, and by reports from the Government geologist of an outcrop of excellent marble near Rayat and supplies elsewhere of chromite, iron ore, magnesite. These, or some of them, were thought capable of commercial development. A hard limestone suitable for barrage building was sought and found. Local salt, gypsum, brick clay, Mosul building-stone, and cement-making materials were in use as before, and it was planned to renew the activity which during the war had produced up to 15,000 tons a year of Kifri 'coal'.

In spite of the imposed delays and frustrations of the war period, the position achieved in the petroleum industry by 1950 was such as to place 'Iraq in the forefront of oil-producing countries, with

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHl Iraq MHl.

An Inquiry

INTO

LAND TENURE AND RELATED QUESTIONS

PART I.—SCOPE AND PROCEDURE OF INQUIRY

185 1. The considerations which led Government to ask me to visit el 'Iraq in the winter-spring season 1929-30 were briefly summarised at the time. The necessity of setting up a sound system of settlement and registration of rights to land as an essential preliminary to agricultural development was urged. It was represented that until effective measures to achieve these ends had been devised and put into operation, agricultural development must either be delayed or based on unstable foundations. It was emphasised that while the country was full of agricultural possibilities and only required development on sound lines, it lacked the necessary basis of a sound system of land registration. And it was explained that the Departments of Revenue, of Land Registration and of State Domains were pursuing reform without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan.

The main objective was the promotion of agricultural development. The particular needs were adjudged to be (i) the execution of a settlement of rights to land throughout the country, (ii) the establishment of an efficient system of book-keeping of those rights, and (iii) the unification of divergent and disconnected Departmental efforts. I was asked to study the problem as a whole and to advise how it should be attacked. As outlined that problem appeared to be essentially one of organisation and procedure for attaining two accepted objectives: a just settlement, and an efficient register, of rights to land. I anticipated that the requisite information regarding existing conditions would be readily available: and I expected that the discussions of previous years would have produced clearly defined issues. But I had not allowed for the peculiar fluidity and diversity of methods of land tenure practised.

423 427 It proved to be common knowledge that the tenure of some four-fifths of the cultivated land in the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in any methodical way at all. It was also common knowledge that the land law was defective and uncertain in its application to the other fifth. And it soon appeared that there was an almost complete lack of precise, authoritative and systematic information in the Headquarter Offices of Government in regard to land conditions generally and to the methods of holding, transferring and transmitting land actually practised from day to day by the great mass of landholders and agricultural peasantry throughout all parts of the country.

121 It therefore became necessary to extend the scope of my inquiry to include an investigation of the conditions of land tenure actually operating throughout the country, as distinct (for the most part) from those

12 enshrined in the Statute Books of Government. And since the taxation imposed on agricultural production is one of the most important practical conditions attaching to the utilisation of land, a study of such taxation had to enter into the inquiry. Nor could any investigation of conditions of landholding in el 'Iraq be intelligible or real which did not pay careful regard to the methods of irrigation, public and private, the prevalent forms and standards of cultivation, the distribution and remuneration of agricultural labour. It was not of course possible within the period of a few months to cover this vast field of investigation as thoroughly and completely as the occasion demanded: but owing to the widespread and generous collaboration aroused, the results provide an adequate basis for immediately useful measures.

121 185 This general study of existing conditions had to precede consideration of the three objectives originally indicated, if Government was to be sure of its ground and to be provided with a trustworthy foundation for progressively constructive reform. For settlement of rights to land pre-supposes and requires some stable bases of land law, or at least of legalised custom, on which such rights can be founded. And so far, by common admission, such bases rarely exist, nor do the discussions of previous years appear to have advanced agreement as to the remedy. Again although an efficient Land Register is indispensable in due course, both for the operation of the statutorily registered tenures, and for any orderly regulation of the enormous residue of (so-called) State Domain, yet the execution of a settlement of rights to land must precede the establishment of such a Register. For an effective Land Register is nothing but an intelligible and dependable record. Its function is simply to mirror clearly and faithfully rights to land existing at any and every moment. It is useless to devote money and effort to rectifying and burnishing the mirror, so long as it will only have an unintelligible tangle to reflect. Attention must first be directed to unravelling the tangle.

185 Further, while it is certainly true that no united effort had been made, and no connected plan pursued, by the three public services mentioned, yet it will be recognised that, as subordinate Departments of three separate Ministries, they were not in a position themselves to adopt any general scheme of reform. This is clearly the responsibility of Government as a whole. And, as will appear later, if any well-concerted and effective measures are to be undertaken, the better co-operation and co-ordination of the efforts of these services will not be enough.

423 2. The lack of a well-documented collection of information about existing conditions of land tenure throughout the country was not on consideration surprising, having regard to the vicissitudes of modern el 'Iraq's short history. There must have been an enormous amount of spade work to be done in establishing orderly government throughout the country during the last ten years: and the current needs of administration no doubt completely absorbed the time and energies of those who might otherwise have undertaken a systematic collection of trustworthy information. The collection of such information, particularly in statistical form, is apt to be a slow development in any country. It requires time, a scientific appreciation of the value of exact data, and the resources of a well-established and experienced public service. And in connection with land it requires a more comprehensive and far-sighted outlook than a number of disunited Departments can reasonably be expected to produce.

423 184 The collection of a representative volume of trustworthy information was also attended by peculiar difficulty, owing to the extreme diversity of conditions prevailing throughout the country. This diversity

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

is partly the outcome of historic causes and has partly been generated by differing local conditions and ethnic origins. Under Ottoman administration present-day el 'Iraq comprised the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, each somewhat jealously watching, and watched from, the capital. This separatism was accentuated by divergent economic orientations. Mosul looked primarily northwards; Baghdad to Persia and the bordering desert; Basra to the sea. And superimposed on the traditional differences between the ancient vilayets were the more varied and more stubborn ones arising from differing natural conditions. Local social influences combined with these varying conditions to produce different practices, as well as to promote different policies, in different districts.

The general absence of reliable information was nevertheless baffling. For although principles are useful guides, and illuminating discussions can be based on generalities, which may or may not be true, a more dependable foundation is needed before measures of constructive reform can be confidently embarked upon.

8. My first care was to seek copies of all important previous papers dealing with the land problems of the country. Naturally many were unobtainable, while others were rare or fragmentary; but a number of those that remained call for gratitude and acknowledgment from a later worker in the same field. Several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlined measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape.

A fresh impetus seems to have been given to the consideration of reform by an extremely able "Note on Land and Revenue Policy" written by Mr. S. H. Longrigg, late Inspector General of Revenue, in May 1926. A series of most interesting and instructive discussions followed. But the writers commonly recognise the unavoidably academic nature of many of these discussions and the need to subject proposals to experimental trial, owing to the absence of adequate information of existing conditions. It is greatly to be regretted that such trials were not made. Measures of reform consequently continued to be confined to paper debates. This sterile result was ascribed to the lack of a formal acceptance and pronouncement by Government of its intended policy. Actually the fewer pronouncements of abstract policy that are made the better for the prospects of useful reform. The failure to do anything appears in fact to have been primarily due to the lack of a competent executive service charged with the study and conduct of such reform.

4. Even if there had been full and exact information available at the Headquarter Offices of Government, it would have been desirable that I should visit each province (Liwa) and get in touch with its conditions on the spot. The general lack of such information made it imperative to secure some expression of the great volume of local knowledge and experience of the actual operation of land tenure and its incidentals from day to day, that was dispersed throughout the country.

The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the

161 162 worthy information was available as to the rural population, their main occupations (e.g. cultivation with type of crops, stock-keeping, fishing, reed cutting, the numbers of the sedentary, semi-nomadic and truly nomadic population, etc.). The figures need not be closely accurate, but they should necessarily be sufficiently reliable relative approximations to allow dependable deductions to be drawn from them. But although continuous and painstaking efforts were made to satisfy this need by the liwa authorities, it has to be admitted that no basis exists for arriving at figures that can be utilised with any confidence. Table II contains the best estimates that the liwa authorities were able to furnish; and the Census Department was not in a position to give me any better material. I include the table, because it at least represents the best local opinion of the position under the various heads cited. It should perhaps be

TABLE II. APPROXIMATE POPULATION, 1930

Expressed in thousands

Liwa	Total estimated population	Three principal towns	Nomadic tribal sections	Rural Population			Mean Density per sq. kilom. cultivated region
				Settled	Tribal	Total	
Mosul ..	320	79	45	176	20	196	22
Arbil ..	108	—	3	47	56	103	15
Sulimani ..	94	—	15	51	28	79	37
Kirkuk ..	160	—	19	63	78	141	13
Diyala ..	340	—	1	79	160	239	67
Baghdad ..	368	219	2	93	74	167	98
Dulaim ..	147	—	59	39	49	88	95
Karbala ..	90	—	2	83	5	88	136
Hilla ..	103	—	—	30	73	103	21
Kut ..	170	—	—	60	110	170	30
Diwaniya ..	238	—	58	79	101	180	40
Muntafiq ..	340	—	20	25	295	320	72
Amara ..	238	—	—	36	202	238	36
Basra ..	190	46	10	34	100	134	264
Totals ..	2,834	344	234	895	1,351	2,246	35*

*Mean density total 78,000 sq. km. cultivated region.

noted more particularly that it was found impossible to separate in any systematic way those engaged in urban, from those engaged in rural, pursuits. Finally, only the populations of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul were excluded from the latter. This explains the misleading density figure for the Karbala Liwa. It should also be noted that the figures given for the agricultural population include all those engaged in rural occupations, other than genuine nomads.

So far as the figures can be accepted the mean density of the rural population per square kilometre of the cultivated region works out at about 19 in the four liwas of the Rainfall Zone, and at about 35 in the five most typical liwas of the Irrigation Zone. These figures are very low, especially for the potentially fertile irrigable lands of the latter; but there is no reason to think that they err on this side. However, it will be appreciated that dependable statistics of the agricultural population are needed to enable development of the country to be pursued to the greatest advantage and with the greatest economy.

166 185 The extreme mobility of the majority of the population, especially throughout the Irrigation Zone, is an important factor in the consideration of development schemes of all sorts, having regard to the general sparsity of the population and the limited resources of the country. If work can be concentrated on such schemes in a few of the most suitable areas, and facilities can be given to the population to colonise them as opportunity and occasion justify, much more rapid and satisfactory results will be obtained for the same effort and expenditure in a given

time, than if attempts have to be made to carry out development in a scattered and incomplete manner throughout the whole country at once.

4. Land Revenue Returns

4. It was my original intention to devote one part of this report entirely to a study of land revenue questions. For although in some respects a matter for independent consideration, the effect upon all tenures of land of the burden of any land revenue demand (whether in cash or kind) and the methods by which it is imposed, is profound. But since I left el 'Iraq a drastic change in the land revenue system has been enacted.* It will clearly not be helpful to comment on land revenue methods that have been superseded. And I understand that the new laws are of a specifically provisional nature and that their imperfections are realised, so that it seems of equally little use to comment on them. But although no useful purpose seems likely to be served by the discussion of the displaced land revenue system now, the three accompany-

* Law for the collection of Istihlak (Consumption) Tax. No. 83 of 1931. Law for the collection of Land Rent. No. 85 of 1931.

TABLE III. ANNUAL COLLECTIONS OF LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

In lakhs of rupees

Year	Summer Crops	Winter Crops	Dates	Vegetables	Other fruits	Tobacco	Miscellaneous	Totals
1923	34·20	44·75	16·73	9·62		1·30	2·24	108·84
1924	34·15	47·24	19·34	6·09	2·33	3·70	0·02	112·87
1925	46·13	69·20	22·79	6·03	2·44	1·96	0·04	148·59
1926	42·16	59·94	18·25	5·38	2·47	2·67	0·02	130·89
1927	39·32	59·07	21·60	4·70	3·46	2·98	0·01	131·14
1928	40·94	59·92	23·30	4·63	3·76	2·91	0·04	135·50
1929	87·77		18·92	3·66	3·11	1·87	0·07	115·42
Totals	273·22	391·57	140·93	36·63	21·07	17·39	2·44	883·25
Averages	39·04	55·94	20·13	5·23	3·01	2·48	0·35	126·18

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE LAND REVENUE, 1923-9

Under forms of assessment prescribed by Law 40 of 1920

Crops	Average receipts 1923-9		Percentage distribution under various forms of assessment prescribed									
	In lakhs of rupees	Per cent. of total	By unit of area Art. 6	Estimation Art. 9	Rope measurement Art. 10	Tree counting Art. 11	By plough units Art. 12	At market centres Art. 14	At Customs and Excise Offices Art. 15	By unit of lift Art. 17	Lease by auction Art. 20	Three, four, or five-year agreements Art. 21
Summer crops	39·04	30·6	6·1*	8·5	7·7§	—	—	—	—	4·6	0·6	3·1
Winter crops	55·94	45·9	6·4	12·4	2·3	—	9·2	—	—	6·9	0·5	8·2
Dates ..	20·13	15·3	9·2†	0·3	—	5·8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vegetables	5·23	3·8	1·2‡	—	—	—	—	2·3	—	0·3	—	—
Other fruits	3·01	2·3	0·1	0·1	—	1·6	—	0·1	—	—	—	0·4
Tobacco ..	2·48	1·9	—	—	—	—	—	—	1·9	—	—	—
Miscellaneous	0·35	0·2	—	—	—	—	—	—	0·2	—	—	—
Totals ..	126·18	100·0	23·0	21·3	10·0	7·4	9·2	2·4	2·1	11·8	1·1	11·7

This table is intended to illustrate the operation of Law 40, applied during an average year under conditions existing in 1929. Actually estimation was principally resorted to before 1926, the various new methods of assessment having been increasingly used subsequently.

* Largely Amara rice, Baghdad and Kut summer crops and rice included in Basra jarib tax.
† Basra jarib tax.
‡ 1930 figures, previously under Art. 14.
§ Mostly Diwaniya rice.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

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2. The introduction of the Ottoman Land Code, and more particularly of tapu tenure, by Midhat Pasha about 1870, was a serious attempt at land reform in el 'Iraq which failed through no want of perseverance or sincerity of purpose. It failed for two reasons, either of which would have been decisive. It was foredoomed to fail, as it failed generally throughout the Ottoman dominions, because the administrative experience and machinery, the technical knowledge and the qualified staff needed to accomplish so formidable a task were lacking. It was also foredoomed to fail because it attempted prematurely to cast in a rigid (and an alien) mould the fluid practices of a still preponderantly primitive society. Land reform cannot be imposed on a country as an exotic by any outside agency. To be successful it must be suited to local needs, conform to local ideas and conditions and be established gradually by Government and people together. Essential preliminaries to success were a sympathetic adaptation of the Code to meet these requirements and a sympathetic initial investigation and stabilisation of existing occupancy and other customary rights. Moreover the construction and maintenance of a reliable Land register would have been indispensable. These were not the only essentials of success, but they are those that chiefly concern us here. Probably none of them were sufficiently understood at the time. Certainly none of them were satisfied. While the causes of the failure must be analysed if a repetition of these old errors is to be avoided in a modern and better managed effort now, they must be recognised to have been not unusual ones at the time. And although the Ottoman Land Code has never been properly assimilated or generally applied in el 'Iraq, yet it has gradually affected both local concepts and local practice deeply. It would therefore in my opinion be an error resembling that originally made, to abandon this Code now for an entirely strange one as Turkey herself has done. The old Ottoman Land Code is no longer an entirely foreign code and it can be more readily and more closely adapted to local needs than any new importation. It unquestionably requires to be drastically mended, but it certainly should not be ended.

3-5. Registered Tenure

3. Outside of the towns and certain garden reaches the private ownership of land (mulk) is rare in the country. As already noted true waqf land can only be constituted from mulk and is correspondingly limited, while untrue waqf is restricted to a dedication of some financial interest in the land affected. There is little differentiation in the Sacred law between movables and immovables held as private property (mulk). But an Ottoman law of 28 Rajab 1291 (September, 1874) required that the latter (including trees and buildings on miri land) should all be registered and forbade the unregistered ownership of such property subsequently. A certain amount of mulk immovable property is registered in el 'Iraq, but the compulsory registration of such property has never been practicable or systematically attempted.

Land reserved for public or communal use (matruka) is not registered as such. It constitutes a small fraction of the whole and, as noted earlier, the distinction between such land and ordinary State Domain is rarely recognised.

With the relatively minor exceptions mentioned the whole land surface of the country—cultivated land, pasture, waste, forest, mountain, desert, steppe, marsh—is in law State Domain of one or other of the two categories (miri or mewat) laid down in the Ottoman Land Code. The legal ownership (raqaba) of all this land is vested in the State; but, as noted, subject to certain important conditions its usufructuary possession (tesaruf) may be granted out on a permanent, heritable,

2: Dowson G-5/ (1929-30) 1932 MHl Iraq MHl

Government Department, certainly beyond the power of the organisation and resources so far devoted to the purpose. 423 427

This is not to say that no systematic efforts have been made to put the tenure of miri land on to a more secure and orderly basis. Many such efforts have been made throughout the country by Provincial Officers, the Irrigation Department, the Survey and others. Foremost among them must be mentioned the periodic revenue settlements in Amara, which not only defined the limits of the various tribal interests there, but have also tended to stabilise many lesser holdings. A valuable fiscal survey of a large part of the Basra Date Gardens has been done. A business-like survey, allotment and record of land accompanied the construction of the Yusefiya, and other canals: and pains have been taken to keep these records up to date. In the Dulaim liwa a careful list of all the holders of recognised parcels of land has been compiled and subsequent changes noted. Other instances could be given. Naturally, all the resulting compilations have serious imperfections regarded as permanent records of the rights admitted to miri land: but this was not usually their primary purpose and such imperfections were inevitable in the conditions under which the investigations had to be made. And whatever the imperfections of such undertakings may be, they deserve grateful recognition and they should materially facilitate further stabilisation of tenure. 427 185

But it must none the less be admitted that these were all detached uncorrelated efforts owing no inspiration to any concerted attempt of the Central Government to improve the position of the mass of holders of miri land. Broadly speaking, those who occupy and cultivate miri land are allowed to do so in the absence of more influential opposition. Possession is ordinarily nine points of the law: but neither long possession nor any other mode of acquisition confers security. Personal influence with the most effective arbiter is commonly the decisive factor at any moment in any particular land dispute: and anyone may find the most convincing claims set aside. Moreover, any dispute may be reopened at any time if circumstances promise a more favourable consideration of a disappointed party's case.

Having regard to the history of the land, the widespread acceptance of tribal rather than individual rights, and the extensive and ill-defined areas affected, this state of affairs is not really remarkable: but it none the less calls for recognition and progressive remedy.

5-7. Pump Development of the Riverain Tracts

5. As is well known there has been a rapid and extensive development of irrigation by privately owned pumps during the last ten years throughout the high level tracts bordering the main waterways (see Plates I and II). As is also well known, the confident expectations of an early and profitable return on the considerable sums sunk in this development have been largely disappointed. 312

Persevering efforts have been made to obtain consistent and comprehensive statistics of the numbers of pumps erected, of the horse power of those pumps and of the areas irrigable by them: but owing to the records having been differently dealt with at different times and in the various liwas and departments concerned, it has not been found possible to do so. Although this is disappointing, in view of the interest and importance of this development, it is not surprising. And I have none the less been enabled to illustrate the rapidity and extent of the

312 movement in Table VI clearly, if not as completely and as accurately as I hoped to do. Although the figures given are incomplete and inexact in places they can be relied upon in the aggregate to furnish a trustworthy general picture of events. It will be seen that whereas in 1921 there were probably something like 140 pumps averaging about 11 horse power installed almost exclusively in the Baghdad and Amara Liwas, in 1929 there were over 2,000 pumps averaging from 25-30 horse power extending along all the principal waterways of the country. On the estimated basis of 50 *misharas* * per horse power the area irrigable by the former was about 200, by the latter about 7,400 square kilometres. According to Table I the total area of the riverain tracts affected is over 10,000 square kilometres; but only a fraction of this can be annually cultivated. The data are crude and the results must be regarded merely as rough approximations: but they indicate the wonderful extension of private [439] pump irrigation that has taken place during the last ten years. It is also interesting to note that the importation of pumps for irrigation purposes during the ten years 1920 to 1929 were 28, 110, 42, 18, 157, 157, 288, 288, 468 and 570 respectively, or a total of 2,006.

It is my duty in this report to consider this development primarily from the point of view of land tenure and in that connection to make some criticisms about the methods of land acquisition adopted that appear obvious enough now. Seriously as I think these errrors have jeopardised the success of many of the pump undertakings, this should not be allowed to obscure the beneficial character of the general effort made, the valuable safeguard against famine that it provided, and the [166] powerful incentive to settle on the land that it created. And if the movement had not unfortunately coincided with the severest economic depression that the civilised world has encountered, the effects of the initial mistakes made would have been less prompt and less serious.

241 464 465 439 6. The general failure of a development from which so much was hoped, is ascribed jointly and severally to a number of causes. Among these may be mentioned (*a*) the absence of a suitable paying summer crop, (*b*) the shortage and indisciplined character of available labour, (*c*) the prevalence of the share system of payment for labour and the consequent dislike felt by agricultural workers for crops that cannot be shared on the field in kind, (*d*) the lack of competent and dependable local agents and mechanics, (*e*) the poor and dirty quality of much of the produce and the consequently poor reputation of Iraqi agricultural commodities in the world's markets, (*f*) the defects of internal and the costs of external transport, (*g*) the general economic depression of the world and the glut of the world's markets with grain.

●185 The question is such an important one, not only from the point of view of those who have sunk money and effort in these enterprises but also owing to its effect upon the prosperity and well-being of the whole country, that the Government for a long time have sought remedies in special legislative proposals designed to remove some of the difficulties mentioned. Among the objects more particularly aimed at may be instanced: the enforcement of the cultivation of a certain proportion of money crops (e.g. cotton), the binding of labour more closely to the soil, and the better regulation and more effective use of such labour. The power of legislation to bring about these and other improvements in the economic conditions of this extensive agricultural development, appears to me to be over-rated and the dangers of restrictive legislation operating adversely to be insufficiently realised.

312 Most of the causes enumerated earlier have probably exerted a

* A misharu is reckoned = 2,500 sq. metres.

423 ephemerally the unceasing stream of disputes concerning or arising out
427 of the possession and use of land.

The confusion of land tenure throughout the country generally is not confined to one category of land. While it may be more general in the case of miri land, it is also common in the case of tapu land. The long-standing and bitter disputes in the Muntafiq area regarding land claimed to be held by tapu sanad are the most notorious, but far from the only, illustration of this. Similar uncertainties are common throughout the country, in regard to land claimed in tapu tenure, to land and trees claimed to be mulk possessions, and to land dedicated, or claimed to have been dedicated, under the various forms of waqf.

185 The execution of an effective reform of land tenure throughout el 'Iraq is a formidable undertaking and one which under the most favourable conditions is bound to take a great many years to complete. It is easy enough to draft bills designed to bring about academic reforms and to get these passed into law: but it is a very difficult matter to ensure that such enactments are beneficial and workable in sober practice and, even more difficult to ensure their steady, intelligent and impartial application over the long term of years that must intervene between the introduction and the accomplishment throughout the whole country of the thorough-going reforms that are needed. But serious as the difficulties to be encountered are, they will yield, as they have done elsewhere, to intelligent, sincere and persevering attack.

185 2. The late State Domains Department warmly espoused and stead-
423 fastly advocated the implementation of the original attempt of the Ottoman administration to grant out all cultivated miri land on tapu tenure. This policy was loosely and, I venture to think, misleadingly termed the alienation of miri land. For alienation denotes an estrangement of legal ownership whereas such ownership (el raqaba) is specifically reserved to the State under tapu tenure. The correction has more than legal significance; because the expression "alienation of State land" connoted, both to the Department itself and to the public, the adoption of a new, a beneficial, and a feasible policy of distributing land hitherto held by the State to private, and for the most part to peasant, proprietors. Tapu tenure, as already noted, was expressly intended in the country of its origin to promote a body of industrious peasant proprietors and taxpayers.

423 In sober fact the overwhelming majority of the cultivated holdings,
427 classified as miri in el 'Iraq, has for generations been in the hands of the people. Its possession is sufficiently subject to local or central interference to cause great individual insecurity of tenure, and all the evils resulting therefrom, as we have noticed. But while the legal ownership of the State is indisputable, its exercise of such ownership is, for the most part ineffective, uncertain and spasmodic. This is inevitable under existing conditions and is bound to remain so until they have been remedied.

The reform attempted by the Turks, and advocated again by the State Domains Department, was not, therefore, in any real sense, a substitution of private for public ownership of land. It was essentially no more than the legal regularisation in a prescribed form of the already widely existing private or communal holding of miri land. Some such reconciliation of actual with lawful tenure of miri land is indispensable if general security of tenure is to be established at all: and the greatest sympathy must be felt with the desire to effect this reconciliation through the medium of an established statutory tenure.

423 for public purposes (e.g. as public waterways, railways, roads) which
427 should be formally reserved forthwith as public utility areas.

It thus appears, on a most cursory examination, that there is a large, a pressing, and a complicated programme of practical reform waiting to be done in the existing legal categories of mulk, tapu and matruka (or manafa' umumiya) land alone. The complementary task of establishing the overwhelming balance of miri land on a securer and economically sounder basis is even more formidable. This balance, it will be remembered, includes the riverain tracts, the settlement of whose complex problems is probably the most imperative agrarian question of all.

●185 The conclusion is inevitable that if any effective reform of existing land tenure is to be established at all throughout the country as a whole within the life-time of the present generation, it must be initiated and maintained on the simplest lines that will satisfy the bare essentials of equitable settlement of existing claims, of substantial security of subsequent tenure, and of even and economical taxation. Simplification of the land law and of the practical working of all tenures; simplification of the procedure of cadastral survey, of settlement and record of rights; simplification of fiscal assessment and collection, must be given the utmost possible consideration throughout.

4. It will be easier to see what simplifications of tapu tenure are desirable and justly possible when the existing provisions of that tenure have been analysed as applied or applicable in el 'Iraq to-day (see vii, 1). But from the point of view of the national interest the necessity of securing a fair and proper valuation of tapu acquisition payments (e.g. tapu mithl or bedl mithl) on all initial grants in this tenure is probably the most important. The enormous territories of miri land now existing constitute the principal capital of the nation and any transfer of rights over such land to individuals should be accompanied by equivalent advantages to the public purse. Timely provision against excessive shareholding, and for the nomination of authorised representatives when there are more than two or three shareholders, should also not be overlooked.

But since the vast majority of the cultivated land in el 'Iraq is miri, the necessity for the general simplification just emphasised applies with greatest force to this category of land. In general the simplest, the quickest and probably the only feasible method of placing the tenure of miri land on to a more satisfactory basis, is to accept to the utmost possible extent the present simple concepts and practices and to concentrate upon making their application more systematic, more equitable and more sure. It is evident that for many years to come at least, the tenure of the great mass of miri land throughout the country must be regulated locally, if it is to be governed by law at all. It is always possible for the central Government to intervene in particular cases here and there: but in the overwhelming majority of cases the questions that arise from day to day must continue to be decided on the spot by the people among themselves, or by the authority of a local public officer (e.g. mudir el nahiya) who is familiar with both the people and the land concerned. Consequently any tenure that is to be operative in practice must be understood by, and commend itself to, the judgment of the mass of actual landholders, social leaders and provincial authorities. Simple principles and simple procedure thus understood and accepted can be made to provide the foundation for an attainable reform which, modest though it may be, is preferable to the pursuit of more theoretically perfect tenures, which will inevitably sleep in the statute books because neither people, nor effective authority, nor conditions are ripe for their application. But desirable as it is to put the land tenure as rapidly as

possible on to a firm and complete basis of law and of fuller economic freedom everywhere, it has to be recognised that the process must be gradual, particularly in the remoter and more backward parts of the country. 185

Some measure of discretionary control will require to be exercised in regard to the persons accepted as lawful holders of miri land, for two reasons. In the first place, so long as there are tribal areas (dira) which must continue to be recognised, it may be necessary to restrict the holding of miri land within those areas to members of the tribal group concerned. In the second place holdings of miri land are not transmissible on death, and this would be inconsistent with that tenure as outlined. So that on the death of a miri holder a suitable successor has to be agreed upon. As we have seen the claims of the deceased holder's family to such succession are commonly admitted by prevailing custom. This is unquestionably in the public interest, provided the recognised representatives of the family are willing and able to discharge their obligations as miri holders to the community and the State. But it is necessary for the secure and economical working of miri, as of tapu tenure, that the number of representatives of a group of holders of a parcel of miri land shall be limited. In my provisional report I suggested that the number should not exceed three. In the case of holdings below a certain size (e.g. 10 misharas) limitation to a single recognised representative or holder might be advisable. 423 185 428

Such recognised representatives or holders should be in actual control of the land on the spot and thus effectively responsible for its cultivation and management. He or they should preferably be chosen by the deceased holder's family (or the group concerned) with the assistance, if necessary, of the local authority. Commonly he or they would have taken a leading part in the cultivation and management of the holding previously. The responsibility of a recognised holder of miri land to his family must primarily be a matter between himself and that family, as it is now. Complaints of abuse could always, also as now, be brought before the local authority, and possibly in future in certain cases before the *qadi*. Again, when the size and productivity of a miri holding permits it could, if desired, be divided on the death of a previous holder. No mortgage direct or indirect of miri land is reconcilable with the tenure as outlined, nor (for reasons given above) does this appear to me desirable (v, 2). Possibly some restriction should also be exercised over the pledging of produce and of agricultural animals and implements. 423 185

In the interests of the nation and the agricultural community as a whole, it is essential to recognise in a practical way, from the first, the economic limitation set on both the fragmentation of holdings and the multiplication of shareholding. The capacity of a parcel of land to provide a livelihood is necessarily restricted, and those who actually develop and work on it, with their immediate households, must evidently have the first call on its production. Moreover, unless there is a surplus of profit to put back into the land the general advance in the standard of agriculture, which is so greatly needed, will be retarded, if not prevented. Security of tenure is one of the primary conditions of such an advance. But security of tenure must be coupled with a wide-spread and general opportunity to make agriculture provide more than a bare and narrow livelihood for the greater mass of the population engaged in it, if any sustained national advance is to be realised. Owing to the sparsity and mobility of the country's existing population and to the backward state of its agricultural development there should be no difficulty for very many years in preventing any uneconomical congestion of the agricultural community on the land. But excessive shareholding

already occurs in more intensive holdings (e.g. gardens) and in house property.

5. When considering the position in the riverain tracts, in my provisional report I suggested (iii, 24) that the simplest and the most appropriate means of regularising the holding of miri land was by standard leasehold agreements in accordance with prevailing theory and partially prevailing practice. It never appears to be contested, even by the most firmly entrenched holders of miri land, that the ownership of such land belongs to the State. Nor is it contended that this ownership is titular. But while the effective ownership of the State is recognised, it is claimed that this ownership does not carry the right to evict at will well-established holders from their holdings of miri land. Subject to good behaviour, to maintaining cultivation, to payment to Government of its revenue contribution, and to the satisfactory discharge of certain public duties, such holders of miri land claim a right of undisturbed possession, which in principle is universally admitted.

There will probably be no difficulty in formulating the main rights and obligations of miri holders in standard terms, if and when Government decide to maintain and systematise miri tenure. But within the main framework of this tenure considerable elasticity would have to be allowed for supplementary or even exceptional provisions required to meet varieties of local circumstances, of local customs and of agricultural needs. The rain-watered plains of the north, the valley cultivation of the hills, the pump-fed riverain tracts, the rice-growing fringes of the marshes, the areas supplied with regular free flow irrigation, are instances of such variations which will occur to all.

[651] At first sight the contingent obligations now customarily imposed on miri holders in the form of public duties appear to be impracticably onerous. But the obligation that needs definition most of all is the nature, the method of assessment and the method of payment of the revenue contribution, which represents the miri holder's amalgamated rent and tax to the nation, for the land he holds. General public duties should not fall on miri holders as such. They would more reasonably be discharged by some unpaid local dignitary, who could be accorded appropriate privileges.

In pursuance of the need to establish greater security of tenure and in conformity with customary doctrine, miri leaseholds held by long-established miri holders or their descendants, should normally be renewable in practice, although terminable in form. The duration of miri leaseholds might as a matter of regular routine be fixed at ten years. While such leaseholds should ordinarily be renewable to previous holders, if they had previously discharged their obligations satisfactorily, yet renewal should require a formal act on both sides. This would keep the nature of the tenure in the public mind, and the existing records up to date and reliable. Standard fees should be charged for all issues and renewals of miri leaseholds. These fees should in principle be limited to covering the aggregate cost of the simple administrative and technical procedure needed to maintain the necessary records satisfactorily.

6. The Land Register

[625] 6. As already noted the Land Code only recognises the private holding of land in two ways. Such a holding must either be private property (mulk) or it must be State property* held in tapu tenure. And the acquisition of all private holdings in either of these categories must be registered to be valid.

* Miri in law including all cultivated land not owned in mulk.

be registered to be valid. Thus the Ottoman legislators intended and provided that all holdings of cultivated land should be recorded in the Land Register. The inability of the Ottoman administration to put the land law into force, has left the greater part of the cultivated land of the country in parcels occupied on loose and irregular tenures unrecognised by the Statute law and unrecorded in the present limited Land Register. Instead of comprising, as intended, a record of all cultivated holdings that Register probably excludes from its purview between three-quarters and four-fifths of the cultivated zones. To permit the Land Registry to perform its intended national function and constitute the general and dependable custodian of land tenure that is needed, not only must its administration and procedure be drastically reformed, but the scope of its operations must be steadily extended until they include at least all privately held land of every recognised category. It should in fact become a General Land Registry (Daftarkhana umumiya el arazi) instead of being, as at present, a Department of tapu and mulk registration only. (Dairet el tapu.)

There are three points to which reform must more particularly be directed before the Land Registry can perform its functions. The Land Register is at present a register of transactions or deeds. Registration of deeds is an unreliable and incomplete method of recording rights to land. It should be converted into registration of title. There are also at present two decisive external obstacles to the construction and maintenance of an effective register of title. The first of these is the absence of a dependable cadastral survey. The existing service recognises this need and carries out scattered property surveys itself to the best of its ability: but this is no substitute for a properly controlled survey conducted by the technically competent Department. The second obstacle is the absence of practical provision to make the extreme multiplication and sub-division of shares upon inheritance of mulk property and tapu holdings economically workable. Such extreme shareholding may possibly still be rare, but it occurs*; and it would be fostered by the introduction of an efficient record until the position became unmanageable.

Since the major defects of the existing Land Registry are due for the most part to circumstances outside of the control of the Department itself, no useful purpose will be served by examining its internal procedure in detail now. Nor does space permit here of any explanation of the necessary conversion of the Register into a Register of Title. When the immediate questions of constructive reform have been decided the requisite modifications in the methods and machinery of record that should supplement them can be considered in detail if desired.

7. Land Survey

7. Reference to Part II will recall to mind the position and prospects of the national land survey, which it will be remembered is of a purely topographical nature. So far as can be foreseen it will take about another ten years to complete and map this survey on a scale of 1:10,000 throughout the cultivated area of the country, if the staff and efficiency of the Survey Department are sufficiently strengthened to enable them to push ahead with their general framework and to make good certain other weaknesses while continuing detail survey on the present lines. It may be hoped that Government will be able to afford the Department the necessary financial and administrative support to enable at least this modest forecast to be fulfilled.

* E.g. see "A Report on el 'Iraq," page 32(b), by Ahmed Fehmi Bey, Director-General of Revenue, Government Press, Baghdad, 1925.

423 This forecast could be halved at relatively slight additional expense
647 if a minor expansion of staff of all grades and of resources could be
185 authorised, if land marks could be regularly safeguarded, and if an uninterrupted programme of work could be maintained. This would make a regular and equitable valuation of the Land for purposes of land revenue practicable within a reasonable period (see vi, 9).

But I see no prospect of any general programme of more detailed or larger scale survey being realisable, nor could it be recommended at present.

423 It has already been stressed that the execution of a methodical and
185 trustworthy land survey of the country is a requisite condition of all effective land reform. It is a requisite condition not only of the establishment of a stable and secure land tenure and of an equitable assessment of land revenue, but also of any efficient system of irrigation and indeed of any reliable and systematic knowledge, development and use of the territorial resources of the country. It was, for example, to provide essential information for the Irrigation Department that the Survey has concentrated on work in the Irrigation Zone hitherto. It is, therefore, imperative that while devoting closer and more considered attention to the needs of land tenure in future, the Survey should call no halt in meeting these other primary needs.

Unquestionably a detailed cadastral survey, which reliably locates the limits of all individual holdings, is required to place land tenure and land revenue on to a thoroughly satisfactory basis. Only on the basis of such a survey can the unqualified stability and security of tenure be attained which is required to stimulate the development and productive capacity of the country fully. But the change from pronounced confusion now characteristic of land tenure to detailed order, is too great to be effected at a single step. The requisite detailed cadastral survey would be a lengthy and onerous undertaking for a much richer, better prepared and better equipped country. It should not be attempted in el 'Iraq at present.

[651] Doubtless in the vicinity of the larger towns and in other places, in which the higher value of land brings in commensurate receipts in higher fees or in increased rentals or other revenues to Government, true large scale cadastral surveys may be justified exceptionally. And the ultimate extension of a proper cadastral survey elsewhere, as development proceeds and land values increase, should always be kept in view.

But the hopes of establishing orderly record, secure tenure, and fair and dependable taxation of land throughout the overwhelming mass of the cultivated territories of the country within the next ten or fifteen years, must be based on a foundation of simpler and less detailed survey. To be precise, the measures of attainable land reform within any period worth envisaging at present should be such as are applicable, and can be maintained, in conjunction with a 1:10,000 topographical survey of the cultivated terrain of broadly the same character and accuracy as is now being produced. The work should be converted into (what has been aptly termed elsewhere) a topo-cadastral survey, without markedly increasing the complexity and closeness of the detail. The parcels or sub-divisions of the land adopted as cadastral units for purposes of survey, record and fiscal assessment, must be of considerable size and bounded (at least ordinarily and preponderantly) by easily recognisable physical features. The placing, and still more the subsequent maintenance and control by Government, of a host of artificial boundary beacons outlining individual holdings must be dismissed as entirely impracticable. It will be as much as the country can do to establish and

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

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protect the framework of survey reference points, which constitutes the one and only indispensable collection of ground marks.

The landed subdivision, cultivation unit, or estate, commonly known as *muqata'a*, which exists in one form or another throughout the greater part of the country, affords an admirable general instance of the type of topo-cadastral unit needed. Plate V shows the actual grouping of land in muqata'as in a village selected at random as well as their considerable variations in size. The term muqata'a itself is usually, if not invariably, applied to large existing agricultural holdings regardless of the method of tenure or the legal category or categories of land included therein. Existing muqata'as should not, of course, be surveyed and accepted as cadastral units without proper scrutiny of their history and tenure, while in some cases they may require subdivision and in others grouping. But subject to necessary investigation and adaptation to the practical requirements of survey and record, they constitute a series of major territorial units of the greatest economical importance agriculturally and the greatest practical importance administratively for the handling and maintenance of land reform. Where muqata'as do not exist, a similar artificial grouping of agricultural land for purposes of survey and record can be substituted. All the more important rights to land can be recorded with respect to some one or other of a series of such major territorial units, not as precisely as if a detailed cadastral survey could be carried out, but with a sufficiently substantial degree of exactness and reliability to provide a solid foundation for the most necessary reforms.

It can, therefore, be concluded that the main objective of survey during the next ten or fifteen years should be the execution of a topo-cadastral survey of the cultivated surface of the country on a scale of 1:10,000 of the existing muqata'as, or of similar artificial territorial groupings of land on the same general lines as at present. In principle this survey should be conducted in association with a preliminary settlement and subsequent record of rights, which will be next considered. And it must be embodied in accurately reproduced published maps, if it is to be of general value and use.

But an extent of territory that would occupy settlement for a number of years has already been mapped on 1:10,000 or some larger scale. So that the survey would be working in advance of settlement for a long time. None the less the co-operation of the Survey staff would be needed on the ground to embody in the maps revisions and additions required during the progress of settlement. The necessary association between the two branches of the work could be secured in this way, although probably not as conveniently or as economically as if the original survey had been done in conjunction with settlement. However, as experience is gained the character of the original survey could be increasingly suited to the later requirements of settlement.

Some reference to surveying from air photographs should be made in view of the discouraging outcome of the work done recently. The difficulties met with appear to have been occasioned by some failure by Government to ensure effective co-operation between the Survey Department and the air work. This should not prevent careful study of the advisability of again utilising air photography under more carefully considered arrangements at least in less accessible areas. The exclusion of all but bold topo-cadastral boundaries should facilitate the use of air photographs in the original survey: but the simplicity of detail, the quality of contouring needed for irrigation purposes and the scale adopted may be expected to continue to make the use of the plane table economical, and of the level necessary, throughout the cultivated terrain. But

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recent advances in the use of air photographs have been great, and further advances should be carefully followed by the Survey Department because of the great acceleration in the rate of survey which the utilisation of air photography secures. But while air work can unquestionably be carried out best by a specialist organisation, such work should be done as part and parcel of the national survey and not as an independent operation.

Finally, emphasis should perhaps again be laid on the necessity of basing all methods of detail survey on a mathematically sound and physically adequate framework of reference points. The provision and the maintenance of such a framework is the first and most important requirement of a dependable survey. It is just as dangerous and short-sighted to build up a survey on an unreliable foundation as a house, or to fail to maintain that foundation subsequently.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH Iraq MH

PART VI.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. SETTLEMENT OF RIGHTS TO LAND AND LAND VALUATION

1–5. Settlement of Rights to Land

1. The injurious uncertainty and insecurity of tenure now so widely prevailing throughout el 'Iraq can only be terminated by a progressive settlement of rights to all individual holdings throughout the length and breadth of the country. This process may be left to the chances of a gradual consolidation over an indefinite future of the results brought about by the interplay of the innumerable social and economic forces operating among the population; or it may be brought about by the conscious statesmanship of Government aiming at the establishment of a sound basis for the development of national prosperity within as short a period as possible. It is such a deliberately planned settlement of rights to land alone that is considered here. Henceforward for brevity the process will frequently be called settlement of rights or simply settlement.

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There are two radically different methods by which a settlement of rights may be undertaken throughout a territory. These may be termed respectively Sporadic settlement and Systematic settlement.

Sporadic settlement aims at allowing the work to be carried out piecemeal here and there as the circumstances of the particular settlement require, until it has been completed throughout the territory concerned. Thus any optional settlement must be sporadic, or any settlement which is compulsory on a specified occasion (e.g. when land changes hands).

Systematic settlement is effected methodically parcel by parcel until the work has been completed throughout the territory dealt with. A systematic settlement must be compulsory.

Sporadic settlement is the more attractive at first sight, because it appears to offer the same opportunity of settlement to all landholders in the country or even the possibility of an entirely voluntary operation. It has indeed been warmly advocated in el 'Iraq on the ground that it would be inequitable not to accord the same facilities to all those claiming rights to land. Actually, it is a delusion to suppose that by any method or expedient the same opportunities for settlement can be provided for all landholders everywhere at the same time. This is unquestionably desirable: but it is unfortunately impossible. Under the most favourable conditions any settlement of rights to land is bound to take many years to complete throughout the country. Consequently somehow or another a drastic selection or restriction must be exercised as to the holdings to be settled in any given period. A voluntary settlement would be unworkable. Applications might be made at the outset which would occupy the Settlement staff for years, or they might be so uncertain and irregular as to dislocate the work completely. Moreover, a voluntary settlement might drag on indefinitely everywhere. Again, a settlement effected when any land changed hands, or upon some such specific occasion, would demand staff and resources greatly beyond the country's means.

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A sporadic settlement is sometimes possible in countries in which a great part of the necessary work of defining holdings, tenures and holders has been previously done, or in new countries in which the number of properties to be defined and recorded annually is relatively small. But a sporadic settlement is inevitably more difficult, more protracted and more costly—ordinarily very much more so—simply because it is essentially a settlement conducted in a haphazard and unmethodical manner.

But there are also more concrete obstacles which render any general sporadic settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq impracticable. It would require a numerous and competent staff capable of visiting at short notice over a long period of years an unknown number of holdings indiscriminately scattered throughout the country, and of authoritatively deciding their rightful limits, tenures, holders and many important ancillary details. It would require a Survey Department sufficiently well staffed and equipped, and with its work sufficiently well advanced everywhere, to enable all these scattered holdings to be concurrently mapped and incorporated piecemeal in a national cadastral survey. And it would also require in operation throughout the whole country a General Land Registry capable of recording efficiently the results of each separate settlement as it occurred and of all subsequent changes affecting the land concerned. For unless such changes were regularly recorded the work would rapidly get out of date again and the settlement would never be finished.

Even if it is thought that the first of these three requirements might be satisfied, the second and third unquestionably could not. It is a technically difficult and a prohibitively costly proceeding to build up the cadastral survey of a mosaic of holdings throughout any large territory in a piecemeal way. In el 'Iraq it is impossible to do so, for the basic framework of triangulation on which such a survey must depend is for the most part lacking and will take many years to provide. Moreover, it has been shown already that the execution of a genuine cadastral survey is beyond the capacity of the country, even if it was carried out in an effective and economical manner. A sporadic settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq is also impracticable because no General Land Register exists in which the results could be effectively recorded and subsequently kept up-to-date. Nor could such a General Land Register be readily established, even if the necessary financial provision could be made, as the history of the Tapu Land Register amply demonstrates.

There are further difficulties which need not be entered into. For it should be evident that it is impossible to attack the formidable task of effecting a settlement of rights to land in every part of the country at once. It is very much to be regretted that the long-standing disabilities of landholders cannot be remedied everywhere without delay. But since this is so, it is best to face the fact and at least to make a start at remedying them somewhere. The sporadic settlement of a limited number of parcels selected for some special reason is, of course, feasible, and may even be necessary. Thus the Government appears to be committed to the sporadic settlement of the miri groves and gardens, while the Tapu Department can hardly avoid continuing to seek to reconcile its records with fact whenever occasion demands. And there may be other cases in which public policy may require sporadic operations occasionally and exceptionally. But the main contention that a general sporadic settlement is impracticable holds true none the less, and however unavoidable and even justifiable a limited amount of privileged sporadic settlement may be, it is bound to be costly and to delay the progress of any general settlement out of all proportion to the extent of the territories specially dealt with in this way.

2. A systematic settlement offers the only realisable prospect of establishing any general certainty and security of land tenure throughout the country. Even a systematic settlement would take many years to accomplish. It is evidently more urgently needed in some parts of the country and under some conditions than others. But, gradually and systematically, settlement of rights to hold or use land under any form of legal tenure should be extended over the whole land surface of the country. And concurrently, as such extension proceeds, measures should be taken to prevent the territory that has been dealt with from reverting again to the confusion of rights and uncertainty of tenure now commonly prevailing. For although a complete survey and settlement would be most beneficial irrespective of subsequent measures, since an immense obstacle to progress would be removed by merely clearing up existing uncertainties and providing a sure starting point for title even for the next few generations alone; yet the full benefits of a settlement will evidently be thrown away if the stability and security of tenure gained thereby are not subsequently maintained.

The record (or General Land Register) of all holdings and their lawful holders that is needed for this purpose has been mentioned earlier (v, 6). It can be progressively compiled as survey and settlement are carried through the country. This is a very different thing to endeavouring to introduce it everywhere at once. As the compilation extends it can be kept up-to-date in conjunction with the survey by quite simple routine measures, provided the land law and current practice have been reconciled. Settlement should be undertaken, and the General Land Register arranged, geographically and follow the administrative divisions of the country—nahiya, qadha, liwa. When the boundaries of these divisions are doubtful they should be decided before or during settlement and survey. The necessity of adopting large territorial units of the muqata'a type as the main unit of survey and record has already been explained. It will be among the earliest, and not the least important, functions of settlement to subdivide each nahiya into these requisite units. Although existing muqata'as would naturally be adopted as such units when of suitable size and satisfactorily defined physically, yet these units need not in principle be units of property. Indeed, if they are to facilitate simplified operations as intended, they must frequently include a number of smaller parcels of property on the one hand, or they may represent portions of larger properties on the other. They should in short, primarily be chosen as convenient permanent subdivisions of the nahiya for the purposes mentioned, and be carefully distinguished as such from the units of property with whose boundaries they may coincide. To differentiate clearly between the two these units of survey, record and assessment, should be given a distinctive name. For convenience in this report they are provisionally termed Sections of the Nahiya (aqsam el nahiya), or more briefly referred to simply as sections.

3. When a settlement of rights has to be conducted under conditions similar to those in el 'Iraq—particularly in the general absence of a previous survey and reliable records—it must be conducted parcel by parcel in the field in the presence of the rival claimants, landholders and tenants, of their neighbours, and of the members of the local community generally. Only in the local setting can the Settlement Authority (whoever he be) get to understand the many-sided local problems on which he will be called upon to adjudicate. And only in that setting will he be able to obtain and weigh properly all the available evidence. A peasant who becomes befogged or lies in a Court-house or Government office will do so less readily when in local surroundings and in the presence of his neighbours who live on the land affected. His errors will also be more evident and be more easily rectified. Indeed,

185 deficiencies in the information presented and mistakes of all sorts, which might escape detection elsewhere, are often obvious on the spot. Moreover, it is impossible to transport to a distance (or even to discover in advance) all the local inhabitants who have knowledge of the past history of the land, any one of whom may supply important information at any stage of an inquiry conducted in the locality. Only in this manner can a settlement of rights be secured which will be understood and considered equitable by the general body of the agricultural community and thereby give them the confidence and the stimulus needed to get the best out of the land.

Provision must, of course, be made to ensure the attendance of all witnesses and the submission of all documents, whose evidence may prove useful in investigating the rights to any parcel of land. But special knowledge and care should be exercised before admitting the validity of documents, particularly if torn, dirty and hoary, or if uncorroborated by independent records, or if in conflict with the consistent evidence of accredited local witnesses. The fabrication of specious documentary evidence presents no great difficulty and is the obvious expedient of an unscrupulous claimant. But a little practical knowledge of the composition of inks and papers and of the forger's customary tricks will enable spurious documents to be fairly readily detected, while in more difficult cases recourse should be had to suitable chemical and physical tests in a scientific laboratory.

Whatever justification there may be elsewhere for composite bodies and elaborate procedure in the conduct of an initial settlement of rights, it has already been shown that the possibilities of any effective reform in el 'Iraq entirely depend upon the use of the simplest methods and procedure possible. Anything of the character of Settlement Commissions, consisting of three or more members, would be far too costly and slow to be practicable. Nor are there available in the judiciary anything like the number of judges with the necessary standing and knowledge of the Land Law and the land, who could be spared from the bench to sit on such Commissions. Nor even if such judges were available would it be either economical or advantageous to employ them in this manner. It can be said with confidence that if settlement is conducted in the field on the general lines recommended there should be no serious dispute or uncertainty in regard to the rightful holders of 80 to 90 per cent. of the holdings. And only a proportion of the remainder are likely to present problems of a nature to call for high judicial consideration. Such consideration will be needed in a small proportion of cases and it should be devoted to them alone, after all possible preliminary elucidation of facts has been carried out in the field by the routine processes of settlement. The cases that require high judicial consideration are unlikely to exceed 5 per cent. of the total at the outside, if the previous work has been properly done. Indeed, they should fall considerably below this figure. But even consideration of 1 or 2 per cent. of the total cases presented to the Settlement Authorities in the field might constitute a heavy additional demand upon the regular judiciary if settlement proceeded at all vigorously.

The best course would be to establish a special Land Court to operate in conjunction with settlement and to hear appeals from, or cases referred to it by, the settlement authorities. Careful provision would have to be made to limit these cases to the minimum strictly justified and necessary. Such a special Land Court would soon acquire unrivalled experience of the operation of the land law and accumulate a mass of valuable precedents. It would be able to deal with the cases submitted to it more rapidly and consistently and with much greater insight than the ordinary courts. The jurisdiction of this Land Court

might embrace all land cases, whether arising from the settlement or not: but if any considered programme of settlement is undertaken, probably more than one Land Court would be required. 185

4. The conduct of settlement operations in the field will be carried out more rapidly, more economically and more effectively by suitable individual executive officers than by Commissions of any sort or by officers with preponderantly judicial experience and training. Executive officers entrusted with the conduct of settlement operations (henceforward called Settlement Officers) should be very carefully selected for qualities of independence, integrity, judgment and experience of the people and the land, as well as for administrative capacity. And they must be capable of conducting simple cases in a judicial manner and exercising simple judicial powers with competence and dignity. For there are bound to be a number of marginal cases on which a minor dispute arises which requires investigation in a judicial manner, but which can most appropriately and economically be dealt with by the Settlement Officer acting in a judicial capacity on the spot.

The regular reference of such minor disputes to the suggested Land Court (or other competent Court) would make settlement impracticable by imposing innumerable delays on its progress and greatly increasing its cost. Such reference would also greatly augment the volume of formal court work. Nor is any gain in justice or efficiency to be expected thereby. A competent officer on the spot is in a much better position to decide the majority of such disputes equitably than a distant court. He will certainly do so more speedily and economically. The majority of more difficult and more doubtful cases alone should be referred to the regular court designated, whose proceedings will gain in value from being able to devote attention exclusively to them.

It is well known that experienced and capable Iraqi officials are at present far too few for the multifarious needs of the country. This is sufficiently evidenced by the enactment of the recent Discipline Law and the proceedings taken under it. Every first class Iraqi will be needed for some time ahead in the regular grades and for the regular work of Government. Settlement of rights is a temporary need apart from the current administration, and Government could not do better than entrust its conduct to some of the present Administrative Inspectors, who are being released from their current duties. It would be impossible to find anywhere a body of officers better fitted to discharge these onerous and responsible functions. They have served the Government of el 'Iraq devotedly for a number of years. They are familiar with the working of the various public services and have long been accustomed to collaborate with them. They have, for the most part, long since shown their knowledge of, and their interest in, the land problems with which they would be required to deal. They are familiar with the fundamental provisions of the current Ottoman Land Code, with post-war legislation affecting land and with the customary practices of the country. They have already had considerable judicial experience as magistrates. They know the country and the language of the people. They know, and are known by, all leading Iraqis. They understand and sympathise with the difficulties of landholders and cultivators, and they would spare no pains to help them. 647 185

5. It would occupy too much space to outline the procedure of settlement in any detail here. Nor will it serve any useful purpose to do so, until the Government have reached a decision on their general policy. But certain broad features of the work may perhaps be usefully indicated. 185

Each Settlement Officer should be entirely responsible for the conduct of settlement operations within a specified Settlement Area and be given the necessary judicial powers for the purpose, subject to such

185 provisions for reference and appeal to the suggested Land Court or other Court of Law as may be judged proper.

Work should be taken up nahiya by nahiya in collaboration with the local authorities and with the Survey. Every effort should be made to arrange proceedings so that the survey and settlement staff work independently, and thus are not delayed by each other. This should present exceptionally little difficulty in view of the large units to which it is suggested survey operations should be principally confined. Collaboration will be needed in the selection and definition of these units (Sections of Nahiyas) in the first place: but the survey staff will probably be able to undertake this part of the work with the assistance of the local officer (Mudir) in most cases, as soon as they have gained a little experience.

While the work is new to the people and while the procedure is being initially tested, it would be advisable for Settlement Officers to investigate all cases throughout themselves; but as soon as possible all preliminary investigations should be entrusted to Assistant Settlement Officers drawn from the junior ranks of the provincial administration. The speed, and consequently the economy, of the settlement could be greatly increased by this means. The permanent value of the work, as well as its future prospects, would depend very much on the quality of these Assistant Settlement Officers. As time passes and local difficulties are surmounted the operations of settlement could be increasingly undertaken by them. They should consequently be carefully chosen and the importance of their work be publicly recognised. Officers with the requisite qualities and experience should be specially selected in consultation with the Settlement Officer concerned. It would be a valuable recognition of their status if they could be given the rank of Qaimmaqam.

While I am clear that the formation of Commissions to conduct settlement operations would be inadvisable, Settlement Officers should be enabled to utilise the services of men of standing and experience in the country as Assessors in difficult cases when this is desired by all parties concerned. Care would have to be taken to ensure (i) that no one was nominated Assessor in a case in which he himself was in any way interested, and (ii) that no undue demands should be made on the time of any particular person. Perhaps a panel of suitable persons to act as Assessors in each Settlement Area might be drawn up by the Ministry of the Interior in consultation with the Settlement Officer concerned, from which the actual choice might in each case be made.

Due and sufficient notice should be given to the public before settlement of rights is begun in a nahiya. When begun it should be undertaken section by section in an orderly manner. All claimants to rights to hold or use or benefit from the use of land in a section should present themselves in person or by suitable deputy to the Settlement Officer on the day notified, irrespective of tenure or form of occupation. The settlement should embrace all forms of tenure and in all cases define the tenure recognised. Lawful charges on the land (e.g. mortgages of tapu land) should also be investigated. If different forms of tenure exist within the same section the limits between them should be surveyed. Otherwise, scientific survey should be strictly confined at the outset to the definition of the boundaries of sections. When the area of a section is sub-divided internally into a number of separate holdings, the record of the limits of these holdings within the section and of their superficial areas must be of a rough and ready nature based on local knowledge and local practice. Since a valuable control will be furnished by the survey limits and surveyed area of each section, the weaknesses of the interior survey and record will not affect other sections. And I am confident that with a little care and patience local men and local means will be found suffi-

ciently adaptable to meet this need with the advice and general collaboration of the Survey.

In the process of settlement all claims to hold land on tapu tenure or in mulk, and the limits of land so held, will require to be thoroughly investigated and authoritatively decided in conjunction with other claims; but although such cases will be important when they arise, they will be a small proportion of the whole and they should present fewer difficulties. But it must be appreciated at the outset that here again a wide discrepancy will commonly be found between law and fact. In law mulk is only valid if registered, while the root of title of all lands granted on tapu tenure exists, and exists solely, in the Land Registers of the Government and in the certificates of registration (tapu sanads) issued by the Land Registry Department (Dairet el Tapu) in conformity with those registers. Now the general imperfection of the Land Registers is well known, and it can be anticipated with confidence that titles to hold land in mulk or tapu would suffer very severely if the legal basis for those titles was solely considered and demanded. Ordinarily under the operation of the Land Code hardships arising from such investigations of legal title to tapu tenure would be mitigated by the recognition of haq el qarar (acquisitive prescription of tapu tenure); but since haq el qarar has long been inoperative this safeguard will be unavailable. Similar difficulties will occur in establishing waqf.

Here, as generally, the solution is to reorganise fact and discount fiction. Suitable provisions should be included in any enactment providing for settlement of rights to land, to allow any claims to mulk or tapu or waqf rights to be adjudged on all the evidence of the facts available, and not merely, or necessarily at all, on the basis of the admittedly unreliable, and often unintelligible, existing Land Registers.

As settlement proceeds a schedule embodying the results should be prepared by the Settlement Officer for each section of each nahiya. In this should be set forth all the more important details. Among these may be mentioned:

(i) The total area of the section.

(ii) The uncultivated area included.

(iii) A list of the separate holdings recognised.

(iv) The location and area (cultivable and uncultivable) of such holdings given with such precision as is possible.

(v) The names of the accepted holders, tenants or holders of other rights with a statement of the nature of all such rights.

Separate holdings should be numbered consecutively throughout the section for convenience of reference.

After suitable periods for publicity and amendment resulting therefrom, and also for appeal as previously suggested, this Schedule would become the record of the settlement of rights to land in the section concerned, and would constitute with the Survey map and documents the authority and basis of the new General Land Register required.

6-8. Selection of Settlement Areas

6. Although settlement of rights is gravely needed throughout the whole country it can evidently only be undertaken in a limited number of places at a time, and it must be expected to take a number of years to complete. If work is to proceed it is therefore a matter of some moment to decide the places in which it shall be commenced. The area of practicable and useful choice is restricted to the districts in which detail survey has been carried out or in which the triangulation framework can be completed in time to allow the suggested topo-cadastral survey to be

1 "reorganize" should be "recognize"

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH1 Iraq MH1

185 pushed forward in conjunction with settlement operations without delaying the latter. Broadly speaking this means that settlement can be carried out as extensively as men and resources permit in the Irrigation Zone, but must be limited in the Rainfall Zone to the immediate vicinity of Mosul town (see Plates III and IV).

423 185 In this neighbourhood the land is widely held, or claimed, in tapu tenure (see Plate II) and special efforts have been made by the Tapu Department during recent years to clear up uncertainties and define the parcels justly affected. It was primarily on this account that a considerable block of isolated detailed survey has been completed here. Settlement of this block of territory therefore appears preponderantly to involve an investigation and definition of the parcels held in tapu tenure and, so far as such parcels are concerned, to have been in progress for some time. But rights to tapu tenure should be systematically reviewed and if possible rights to miri land concurrently settled, throughout this area by an independent Settlement Officer in collaboration with the Survey at an early date.

In the Irrigation Zone a considerable amount of detailed survey has been completed in every liwa and there is a wide range of territory in various stages of readiness for systematic settlement.

423 185 651 In el Amara, as is well known, the political and administrative conditions have been retained on an almost exclusively tribal basis, the miri lands (of which the liwa is almost exclusively composed) being farmed out to various tribal sheikhs for triennially assessed payments. It is impossible to discuss the details of these methods here; nor is there any need, since the agrarian conditions of no liwa have been investigated and reported on so regularly or so fully, owing to these periodic assessments. Each successive assessment has built on that which preceded it, but has been carried out in greater detail with increasing attention to the smaller men who hold from the leading sheikhs and really manage and work the land. If public security and genuine national consciousness continue to grow these periodic assessments should crystallise steadily into an effective settlement of rights to land. But the conditions under which the work had to be done in the past were extremely difficult, and if this end is to be obtained (and even if the revenue assessments are to be as equitable and reliable as is now reasonable and practicable) the work must be more closely based upon trustworthy detailed survey and rights be investigated more thoroughly than has so far been possible. A reassessment of the Amara estates (muqata'as) was due, and has doubtless been undertaken, this year. And under the agreements in force with the leading sheikhs the prevailing system terminates and is open to review in 1984. The consideration of fuller and more permanent settlement of rights in this district can therefore properly be left over until this termination approaches, or a further reassessment is arranged.

In the Basra liwa, as already observed, an excellent fiscal survey of the date gardens was carried out several years ago. And the principle of a regular Land Tax has long been familiar through the operation of Midhat Pasha's enlightened *jarib* tax.* The tenure of these gardens (mulk or miri) appears to be rarely, if at all, disputed. For the most part the mulk owners are well known, or could readily be determined. 185 Consequently a relatively minor effort would enable titles to be authoritatively reviewed and, when necessary, settled throughout the Basra reach on the basis of the existing survey. The respective responsibilities of garden owners and the State for the maintenance of the tidal [312] creeks off the Shatt el Arab, from which the gardens are largely watered,

* A commutation of the Government crop share on date gardens into a tax assessed by quality and area, carried out in 1871. A jarib = 3937 square metres, or 0·98 of an acre.

should also be decided on grounds of common interest and common sense, not by expositions of the law. 185

The management of the miri, or State Domain, date gardens must be mentioned as it has been the subject of controversy for some time and calls for some consistent policy. But interesting and important intrinsically as the points of principle and practice involved are, space does not allow of their consideration here. In its relation to the major problems of the land tenure of the country as a whole, this is a domestic question for the separate consideration of Government in its capacity as one landholder among many. 423

In the Muntafiq liwa, as we have noted, an authoritative settlement of disputes arising out of important and long-standing claims to hold land in tapu tenure was initiated recently under a special law (see iii, 4). But the work appears to be limited to investigations into claims to this tenure alone and thus to fall considerably short of the general settlement of rights to land that is needed throughout the country. If land is declared free of tapu rights it is, I believe, simply recorded as miri without any settlement of the rights of those in occupation of it. Even a successful settlement of tapu rights alone in this, or in any, area is no doubt a valuable contribution to the general introduction of secure land tenure needed: but when all the cost of carrying out investigation of tapu claims is being incurred in a district so honeycombed with them, it would be a great pity to miss the opportunity to effect a thorough and complete settlement. 123 185

And although it was natural, and very possibly desirable, to entrust this particular piece of settlement originally to a Commission, it is permissible to doubt whether the diversion of three important members of the judiciary and two important members of the administration from their normal duties will continue to be justified by any persistent delicacy or difficulty in the investigation of tapu rights in this particular district. The general widespread need of settlement in all parts of the country is commonly admitted. I have represented earlier that the only hope of satisfying this need within the lifetime of the present generation is to adopt the simplest and cheapest procedure and machinery possible everywhere. No doubt the size and composition of the Muntafiq Commission helped to inspire confidence among the disputants with whom it had to deal, but with all its qualities and advantages a Commission of this nature is bound to be costly and deliberate, and unduly to absorb for the benefit of one locality, public service and public funds which can be ill spared from the much wider general national effort that is needed. At a suitable opportunity (of which the Commission itself would be the appropriate judge) the work which they have initiated might be transferred to an organisation of the simpler character that I have recommended for adoption elsewhere, without breach of continuity, authority or efficiency. 123 185 647

In the remaining liwas of the Irrigation Zone there are several canal areas already mentioned (e.g. the Yuseflya canal area) which were settled by the Irrigation Department, when the canals irrigating them were remodelled or constructed. The work that I saw appeared to have been well done and was certainly well recorded. It should not be allowed to fall into confusion. Owing to various chances I did not succeed in visiting the Latifiya estate, which I very much regret, as the lessons to be derived from its methods and experience in the field of agricultural development should be extremely valuable; but in respect of land tenure it can no doubt be regarded as a specially granted and administered canal area.

The Dulaim reach is ripe for settlement because of much good investigatory work already done and recorded; but largely for this very reason, settlement (except possibly in its lower portion) can, I think, 123 185

423/185 be delayed with less disadvantage here than in areas in which the unsolved pump problems cluster more thickly.

185 7. Throughout the Irrigation Zone as a whole it is the riverain tracts watered by pump installations which appear to me to call most insistently for early and authoritative settlement of rights. Economically it is these mechanically watered territories (whose approximate extent is indicated on Plate II and embraces about 10,000 square kilometres) that present the most urgent as well as the most intricate problems. And it is these territories that the most progressive elements in the nation are particularly endeavouring to develop.

It can be recognised now without reproach or fault-finding that the interests alike of the nation as a whole, of the claimants to prescriptive rights, and of members of the public willing to invest money and energy in the development of these riverain tracts, would have been immeasurably better served if all pre-existing rights had been properly investigated and settled, and if the parcels of land affected had been satisfactorily defined and recorded, before pump permits were granted in increased numbers and before agreements with reputed holders of prescriptive rights had been recognised.

The systematic settlement of rights to land throughout these tracts, that I have already recommended, affords a second opportunity of putting matters on to a stable footing; but it need hardly be repeated that the position of prescriptive holders has been appreciably strengthened and the extent of their claims appreciably increased in the interval. When such holders (corporate or individual) have in effect themselves invested money and effort in pump works, etc., this may be accepted without regret, provided their holdings promise to be effectively developed. Where, what may perhaps be briefly called, dual enterprises are in operation, it is impossible to formulate any general conclusions having regard to the great varieties of conditions in the terms of the agreements made and in the personalities concerned. But it can be said with assurance that a definition of existing rights still remains the first step to a clarification of the relative positions of those associated in these dual enterprises and that such clarification is, in its turn, the doorway towards improvement. Whatever mistakes have been made in the past, whether by the Government itself or by the parties concerned, there will be no hesitation in agreeing that it is in the common interest now, wherever and however reasonably possible, either to reconcile or to separate the interests of those unsuccessfully associated in these joint enterprises.

The complication of conflicting claims and rights in these riverain tracts is very great, but the conditions differ so much from one pump area to the next that there is no general decision that can clear up the existing tangle. This can only be done by a patient investigation and settlement parcel by parcel conducted by a competent and impartial officer equipped with the necessary powers. While I do not pretend that such a settlement of rights in these areas would be easy, I am quite confident that it is practicable. And there can be no doubt that it is most necessary both in the interests of the country as a whole and of the particular parties concerned in each case.

The normally convenient section of survey and record throughout these riverain tracts will tend to conform to the limits worked by a pump, or battery of pumps, as a unified agricultural holding. Sections so indicated will probably be fairly stable; but they may frequently require subdivision for fiscal assessment. High ground not commanded by the pump, or not worth cultivating, would be included or constituted part of an adjoining section, as best suited the general requirements of the work.

The first objective of any settlement of rights in the pump areas should therefore be a systematic investigation and detailed settlement of the prescriptive claims admitted as the basis of existing agreements. This is undeniably difficult because the indications of earlier cultivation, in the light of which this settlement might have been previously carried out, have now been submerged by the great extension of cultivation. It has consequently been suggested that the only practicable course is to allow a specific area per adult male cultivator whose right to participate is recognised. This area would naturally vary according to the locality and the general conditions prevailing. Under certain conditions this expedient may be the best, or indeed the only practicable, course; but it savours of a new allotment of land rather than of a recognition of a claim based upon previous use. As a general rule, and wherever possible, it is preferable that the physical recognition of the limits affected by a prescriptive claim, as well as the equitable recognition of the claim itself, should be based upon reasonably attested previous exploitation of the soil. I believe that a painstaking, experienced and impartial officer studying local features and hearing local evidence on the spot, will even now generally be able to arrive at very dependable conclusions regarding both (i) the limits of old effective occupation and use and (ii) the present-day representatives of the previous occupants and users.

It has been mentioned earlier that the prior rights recognised by the provincial authorities as the basis of so many pump agreements were largely of tribal origin and character. During settlement the exact nature of all holdings should be carefully investigated and recorded in a manner that is compatible with their origin and character. This should present no undue difficulty in the cases referred to, if the leasehold form of miri tenure is systematically applied in future. It would probably be sufficient if the lease was made with the accepted head of the tribal section (reis-el-firqa) as such. Or legislative provision might be made to recognise tribal sections as juristic persons represented in each case by a duly appointed head or a small council (lujna), when preferred. In the event of the death of the accepted head, or other representative, of a tribal section a substitute would need to be forthwith nominated. When there was no disagreement, such nomination would no doubt be a matter for the tribal section concerned, but the local authorities should be empowered to make the nomination, after consultation with the members of such a section, when the latter were unable to agree.

8. On a general review it is evident that the prospective field of settlement is very large. But it is unfortunately no less evident that, under existing conditions, any immediate commencement can only be on a very small scale. I suggest for consideration the appointment of three small settlement parties under the charge of three of the present Administrative Inspectors as Settlement Officers. One of these Settlement Officers might take over the work in the Muntafiq if and as circumstances and occasion permit. The development of this work into a general settlement of miri holdings as well should be considered. Such a development is very desirable if it can be reconciled with the primary need to terminate promptly the long-standing disputes regarding tapu tenure in this district. Alternatively the miri areas could be revisited and settled in detail subsequently; but this would necessarily be slower, more costly and probably less satisfactory in the long run.

The selection of the other two areas in which settlement could most advantageously be initiated is inevitably difficult, when there is so much work waiting to be done everywhere. In my opinion it is at least clear that the settlement of the difficulties that have occurred in the development of the riverain tracts by pump is the most pressing of

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI

185 many pressing problems. I therefore suggest that two settlement areas should be constituted in these tracts, preferably one situated on the Tigris and the other on the Euphrates. From these as starting points, settlement of these tracts could progressively be extended up and down the two rivers until they had been completed.

The above is no doubt an extremely modest programme; but it is better to begin modestly than to continue to postpone these greatly needed land reforms indefinitely. After six months practical experience in the field, and of the cost and speed of the work in three different settlement areas, there would be solid grounds on which to base plans for an extension of operations.

185 423 It will not have escaped attention that the completion of the work already partly done in the Mosul and Basra liwas is not included in this initial programme. This is not because such exclusion can be contentedly acquiesced in, even temporarily, but because it appears to me that a cessation of the appeasement that has been started in the Muntafiq, or still further delay in placing pump cultivation along the river reaches on to a healthy basis, would be even more deplorable.

9. Land Valuation

651 185 9. For reasons given earlier (ii, 4) it has not appeared useful to comment either on the recently superseded land revenue methods or on the two new laws But the old and the new appear mutually to envisage the eventual establishment of a regular land tax or Government rental, if this term is preferable. By this I mean the valuation of the land by appropriate means and the assessment and imposition of an annual payment based thereon. Thus, in the explanation issued with the displaced land tax assessment law,* the Land Revenue policy of Government was described as "the imposition of a fixed assessment in cash per unit of area of land," while the universal application of this method ultimately was foreshadowed. And Article 6 of the law required that the process of assessment should include survey, the classification of the land into grades according to the quantity and value of the produce, and the resulting assessment per unit of area of each grade.

And I understand Article 6 of the second of the new laws to provide for the early completion of the survey and valuation of all cultivated miri land and all irrigated tapu land with a view to the assessment and imposition of an annual rental thereon.

The ultimate objective in this important sphere of reform therefore appears essentially to be unchanged, and it is an objective which, in my opinion, alone offers any prospect of escape from the inequalities, irregularities, uncertainties and hardships inseparable from the wisest and most carefully considered combinations of stop-gap methods lacking a uniform and systematic basis. For pending a methodical valuation of the land there are bound to be seriously unsatisfactory features in any land revenue expedients adopted.

185 The section of the nahiya (qism el nahiya) suggested earlier as the land unit of immediate topo-cadastral survey and record (v, 7, and vi, 2) should also constitute a suitable land unit for revenue purposes, if carefully selected with this further object also in view. No doubt the quality of the land within the limits of such sections will not be strictly uniform, and may frequently include salty or other uncultivable patches on the one hand, and possibly gardens or other exceptionally fertile pieces on the other. When the conditions really justify it, areas differing markedly from the general quality of the land within the section can be excluded or specially treated; but so far as practicable an average valuation of the section should be aimed at, taking the good with the

* "Law prescribing the methods of assessment of land tax and rent due to Government." No. 40 of 1929.

bad, especially when the section coincides with an estate (muqata'a) owned or managed as a cultivation unit. Such general averaging of the land value throughout each section may add a little to the difficulty of initial valuation, but it will enormously facilitate subsequent collection and administration of the tax and the prevention of abuse. When series of small holdings occur in a section of markedly irregular quality, subdivision of the section and more careful detailed valuation will no doubt be necessary; but such cases should be a small proportion of the whole, although in certain districts they may predominate. But having regard to the supreme importance, both to Government and to land-holders and peasantry, of getting the taxation of the agricultural industry on to a better basis throughout the whole country with the utmost dispatch, a bold policy of general averaging of value throughout each section of a nahiya should, I suggest, be adopted in the first place. Some, even considerable, unevennesses there would unquestionably be; but only by accepting such imperfections can a generally tolerable and workable system of land tax be introduced without excessive delay. And the results should be compared, not with the ideally assessed taxation of selected parcels of land that could be obtained by slow and careful work; but with the degree of solid improvement on existing conditions attainable for the nation at large and the great mass of land revenue payers within the shortest possible period. Once such a basis of general valuation existed throughout the country a progressive improvement could be undertaken.

Selection, definition and valuation of sections of nahiyas need not wait upon settlement. Wherever the detail survey has been completed, the former work could be put in hand and pressed forward independently. Lack or uncertainty of ownership does not prevent taxation now, and should be no bar to putting assessment on to an orderly and carefully considered basis in advance of a settlement of legal rights. And such a definition and valuation of sections ahead of settlement, accompanied as it should be by a roll of land taxpayers compiled section by section throughout nahiyas, would immensely facilitate and accelerate the subsequent slower march of settlement.

The detail survey is sufficiently advanced throughout the Irrigation Zone to enable this work to be taken up promptly and pressed forward as vigorously as staff and funds permit for a few years; but a gradual expansion of the Survey staff would be needed throughout those same years to allow survey and land valuation to proceed with the speed desirable afterwards. For it will be remembered that in accordance with the present programme another ten years may be expected to be required to complete the detailed survey of the cultivated area of the country. A delay of another ten years, in putting the Land Revenue system of the country on to a better basis, could hardly be accepted with equanimity.

In this connection I should again emphasise the extreme importance of carefully considering, and then steadfastly maintaining, the authorised programme of survey. Nothing has dissipated the efforts and the value of public expenditure provided for the Survey Department more than the continually varying demands made upon it during the last ten years. Small occasional special demands there must be; but if important national objectives, such as those under consideration, are to be secured in reasonable time and at reasonable cost, continuity of the main programme of survey work must be maintained.

No attempt is made here to consider the qualifications of the staff or the nature of the methods that would be necessary to carry out the systematic valuation of land for fiscal purposes suggested. These could be decided more usefully later should Government adopt some such procedure as outlined.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH1 Iraq MH1

PART VII.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. LEGISLATION, INITIAL FEES, GENERAL CO-OPERATION

1 and 2. Legislation

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1. I have neither thought it possible nor useful to endeavour to catalogue the many ambiguities, omissions, contradictions and redundancies of the Statute Law as it stands. The existence of serious defects in all these respects is not likely to be contested; nor that the law must be made consistent, intelligible and adequate, if the tenure of land is to be put on a clear and stable legal basis. But two conditions must be satisfied before any constructive amendment of the law can be advantageously undertaken.

In the first place we should know where we stand. In the second we should know where we are going. The first demands a careful study and authoritative statement of the existing law with a view to as complete an elucidation as possible of the points on which it is ambiguous or defective, in preparation for comprehensive clarification and amendment, as well as as a guide to those dealing with land questions in the meantime. A similar need arose in Palestine and was met by a most valuable "Statement of the Land Law of Palestine" prepared by Messrs. Goadby and Dukhan in 1927. Copies of this work were supplied to the 'Iraqi Government at the time. For although recent legislation in the two countries is different the foundation of their land law is, of course, the same. The preparation of a similar statement of the existing Land Law of el 'Iraq should be greatly facilitated by this previous work. But in el [423] 'Iraq custom and administrative practice exercise so much wider and more powerful an influence on land dealings than the statute law, that special provision should be made to include them in an appropriate manner in such a statement.

I recommend that two competent officers shall be nominated by Government to undertake this important preparatory work. I suggest that one of these shall be an officer with legal training and knowledge of the existing land law and of its administration in the Courts, and that the other shall be an officer with personal knowledge and experience of the actual practices prevailing in the holding, use and transfer of land throughout the country These officers should be instructed to make specific recommendations in due course for the progressive amendment and codification of the Land Law.

The second requisite preliminary is a decision by Government on the critical questions of principle or policy, which occasioned the present inquiry, and on points of law which are presented in the suggested statement.

2. The direct object of a general settlement of rights is the establishment of land tenure progressively throughout the country on a firm foundation of legal right determined in a judicial manner on the spot with reference to actual and physically defined parcels of land. Moreover, to perpetuate the definition and security of tenure thereby obtained, the results should be suitably incorporated in an effective record (or Land Register) which thereafter is continuously kept up-to-date. The whole

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process calls for a body of carefully considered and carefully co-ordinated legislation. 185

By whatever methods the initial settlement is conducted there must be a lengthy period during which land holdings are in one of three distinct conditions: (*a*) their initial unsettled condition, (*b*) a transitory condition while undergoing settlement, (*c*) an ultimately settled condition. A similar distinction should be preserved in the legislation applying to the three. The first stage is intended to disappear finally, if gradually, so that legislative provisions applying to it alone should disappear with it. The second is also a transitory stage, which should be governed by a special law for the settlement of rights to land. This law should provide the necessary authority for, and prescribe the general conduct of, the settlement. The character of the process and the nature of the procedure have already been discussed. The third stage requires legislation designed to place the land law and land tenure of the country permanently on a sound footing. The detailed elucidation of the existing land law and operative practice recommended above should furnish the necessary foundation for the progressive amendment and re-enactment of the whole land law that is needed. This should include a new law providing for the regular registration of rights to land subsequent to settlement, which would replace the various Ottoman laws and regulations on the subject now in force.

The preparation of the full body of legislation needed will demand a good deal of study, effort and time. It is useless to enact it unless the Government have carefully weighed the need and have given the requisite measures their considered approval. They are unlikely to do this unreservedly or finally on the strength of even the most careful and thorough preliminary study alone. And even if they did so the legislation would be sterile until some simple organisation for the general conduct and co-ordination of the work had been established, suitable settlement officers appointed, effective investigationary and technical procedure adopted.

It therefore appears on all grounds advisable to pass legislation of a provisional nature in the first place, providing for the abrogation of the existing law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq lands, if and when deemed advisable, and for the execution of settlement on the general lines recommended and in such areas as Government may decide. This would have the advantage of combining a practical test of these recommendations with an immediate and realistic attempt to settle the problems of the pump areas in a methodical way. Concurrently the preparation of the legislation needed to continue the work on a more fully considered and permanent basis could be prepared thoroughly and carefully.

In preparing legislation it must never be forgotten that settlement of rights to land and the establishment of a stable land tenure in el 'Iraq are practical operations of an intricate nature dependent upon the conscientious execution of a steady programme of investigation and survey carried out day by day in the field for a great many years in co-operation with landholders and people. The quality of the officers entrusted with the work, the suitability of the procedure employed and the degree of co-operation obtained will be the critical determinants of failure or success. Bad laws may readily retard, multiply the cost of, jeopardise, or even prevent the attainment of reform: although a considerable degree of success can sometimes be obtained by good officers operating good investigatory and technical methods in spite of defective laws. But failing these essential agents and methods the best laws would remain idle instruments or be viciously misapplied. Suitable legislation

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is, of course, required to empower and consolidate success: but it cannot do more. And it will only be suitable if it is designed to give statutory endorsement to very carefully considered and thoroughly well-tested detailed procedure.

But while general knowledge of the practicable requirements of land reform, applied in the light of local conditions and local experience, can alone supply the material for the planning and execution of the necessary measures, this material can only be transmuted into successful legislation by a skilled legal draftsman, himself thoroughly conversant with the existing land law, working in consultation with accredited representatives of the public services responsible for the execution of reform.

I emphasise these points because the history of land reform in el 'Iraq is punctuated by abortive measures which appear to have been drawn by various executive officers without adequate legal assistance and without proper previous discussion. In a matter of such far-reaching importance and complexity, as the measures of land reform now projected, personal ability and the individual view point of even the most important Departments of State, are insufficient. Successful legislation will demand the careful preparatory team work of all the public services primarily concerned and the skilled expression of a trained legal draftsman, or at least of a professional lawyer.

There seems to be an inclination to feel that something of positive value has been achieved if a law purporting to give effect to some benevolent or public-spirited intention has been placed on the Statute Book, however unworkable such a law may be. But this feeling will not stand intelligent examination or satisfy any patriotic legislator who seeks more than documentary results and facile applause. In sober fact, academic aspirations and indifferent legislation appear to me to have been the worst enemies of practically realisable reform in the country hitherto.

8. Considerations of Initial Cost and Fees

8. The principal difficulty in carrying out a settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq will no doubt be the initial cost. It is impossible to make any useful estimate of this cost on the basis of the numerous hypotheses that would be inevitable at present. But it will be evident that work on the modest lines proposed above could be initiated at a very small cost, particularly having regard to the importance, both to the nation at large and to the parties immediately concerned, of making an early effort to secure a more satisfactory return from the capital and effort sunk in the pump development of the riverain tracts during the last ten years. The financial provision needed for the first year's work would amount to little more than the cost (i) of equipping and maintaining the three suggested Settlement parties possibly for eight months in the field and for the remaining four at Headquarters, or elsewhere, and (ii) of establishing a Land Court a few months later. As against this the cost of the present Muntafiq Commission might be saved. The requirements of the Survey would not be materially affected. The introduction of the General Land Register could advisedly await the conclusion of the initial year's work. Although the speed and cost of the work in such an initiatory stage would be gravely misleading as an index of future progress, since both would rapidly improve from year to year, yet a considerably better forecast could be made in the light of the experience gained by actual trial than by the most elaborate estimates that could be furnished now.

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Although public funds will benefit directly by methodical and equitable assessment and imposition of land revenue, and indirectly by the steady increase in prosperity which should follow if settlement is accompanied by complementary developments in irrigation and agricultural conditions, yet these financial returns will not be immediate. The immediate problem of finding the funds needed to initiate settlement would be lightened or removed, if the cost could be promptly recovered from the individuals whose rights to land are thereby recognised and secured. Now settlement is essentially the clearing up of disputes and uncertainties inherited from an indefinite past. It has been necessitated in el 'Iraq by the failure of past governments to keep their records of mulk, tapu and miri land properly. It is now required in the interests of the nation as a whole, and the national budget will benefit generously by it in the future if it is accompanied by appropriate complementary measures. While therefore it is proper that individuals and corporate bodies should pay fees for the recognition of their rights in mulk, in tapu and in waqf (just as they would legally have been required to do if the existing Land Registers had been functioning properly hitherto and registration of all changes had been required, as they occurred): it is not equitable that they should repeat any payments they themselves have already made to the existing Land Registry or pay on a higher scale than may be needed to maintain the General Land Register in the future. It will, of course, be understood that the fees referred to here are genuine registration fees only, not acquisition payments on obtaining land in tapu tenure initially.

The settlement and record of rights to hold and use miri land stands on a different footing. It would not intrinsically be in any way inequitable to charge a suitable fee upon recognition and record of these rights also: but it would, I think, be inexpedient and inadvisable to do so upon initial settlement. If settlement is to be carried out with the utmost practicable speed and economy it is essential that everything possible should be done to encourage and ensure the presentation of all claims promptly at the appropriate moment. The degree of smooth and punctual co-operation secured between the great mass of claimants and the Settlement parties will primarily determine the speed and success of the work, while these in turn will primarily govern its cost. The bulk of mulk and tapu claimants and of custodians of waqf interests may reasonably be relied upon to appreciate the advantage of assisting the settlement and of consolidating their recognised rights by due and proper record: but the bulk of holders and users of miri land may be expected to be illiterate and very possibly suspicious of ulterior designs on the part of Government. Nothing will facilitate, accelerate and therefore cheapen, settlement so much as waiving all fees on the initial settlement of miri land. The poverty of the majority of such land is too great to admit of any really adequate scale of fees being imposed. And it may be predicted with some confidence that the saving in the cost of the work occasioned by foregoing such fees will more than compensate for any effective revenue lost thereby.

4. General Co-operation

4. In previous sections attention has been primarily devoted to the objectives, methods and procedure of the various agents directly concerned in one way or another with the conduct of reform. But a really national effort will be required if success is to be achieved. The necessity of winning the confidence and securing the prompt and willing co-operation of the great mass of landholders and cultivators has probably been sufficiently stressed already. The necessity of ensuring the continuous and effective co-operation of all branches of the public service,

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185 and more particularly of the provincial administration, is as great. Provincial officers can assist the settlement in more ways than can possibly be mentioned without in the least interfering with the independence either of its judgments or of its progress. They above all others could prepare and educate public opinion by explaining beforehand the objects of the work and the character of the procedure to those with whom they are brought in daily contact. This would go far towards preparing men's minds and making them ready to participate promptly and effectively when their turn came. And it is only provincial officers who, by patient influence and persistent firmness, will be able gradually to enlist the assistance of landholders and cultivators in the protection of survey reference marks and in the regular notification of those that are displaced. The possibility of survey and provincial officers working in conjunction in advance of settlement to subdivide nahiyas into sections suitable for purposes of survey, record and fiscal assessment has been previously mentioned. It would also facilitate, and consequently accelerate, the work very materially if each local officer (mudir el nahiya) could provisionally collect and tabulate all claims to each of such sections of his nahiya in preparation for the settlement officer. I saw in Kut liwa schedules of information concerning pump areas and other estates which would be most helpful. Analogous records exist in other liwas.

The co-operation of the provincial authorities, as well as of other interested services, would also be needed to define provisionally in advance of settlement the areas that should be reserved (*a*) for public utility waterways, roads, railways, historic sites, (*b*) for particular tribes or communities, (*c*) for projected national forests, pastures, etc. etc. But such examples could be multiplied indefinitely.

The importance of general and sustained co-operation from all national elements who are in a position to do so cannot be exaggerated. The degree to which it was secured might readily decide success or failure. It would certainly affect decisively the quality and cost of the proposed settlement of rights to land throughout el 'Iraq and the period taken to complete it.

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PART VIII.—MEASURES RECOMMENDED. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION

1-8. Unified Planning and Direction of Reform

1. It will be remembered that among the defects which Government expressly sought to cure was the pursuit of reform by three independent Departments of State without proper co-ordination and on no connected plan. I have ventured earlier to express the view that these Departments were not in a position to adopt a suitable common plan or to pursue it unitedly. But it is also important to realise that their Departmental duties are not properly reconcilable with the conduct of the requisite reforms.

In considering the administrative organisation of reform it is desirable to distinguish clearly between the men, measures and machinery needed: (i) to produce order initially out of the chaos inherited from past centuries, and (ii) to consolidate and perpetuate this order as it is secured. These two processes may be conveniently called the execution, and the conservation, of reform.

The executive programme of reform should co-ordinate in one carefully balanced and united effort:

(i) The study and revision of the land law.

(ii) The completion of the topo-cadastral survey.

(iii) The systematic valuation of the land for revenue purposes.

(iv) The general settlement of rights to land.

The economy, speed and quality of the results will depend upon the efficiency of the combination secured. But although the importance of the initial execution of reform is supreme, and although it will necessarily occupy many years, yet administratively, legally and financially it should be recognised to be a special, terminable, capital effort.

The conservation subsequently of the benefits secured by this initial capital effort would necessitate administratively

(i) The progressive establishment, and maintenance up-to-date thereafter, of a General Land Register or Land Book.

(ii) The corresponding maintenance up-to-date of the complementary topo-cadastral survey.

(iii) The establishment of suitable ancillary land revenue records based on the above.

Throughout this Report I have avoided any detailed discussion of these conservancy measures: because the execution of initial reform is a sufficiently complex matter and is independently justified. And it seems more reasonable to defer consideration of methods of conserving reform, until it has been decided whether such reform will be undertaken. It may, however, be observed that if the requisite reforms are carried out successfully, there should be no intrinsic difficulty about subsequent conservation of the results; although it will demand a thoroughly efficient

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985 organisation. Moreover, the current cost of such conservation should be balanced by current fees.

But if it is reasonable and proper to defer consideration of conservancy measures which may or may not be needed, consideration of the administrative organisation best suited to give effect to these measures can also be deferred.

2. If the activities to be co-ordinated in the execution of the initial programme of reform are again referred to, it will be seen how slight is any functional aptitude of any of the three specified Departments to undertake this work, and how strong are the reasons of public policy that should preclude them from participation in its conduct. The necessary study and revision of the land law must in any case be taken up by specially selected individuals. The completion of the land survey is the express business of quite another department. Land valuation could no doubt be undertaken by the Revenue Department and the Survey Departments in co-operation, if this was a solitary measure; but it will be more easily, cheaply and satisfactorily effected as part of the general programme of reform. Moreover, it is really preferable that this valuation should be carried out by an organisation occupying a midway position between the fisc and the taxpayer, and not functionally concerned with raising revenue. Again a general settlement of rights is a process that none of the three departments mentioned are in any way organised or equipped to undertake. Such a settlement will necessitate a special staff and special arrangements in any event; while it is imperative that the judicial character and independence of the proceedings shall be unchallengeable. This dominant consideration should preclude all idea of settlement being conducted by either the State Domains or the Tapu Departments. For the State Domains should be responsible for presenting the State's rights as a landholder throughout the whole course of settlement and will thus occupy a partisan position, although most rightly and properly. And during the course of the work the settlement authorities will be continuously required to scrutinise, interpret and adjudicate on Tapu documents and records. It will be the duty of the officials of the Tapu Department to do their best to expound and explain such material to the settlement officers; but the latter must be open to no charge of departmental bias influencing their decisions.

185 647 But although the Departments of Revenue, of State Domains and of Tapu should be dissociated from any participation in the execution of reform, and although they cannot be justly held responsible for failure to unite to produce and promote a programme of such reform in the past, yet the serious character of the defect in organisation indicated by Government, is only emphasised thereby. It is to the lack of a competent executive authority charged with the unified study and conduct of the necessary reforms, that the persistent failure of successive governments throughout the last decade to proceed from discussion to action must be primarily attributed. For the volume of memoranda and correspondence on the subject from the early days of the administration onwards, shows a constant and clearly understood appreciation of the need to put the systems of land tenure and land revenue on to a healthier basis. In the early days settlement of rights indeed appears to have been actually started in one or more districts. But during the latter half of the period the discussions have been characterised by uncertainty and disagreement as to the methods and means whereby the necessary objectives might be attained.

185 If a single central authority, possessing vigour and initiative, had been responsible to Government for the planning and general direction of the requisite reforms, a mass of sterile interdepartmental discussions

would have been avoided and some practical effort to discharge this responsibility must have been made. And no sincere, sensible and united effort could have failed to benefit by the lessons of experience and to have achieved a considerable degree of success by now. If my assistance had still been necessary I should hardly have had to devote time and energy to unearthing and collating details of elementary information needed to arrive at trustworthy primary deductions. This was work which an established organ of Government would have done gradually and methodically year by year, with fuller and more reliable results. But neither organised preparation for, nor organised execution of, these vitally important national reforms was to be expected as the by-product of the unrelated activities of three public services charged with other primary responsibilities. 185

3. Organically therefore the imperative need is to establish as soon as possible in the central administration of Government, a service expressly and exclusively charged with the continued study, preparation and general direction of the measures of executive reform named a little earlier. All that is needed at this stage, and all that is desirable under present conditions, is quite a small office to act as the thinking and directing organ of executive reform. For here again reform must be initiated on the simplest lines that will satisfy bare essentials. But, although the Central Lands Office can be small, its influence and authority within the wide field of its responsibility must be effective. And although every effort has to be made to initiate reform cheaply, this Office must be made efficient if it is to fulfil its purpose and replace in the counsels of Government all unco-ordinated sectional advice.

The main functions of the Central Lands Office may be summarised as follows. It should be the central clearing house, depository and advisory office of Government on all matters of public policy regarding the tenure and use of land. It should have general administrative direction and control of the procedure and operations of settlement and land valuation, which should be treated as a conjoint enterprise. This direction and control should include that of any unavoidable sporadic operations. In the case of such sporadic investigations into existing registered tenures, any necessary measures should be concerted by the Tapu Department and the Central Lands Office in consultation. The Central Lands Office should also have the necessary authority to secure the complete and fully co-ordinated co-operation of the Survey Department in the execution of the programme of settlement and land valuation adopted. The necessary legal assistance should be placed at its disposal, to enable the requisite legislation (and orders thereunder) to be properly drafted, and the progressive amendment of the Land Law to proceed steadily. It should also, with the least possible delay, make a start to ensure the regular collection, tabulation and mathematical scrutiny of all important statistics relating to the land. Such statistics could be collected by the most appropriate or most convenient branch of the public service in each case, but their tabulation and mathematical scrutiny will be carried out most economically and efficiently by the Mathematical Office of the Survey with the assistance of calculating machines.

It should perhaps be emphasised again that the general administrative direction and control of settlement and land valuation exercised by the Central Lands Office must not confer or permit any power to review, criticise or alter any actual decisions of settlement or valuation. The independence of such decisions of all administrative modification must be absolute and indisputable. On due and proper occasion the former will be subject to appeal to the proposed Land Court, while some independent expert body qualified to review and revise land valuations when required would also be necessary.

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4 AND 5. LAND SURVEY

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4. The general direction and control of all survey work should be left to the technical head of that service. Any administrative subordination of the Survey Department to the small Central Lands Office would only be an inconvenience to both sides and nothing is to be gained by it, if it is clearly recognised that the Survey Department's primary duty is to co-operate as closely and effectively as possible with the Lands Office in carrying out the Government's general plan of land reform. For purposes of the programme of land survey, that plan must provide for the progressive requirements of concurrent development in other branches of work, notably of irrigation; but no departures from the approved national programme of survey should be permitted without the concurrence of the Central Lands Office, as the plan of general land reform, its cost and its speed, will be dependent upon a steady and punctual performance of that programme.

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The Survey Department is rightly recognised to be a specialist scientific service; and good work has been done in organising and equipping it for its duties. But its importance as an agent of economic progress appears to me to be insufficiently appreciated, while circumstances have interfered with its vigorous use in the steady execution of a national programme of land survey drawn up in consultation with the public services primarily concerned. It also possesses serious weaknesses which must be cured if it is to play its essential part in the well-co-ordinated effort without which the successful development of the country will remain a dream.

The land survey of a large, varied and previously unmapped country, like el 'Iraq, is a formidable scientific operation. It would be wasteful and short-sighted to an extreme degree to grudge the few additional specialist officers and the gradual addition to its accommodation and resources that are needed to enable this indispensable service to carry out its work punctually, reliably and to proper general advantage. A first-class Observer to push on with the primary triangulation is long overdue. Effective measures must be taken to protect survey reference marks. Additional specialist assistance is greatly needed in the Mathematical Office and in the performance of the chain of scientific processes whereby the surveyors' field work is reproduced and published as series of national maps. Map drawing, map reproduction by modern photo-metal processes and map printing, under the difficult climatic conditions existing in Baghdad, call for great skill, knowledge and experience, if they are to be successfully and economically performed. The publication of the Department's maps is very much in arrear, as has been already noted. And yet the value of national expenditure on survey operations is seriously minimised if the work remains locked away in the Department's cupboards in the form of original drawings, instead of being published in printed maps available to all. More systematic provision for the training of Iraqi staff in the technical operations of survey is also very necessary.

And timely consideration should be given to the whole question of the situation of the Survey Department and the arrangements for its present and future accommodation. The present site of the Department is, or is likely to become, valuable; and it is by no means the most suitable for the delicate processes of map reproduction. Again a fireproof map store is badly needed. The original field sheets and records of the Survey (and to a lesser extent its eventually published map series) represent the capitalised value of all the expenditure of past years on this branch of work. The set back to the country if all these records were destroyed as development of all sorts was at length getting well

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under way, would take many years and a large expenditure of money to retrieve. And such wholesale destructions of valuable public documents have quite frequently occurred elsewhere. Perhaps an opportunity might be found to transfer the whole Department to less valuable, less busy and less dusty, but more commodious precincts, where its map reproduction offices, its map stores, etc., might be planned for gradual expansion as the Land Survey of the country extends. Scientific organisations, such as this, depending upon the punctual co-operation of numerous specialist branches are wasteful to administer if badly arranged and they are costly to move after they have been long established. A central urban situation is neither necessary nor desirable, for the Headquarter Offices of a national land survey.

3. Another matter calling for early consideration is the amalgamation of the two existing organisations charged with the conduct of land survey—the Survey Department proper and the Survey branch of the Tapu Department. The Survey Department has had a somewhat chequered career; but two important steps in the direction of constituting it the single unified national service that is required for the economical and effective conduct of land surveys, appear to have been previously taken. In 1922 about half of the survey staff of the Tapu Department were absorbed by the Survey Department proper; while in 1923 the Irrigation Department, which had previously carried out its own surveys, transferred its Survey Division to the Survey Department. The process should now be completed.

When I was in el 'Iraq the comparable field staff of these two existing land survey services were returned to me as follows:

Survey Department	*Tapu Survey Branch*
3 Survey Officers	1 Director (Mudir)
14 Inspectors	4 Inspectors
100 Surveyors	58 Surveyors

I wish to make it clear that the development of its own little Survey Department by the Tapu Department is a matter for commendation: not for reproach. That Department realised acutely the need to define with some approach to accuracy the parcels of land which were purported to be held on tapu tenure. The National Survey were either non-existent or too weak at the time to assist, so that two parallel survey organisations were established.

The arrangement is none the less indefensible and absurd from the national standpoint. If the land surveys carried out by the smaller organisation are necessary in the public interest they should be carried out under the technical direction and control of the competent public service. In the course of this report various weaknesses in the Survey Department proper have been indicated. Of the lesser service it may be briefly said that, in spite of much keenness and appreciation of technical needs it is not, and cannot be, either properly organised and equipped or adequately directed technically to execute land surveys of the quality and permanence which expenditure of public funds should secure. No country, and particularly no country which requires the utmost economy and efficiency of effort to promote its primary development, should attempt to maintain two organisations to carry out the indivisible task of a national land survey. It is otherwise with what may be called engineering surveying or lay-outs for railways, roads, etc. These are sectional operations which can be best performed by the Engineering services concerned; but even these services should, and no

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185 doubt would, make the fullest use of the National Land Survey and leave all genuine land survey operations to it.

I do not advocate any hasty change. That would probably do more harm than good. But I venture to urge that it should be accepted in principle that this duality must be terminated as rapidly as the mutual convenience of the Survey Department proper and the Tapu Department permit. And among the duties of the proposed Central Lands Office should be the examination at an early date, in consultation with the Tapu Department and the Survey Department, of the comparative public advantages (i) of continuing to carry out the Tapu Department's special programme unabated, or (ii) of employing a portion of the resulting addition to the Survey Department's resources on the greatly needed acceleration of the national programme. I am not questioning the intrinsic value of the former, and so far as it meets specific Land Registry needs which are covered by fees received, it should doubtless be continued; but it may well be that on mature and comprehensive consideration the acceleration of the national programme of survey may justify some sacrifice of the more purely departmental work.

6. Administration of Areas Awaiting Settlement

6. However intensively, and by whatsoever methods, a general settlement of rights to land is conducted, there will for many years be a large balance of unsettled holdings, which balance can only be very gradually redressed. The satisfactory administration of these unsettled holdings pending their turn for settlement, is one of the most serious problems of the transition period; but it is clearly one that will be more manageable and better understood, if homogeneous settled and unsettled areas are maintained so far as possible. Any attempts to effect a general settlement sporadically would not only dissipate energy and resources (as previously pointed out), but also further complicate the administration of unsettled land by causing settled and unsettled holdings to occur increasingly intermixed side by side. It has already been recognised that sporadic settlement of some special holdings will be necessary; but this should not occasion undue difficulty if it is restricted to really necessary cases.

185 647 It is the current mangement of the enormous extent of miri land during the years preceding settlement that is however the main problem. This must in practice be conducted for the most part, as at present, by the local officers of the provincial administration, except in areas under some form of tribal or sectional occupation. Some measure of central supervision and control must be maintained. This can continue to be exercised most suitably by the State Domains Section, which, I believe, is now administered in association with Land Revenue, under the Ministry of Finance. In advance of settlement this association of functions appears to me to be both an economical and a convenient 185 arrangement. If land valuation is undertaken methodically in the manner suggested, there will gradually be formed in advance of settlement a national roll of land revenue payers who will also for the most part be claimants to prescriptive rights to hold and use miri land. So that the connection between the supervision of miri land and of land revenue will throughout the pre-settlement stage be close. After settlement the work of both services should be greatly simplified and new arrangements would probably be required; but these can be more usefully discussed after the measures of executive reform to be undertaken have been decided.

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In advance of settlement, and pending the establishment subsequently of a General Land Register, map records should be constituted showing the position of all land authoritatively reserved for public purposes, or forming the subject of special concessions. These should be kept in duplicate through the agency of the Survey Department at the Headquarters of each liwa and in the capital. All Departments should be instructed to collaborate in the preparation and maintenance of these records, whereby the waste of public funds and the injury to public interests occasioned by conflicting arrangements and authorisations to utilise land might be quickly eliminated, without waiting for the gradual advance of settlement.

All proposed reservations of miri land, all proposed concessions and all proposed expropriations of mulk or tapu land should be examined by a small committee representing the bodies principally concerned in the administration of land or of its use for public purposes. These proposals might then be submitted with the committee's recommendations to the proper Minister, who I take it would normally be the Minister of Finance as custodian both of the public purse and of miri land. In this way all important public interests would receive consideration before land was reserved, conceded or expropriated for any special purpose. To make the record as complete as possible the location of all existing reservations, concessions, etc., should be examined and defined, so far as available information permits. In the case of urban areas the local record would most conveniently be kept in the town concerned.

Since the proposed record is in the form of maps indicating specific locations of land, the work of constructing and maintaining it should be entrusted to the Survey Department. The Headquarter Offices of the Survey would also be the best place to keep the authorised duplicates of the local maps, so that all changes could be regularly and easily incorporated. A Survey Officer might also conveniently act as the Secretary of the suggested Examining Committee.

7 and 8. Ministerial Grouping of Services

7. If settlement of rights and land valuation are undertaken on the lines recommended, four Departments of State will be required to perform important functions; but there is a sharp division in the nature of those functions, as already noted.

Two Departments will be charged with the execution of these reforms, viz. the Central Lands Office (with its settlement and valuation field parties) and the Survey Department. Two other Departments, viz. the combined Land Revenue and State Domains Department, and the Tapu Department will be charged respectively with the presentation and support during settlement and valuation (*a*) of the interests of the State as the largest landowner and the collector of land revenue and (*b*) of the registered rights to mulk, tapu and waqf interests.

The two former will be called upon to discharge the functions of impartial and disinterested investigators and recorders of duly established rights. The two latter will be called upon to expound and support as strongly and ably as possible the particular public interests or private rights for which they are responsible.

The first of these services has still to be created and attached to some Ministry. The other three are already in existence, attached respectively to the Ministries of Economics, Communications and Works, of Finance and of Justice. In pursuance of the general inadvisability of

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making avoidable changes at this stage these existing arrangements should not be disturbed. The Central Lands Office would in my opinion be most advantageously attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The supreme importance, for speedy and economical working, of the general and widespread co-operation of the provincial staff of the Ministry of the Interior, both during and in advance of settlement, has previously been emphasised. Indeed, the conduct of settlement, which so closely affects the security, contentment and peacefulness of the whole mass of land-holders and peasantry throughout the country, must in any case be a dominant interest and responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. It is better that this interest should be directly safeguarded and this responsibility directly discharged, by the Ministry most intimately concerned. The arrangements in the field for securing the attendance of claimants and witnesses, as well as for orderly conduct of operations would in any case have to be made by the provincial staff of this Ministry. Settlement Officers and their principal assistants must also for the most part be drawn from the same staff, for that staff constitutes the only body of public servants who combine the necessary qualifications with the necessary experience. Moreover if the Ministry of the Interior undertakes administrative charge of the work, it will be a simpler matter to make changes in the personnel, than it would be if such changes involved transfers to and from another Ministry each time. For while it can be said with confidence that Settlement Officers and Assistant Settlement Officers should normally be recruited from the staff of the Ministry of the Interior, it is not to be expected that all those selected will find the work congenial or will prove successful.

8. I understand that the Ministry of Finance incline to the view that the general administration of settlement and land valuation operations might more appropriately be undertaken by that Ministry. This course would, in my opinion, be inadvisable both in the financial interests of the State and in those of the proposed reforms.

It must, I think, be recognised that the Ministry of Finance occupies an essentially different position and performs essentially different functions to, all other Ministries of State. It is the primary duty of all other Ministries to administer efficiently the specific branches of the public service, executive or judicial, allotted to their control. On the other hand, the distinctive and all-important duties of the Ministry of Finance are (i) to inspire, supervise and control all the operations of Government in so far as they affect the financial position of the State, and (ii) to nurse the economic resources of the country, to study all potential sources of revenue and to make these contribute fairly and without injurious reaction to the income of the State.

The Ministry of Finance must necessarily administer its own financial services; but I venture to think that, otherwise it should aim at as complete a detachment as possible from those administrative and executive functions of Government, which it is its duty to criticise impartially and control closely from a financial standpoint. Not only do the Ministry of Finance's wide and supremely important range of financial and economic functions demand its exclusive and fullest attention, if they are to be performed with any approach to the high standard needed; but the Ministry's duty as the financial watchdog of the State cannot be discharged with the same detachment, and is unlikely to be credited with the same disinterestedness, when applied to its own proceedings.

On these grounds alone it appears to me highly undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should itself assume administrative conduct and control of a new and formidable undertaking which is no part of its financial duties.

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I also believe that the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the public purse, regards itself as the natural trustee and manager of State land and I imagine that it was on this account that the duties of the late State Domains Department were resumed by the Ministry of Finance. Subject to the considerations just urged, no exception to this view is called for, and the transfer was logical. But it should be recognised that (*a*) the current management of, what may be termed, the national estate (miri) and (*b*) the proposed systematic settlement of rights and valuation of land, are not only different but mutually incompatible, undertakings.

During the process of settlement innumerable cases are bound to arise in which the immediate and direct interests of the State, as landowner, will conflict with those of private individuals. It is essential that the former shall be presented as wholeheartedly and singlemindedly as the latter, at every stage of settlement operations. This is a duty which very properly pertains to the Ministry of Finance as custodian of the public purse. For the vast territories of the national estate (miri) represent by far the most important capital asset which el 'Iraq possesses, not excepting her petroliferous deposits. As custodian and advocate of the landed interests of the State in its capacity as landowner, the Ministry of Finance occupies the position, and should be free to act without distraction, as a profoundly interested party. Subject to the general conditions of the settlement law, it should, as a general matter of principle during settlement, offer a healthy opposition through its appropriate Department to all claims to rights over land statutorily in the ownership of the State.

And similar considerations apply to the general methodical valuation of land for fiscal purposes. Here again the organisation charged with execution of the task should occupy a position of cold scientific detachment. Here again there should be provision for appeal from the decisions of the settlement authorities under proper safeguards against obstruction or frivolous abuse. Here again the Ministry of Finance, as custodian of the financial interests of the State, should act as the vigilant and unhampered exponent of those interests. And here again landholders and other parties directly concerned may be relied on to exercise no less vigilance in their endeavours to ensure that the approved results do not unduly favour at their expense, either their neighbours or the State.

In short, the successful and satisfactory execution of settlement of rights and valuation of land for fiscal purposes, requires complete freedom on the part of the Ministry of Finance to defend the financial interests of the State, whether represented by its capital assets in land or its prospective revenue. And such a successful and satisfactory execution also requires a position of recognised and unchallengeable impartiality on the part of the Ministry responsible for the administrative conduct of these operations. On these further grounds also it appears to me most undesirable that the Ministry of Finance should undertake this part of the general task.

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PART IX.—GENERAL REVIEW OF PROBLEM

1. Old Conditions and New

000 In conclusion it may be useful to review the problem in the wider setting of the general agricultural development which it is the main purpose to stimulate and serve. The land traversed by the historic rivers of el 'Iraq was one of the cradles of civilisation. It has been the seat of a succession of famous kingdoms. It was one of the birthplaces of artificial irrigation. If not the earliest, it was the best known, source of mineral fuel. And from time immemorial it has been recognised as one of the most fertile areas in the world. The country thus played a part second to none in earlier days and still possesses exceptional natural resources. Unfortunately these initial advantages have been nullified by centuries of unprogressive administration and by the unprecedented progress in human organisation and scientific advance made in the meanwhile elsewhere.

439 In ancient days bursting granaries represented prosperity and constituted wealth. The old world was small and its good grain lands scarce; while those of el 'Iraq were productive and accessible by the leisurely transport of the time. To-day the grain lands of civilised man circle the globe; while science and organisation have enabled him everywhere to enhance quality and yield many fold, as well as to obliterate distance. Moreover, with increasing individual well-being and vastly increased control of the earth's resources, mankind is eating a smaller proportion of bread and demanding a greater proportion of other commodities. And since he has the whole world competing to meet his requirements, everywhere he is selecting higher quality, cleaner, better graded, better packed produce and rejecting inferior supplies. There is a belief prevalent in el 'Iraq, as in other countries, that combines, rings and other marketing associations have power to affect the nation's trade critically. Temporary and restricted effects they may have: but the modern world is too closely knit together and the volume of its trade far too large and too complex to allow such manœuvres to prevent any reliable supply of satisfactory goods from finding its proper market before long. And since solid and efficient trading associations are partners in the nation's prosperity, it is to the interest of all such associations to promote the expansion of the country's trade and the reputation of its goods in the world's markets.

185 But el 'Iraq to-day must be recognised as being in the position of an old estate, previously rich, still very valuable potentially, but now derelict through long bad management, accentuated by changing needs and progress elsewhere. And its difficulties have been enhanced by its unfavourable transport connections with the outside world, as judged by modern requirements. Subject to the over-riding necessity of preserving public order and contentment and to the steady improvement of communications, the country's primary need is the reclamation of its derelict national estate and the regeneration of its agriculture. No intelligent and progressive person inheriting such an estate would fail to recognise the wisdom of spending on it the capital sums needed to bring it to a high pitch of prosperity again. Such expenditure planned on well-considered lines, carefully managed financially, and devoted

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solely to the productive regeneration of the estate, should soon prove a profitable investment. If the accompanying returns of Budgetary Revenue and Expenditure during the nine years 1921-29 are referred to, it will be seen how small a sum, both absolutely and relatively, the Government has been able so far to allot to land development services. And

TABLE VII. TOTAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE, 1921-1929

Nature of Service	Expenditure in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total expenditure
General National Charges*	325·5	6·9
Finance	619·4	13·1
Interior	1,068·3	22·7
Health	221·9	4·7
Defence	980·1	20·9
Justice	125·2	2·6
Education	223·2	5·0
Communications and works ..	680·6	14·5
Lands Services†	454·0	9·6
Total ..	4,698·2	100·0

*Civil List of H.M. the King, Parliament, Council of Ministers, Comptroller and Auditor-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Debt and Pensions, Antiquities and Census Departments.

†Departments of Irrigation, Agriculture, Veterinary Service, Land Survey, Taps, State Domains and Ministerial Services of the Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture during its existence.

necessarily only a modicum of that sum could be utilised for capital improvements. If expenditure on capital development continues to be limited to what can be spared from current resources, it is to be feared that the economic revival of the country must be indefinitely retarded.

TABLE VIII. TOTAL BUDGETARY REVENUE, 1921-1929

Nature of Revenue	Revenue in lakhs of rupees	Percentage of total revenue
Direct Revenues from land*	1,619·3	32·7
Customs and Excise	2,248·4	45·4
Post and Telegraph Receipts ..	287·1	5·8
Other revenues	795·7	16·1
Total ..	4,950·5	100·0

*Land revenue, animal tax, receipts of land services, mines, rents of Government property, etc.

2. Three Spheres of Reform

2. In the northern Rainfall Zone the effects of past neglect are less obvious and the problem of agricultural development less intricate owing to this area being predominantly independent of irrigation: but otherwise there is just as great a need for a steady programme of agrarian reform here as in the South.

The three great obstacles to the agricultural development, and, therefore, to the economic advance of el 'Iraq may be summarised as:

in the south (*a*) the absence of an adequate irrigation system, and throughout the country

(*b*) the rude methods of cultivation and stock-keeping practised, and

(*c*) the chaotic state of land tenure.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH1 Iraq MH1

312 The inadequacy of the existing irrigation system is generally recognised in so far as it relates to the great incompleteness of the network of engineering works needed, such as storage reservoirs, flood embankments, regulator constructions, delivery and drainage channels: but it appears at present to be insufficiently appreciated in the country that the proper utilisation and maintenance of these expensive works is even more important than their construction and probably calls for greater technical skill at the outset. It is a serious mistake to suppose that the management of a great engineering undertaking, such as a national irrigation system, is a simpler problem than its design and construction, or that such management can be economically and wisely left to inexpert hands or to officials primarily occupied with other duties.

242 The primitive methods of cultivation, stock-keeping and disposal of produce prevalently practised, as well as their marked effect on the quantity and quality of the country's output and on its reputation in the world's markets, have been repeatedly emphasised and need only be mentioned here.

439 To build up her prosperity el 'Iraq must evidently develop her export trade both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is therefore of

TABLE IX. MAIN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS DURING FIVE YEARS 1925-6 TO 1929-30

Product	Quantity in thousands of tons	Value in lakhs of rupees
Living animals (horses, camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc.)	835·6*	87·7
Raw cotton	3·2	32·7
Dates	824·3	902·1
Grain, etc. (barley, pulse, rice, wheat, etc.)	366·2	449·1
Hides (cow, sheep, goats, wild animal, etc.)	9·3	171·9
Intestines (casings)	0·6	70·1
Raw silk	0·005	0·7
Tobacco	0·8	9·2
Raw wool	32·4	368·2

*Thousands of animals.

great importance to follow the statistics of external trade continuously and to endeavour to adjust the country's agricultural output unceasingly to world demand. Unlike the various land statistics, which have proved so difficult to collect and so unreliable when collected, the Trade statistics kept by the Customs and Excise Department appear not only to be in excellent order but to be used. No attempt will be made to discuss these valuable figures here: but the nature, quantity and value of the principal exports of agricultural products during the five years 1923-6 to 1929-30 in the accompanying table should be noted.

242 It is in experimenting in the culture of new or improved products required by the world, in adapting them to local environment, in multiplying them for local growth, and in demonstrating their successful cultivation and disposal on a commercial scale, that scientific agricultural research stations, progressive landed estates and well-managed marketing bodies, have such an indispensable part to play in the general development of the country's agriculture.

185 The establishment of an efficient national irrigation system and the application of the lessons of progressive scientific research and experience elsewhere must be recognised as two of the fundamental conditions of

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHI Iraq MHI
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any solid economic advance in el 'Iraq. The third is the introduction and maintenance of a simple, secure and equitable land tenure, which term should be understood to include an even and readily met revenue demand. This report is only directly concerned with the last need: but in studying it, its inter-relation to the other two must be continuously kept in mind. No development of the country's agricultural resources can expect to be successful which does not take all these three needs into consideration together.

3. Comparison with Egypt

3. During the progress of my inquiry comparisons were frequently instituted with Egypt, a country with many parallels to el 'Iraq both in its history and its natural conditions. Owing to the courtesy of the Egyptian Government I am able to compare in Table X the respective positions on certain salient points of el 'Iraq in 1929 and of Egypt in successive decades from 1882 onwards. It will be noted that during the last fifty years Egypt has more than doubled her population, added 30 per cent. to her cropped area, quadrupled her trade, and her budget, built up a substantial budgetary reserve, and largely absorbed her original external debt.

TABLE X. COMPARATIVE FIGURES, EL 'IRAQ AND EGYPT

		EL 'IRAQ	EGYPT					
		1929	1882	1890	1900	1910	1920	1929
Population in millions		2·8	6·8	8·2	10·1	11·8	13·2	14·4
Gross cultivable area, sq. km.		90,000	32,000					
Area cropped yearly, sq. km.		10,000	24,000*	27,000*	30,000*	32,000*	34,000*	36,000*
Imports	Million rupees	980	1,100	1,100	1,900	3,200	14,000	7,200
Exports		560	1,800	1,700	2,400	4,000	11,800	7,800
Re-exports		510†	14	40	80	60	350	190
Land Revenue		168	680‡	700‡	600‡	700‡	700‡	730‡
Customs Revenue		274	80	190	330	480	1,370	1,020
Total Budgetary Revenue		570	1,300	1,650	1,630	2,960	4,700	5,790
Total Budgetary Expenditure		560	1,230	1,560	1,500	2,340	4,000	5,690
Budgetary Reserve Fund				200	1,150	790	2,370	5,540
Debt§			10,900	13,100	13,000	13,100	12,900	12,400

*From ½ to ⅔ cropped twice. Net area cultivated in 1929 was 23,000 sq. km.

†Goods in transit, not included in imports.

‡Yield maintained constant on re-assessment following revenue settlement. Fluctuations due to remissions to unwatered land followed by extensions of irrigation.

§Mostly held in Egypt now.

Egypt is more favourably situated geographically than el 'Iraq; while Mahommed Ali Pasha did much to initiate early in the last century the reform of her land tenure which has proceeded since. And it will be seen that even fifty years ago Egypt was considerably more populous and wealthier than el 'Iraq is to-day. But el 'Iraq is by no means devoid of advantages also. She has Egypt's established success before her. Her cultivable area is larger and more diverse, so that she is in a better position to develop a varied export trade. She is free of unproductive debt and can devote all funds not absorbed by current needs, to productive purposes. And her petroliferous deposits provide her with special financial aid at the most useful moment. So that a comparable advance to that made by Egypt may be hoped for, if a comparable effort can be made.

The unavoidably lengthy duration of a general settlement of rights to land in el 'Iraq has been emphasised several times in this report: although no precise estimate of the period required is practicable in the

which the Administration were unable to provide. And even if this radical defect had been remedied the application of this advanced tenure would have been premature throughout the majority of the country. So that to-day—more than half a century after the introduction of the Ottoman Land Code in the country—only a fraction of the cultivated region is somewhat uncertainly held on tapu tenure, while throughout the overwhelming balance, land is for the most part occupied and cultivated on no legal tenure at all. 123 471

The injurious effects of the prevailing welter of insecurity and confusion both on agricultural productivity and on public order have been emphasised in the body of this report and are too well known to need repetition. The main problem of land tenure may therefore be summarised as the need to establish security and clarity of tenure everywhere by a general definition and settlement on a clear legal basis of both statutory and equitable rights to land. The broad objective should be to confirm and maintain beneficial occupation and use, whenever this is reconcilable with the equitable treatment of third parties and the just interests of the public. 185

It is very understandably urged that the proper course is to extend tapu tenure generally throughout the cultivated territory, subject of course to the requisite clarification of that tenure and its adaptation to national requirements. Excellent as the chief characteristics of tapu tenure are, and advantageous as the suggested course may prove ultimately to be, this is too ambitious a plan to be practicable at present. It is what the Ottoman Government attempted and failed to do, and the causes for their failure must be remedied before that attempt can be successfully repeated. This was implicitly recognised by the Turks themselves some years before the war in a provisional law already cited. No useful purpose will be served by examining here the prospects of practical success of this now defunct measure. But it is certain that it is beyond the present capacity of el 'Iraq to establish the detailed cadastral survey and land register of the requisite accuracy and authority. And without these accompaniments any ostensible general introduction of tapu tenure would be to grasp an attractive shadow in preference to the substance of a solid and attainable reform. To place even the admitted rights to tapu tenure on an intelligible and proper basis will be a most difficult and lengthy undertaking.

Occasional and sporadic grants of miri land in tapu tenure can, of course, be made and implemented in due course if special justification arises and special efforts are taken. But no general grant of tapu tenure can be made effective for many years to come. And while islands of secure tenure and good culture are most valuable, it is the establishment of a general reform giving security of tenure to the mass of existing landholders and cultivating tenants, which is needed to stimulate enterprise and development throughout the length and breadth of the country and thereby promote economic revival on a national scale.

A hardly less important accompanying reform is the establishment of a uniform and equitable basis for land revenue collection. Here again the Turkish administrator perseveringly sought to establish in his land tax (werko) a measure admirable in principle and conception. But here again he was unable to translate his measure effectively and generally from the Statute book to the land. And here again no far-reaching or solid success is practicable in the absence of a reliable land survey, or without a general settlement of rights and a methodical valuation of the land, as was also ultimately recognised by the Ottoman Government.

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHl Iraq MHl

5. Summary of Recommendations

● 185 5. The dominant facts to be taken into consideration in planning these reforms are the magnitude of the task and the poverty of el 'Iraq's resources at present in experienced public servants, in money and in equipment. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the simplest measures that will secure the main essentials shall be adopted. Anything less will be waste of money and effort. Anything more, at this stage, will divert money, effort and equipment from complementary productive reforms.

The simplest form of tenure that can be adopted at present for miri land is the effective application of the leasehold, under which it is already in theory commonly supposed to be held. This will be immeasurably easier to operate than tapu tenure. And leaseholds which work successfully can give the great body of landholders a clarity and security of tenure in practice, which will not be realisable under tapu tenure until a proper cadastral survey of the country has been executed and an efficient system of registration of title to land is in general operation.

It would also seem wiser for the State to retain the residuary freedom it would still possess under the leasehold system to occupy and use miri land for national purposes, until the land surface of a district has been mapped and contoured, and the irrigation and communications systems projected therein have been planned in detail. For many years to come el 'Iraq will possess a superabundance of potentially valuable agricultural land, so that in planning new works it should always be possible to re-arrange holdings to the common advantage of the holders and the State. But if a general policy of granting land in tapu tenure is adopted in advance of the planning of the national estate, expropriation would have to be resorted to, to resume land so granted. And expropriation would be more troublesome, slower and more costly, all of which would ultimately re-act on the general taxpayers and on the progress of development as a whole.

000 The principal measures recommended in the main body of this report may now be summarised very briefly :

(i) The establishment of a small Central Lands Office attached to the Ministry of the Interior. This office would be responsible for the continued study of land tenure and allied questions and for the general direction of the executive programme of reform recommended (viii, 8 and 7).

(ii) The Survey Department, the State Domains service, and the Tapu Department to remain attached to their present Ministries (viii, 7).

(iii) The remedy of a number of important weaknesses in the organisation and equipment of the Survey Department and the unification of all land survey required by the State under this service (ii, 5 and viii, 4 and 5).

(iv) A combined programme of a skeleton form of cadastral survey, of settlement of rights to land, and of land valuation, on the simplest lines to be carried methodically through the country (v, 7, vi, 1-5 and 9).

(v) Land survey operations to be conducted under the unfettered technical direction of the Survey Department, but in accordance with the general programme adopted, after due consultation, by the Central Lands Office (viii, 8 and 4).

(vi) The parallel operations of settlement of rights to land and of land valuation in the field to be undertaken by selected Administrative Officers working under the general administration of the Central Lands Office, and helped by suitable assistant officers (vi, 4 and 5, viii, 3). 000

(vii) The comprehensive study and progressive amendment of the Land Code and supplementary legislation, so as to make the statutory land law clear, consistent, and workable and better adapted to local needs and conditions (vii, 1).

(viii) The establishment of a special Land Court to hear due and proper appeals from the decisions of Settlement Officers in regard to rights to land (vi, 3).

(ix) The establishment of a suitable independent body to hear similar due and proper appeals in regard to the valuation of land (viii, 3).

(x) The general policy animating settlement of rights to land to be the confirmation and maintenance of beneficial occupation and use whenever reconcilable with the equitable treatment of third parties and the just interests of the public. Existing legal tenures to be duly recognised: but the possession of miri land to be granted out on leasehold, which it is suggested might normally be for ten-year periods.

The above are all measures for the initial execution of the reforms. Owing to the complexity and many-sidedness of the problem, it is better to defer detailed consideration of the measures of conservation that would be subsequently needed, until Government has decided whether to proceed with the programme of initial reforms or not. The nature of these subsequent measures of conservation, have been indicated in previous parts of this report (e.g., viii, 1).

The greatest pains have been taken throughout to suggest the simplest and cheapest measures which are capable, if steadily and effectively applied, of establishing the land tenure and land revenue of the country on a generally acceptable and economically sound foundation. It is earnestly hoped that the interdependence of these measures will be recognised and that the scheme put forward will be considered as a united whole. And I venture more particularly here to emphasise the desirability of entrusting the conduct of settlement and land valuation operations in the field to selected Administrative Inspectors, at least during the earlier years of the work. As has been represented earlier (vi, 4) the qualifications that these officers possess make them exceptionally fitted for the execution of this most onerous, greatly needed, but essentially transitory, task.

6 and 7. Concluding Considerations

6. But the central question for Government to decide is whether to undertake a comprehensive programme of practical reform or to leave things as they are. As has been noted more fully earlier in this report, the importance of putting the land tenure of the country on to a clear, equitable and stable basis was appreciated at the very outset of the establishment of modern el 'Iraq. It has received most earnest consideration ever since. And yet it has to be recognised that more than a decade has passed without any effective steps in the desired direction having been taken. The times have been troubled, the pre-occupations of Government great, while a decade is a brief space in the lifetime of a 185

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MH1 Iraq MH1

185 people. So there is nothing unusual in the failure so far to attack this evil effectively. Richer and more experienced countries have done no better. Indeed it is remarkable that the importance of the question was realised so quickly and appears to be understood so generally throughout the country.

But attention has to be directed to the past as a guide to the future. For this reason it should be realised that ten years, during which a great deal of thought and labour have been devoted to the subject, have elapsed without any constructive measure for the general improvement of the tenure of land by the mass of landowners and cultivators having been carried out. And although ten years is a short span in a country's history it is a considerable portion of a man's life. Resolute and well-directed effort during the next ten years could put the tenure of land throughout the bulk of the country on to an essentially sound and satisfactory footing; whereas the next ten, twenty, or a hundred years will find the prevailing evils still uncured if they are not attacked on more practical lines than hitherto. And it should perhaps again be stressed that few countries exhibit such deplorably unstable and confused conditions of land tenure, or are so dependent for the creation of the wealth they need, upon stimulating the energy of the whole agricultural population and safeguarding their attachment to the land. For while no proper development of the country's resources is possible without a well planned and well regulated system of irrigation or without assimilating and applying the lessons of scientific and economic advance elsewhere, yet the fruitfulness of these measures will ultimately depend upon the individual efforts of the great mass of landholders and cultivators throughout the country.

7. And the past history of the land should also help the public to realise that the present long established and deep-seated evils cannot be cured by edict or in a year or two. The establishment in practice throughout the country of a secure legal land tenure will not be brought about by a vote in the Legislative Chamber nor by any official actions alone. A considerable amount of preparatory work must precede any useful legislation: and such preparatory work must be well conceived and thorough if it is to yield satisfactory, economical and assured results. For even the most appropriate legislation is only the national authority to proceed. Before such legislation can be implemented attention must be directed to providing the necessary working organisation, to securing suitable officers, and to formulating investigatory and technical procedure which will both satisfy the practical requirements of the work and ensure the co-operation of the agricultural population. For success must be gauged by its ultimate effects, and it will be decisively determined in the open fields by the confidence felt by the general body of landholders and cultivators in the integrity and competence of the settlement staff, by the reasonableness and dispatch of the procedure adopted, and by the equity and stability of the findings.

3: Clark S-6 (1960)1961 MH Iraq MH

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education is not possible without some reference to the history and present circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Administrative reforms and some social advance were attempted during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

powerful local landowners operated as effective obstacles to compulsory schooling.

Despite this initial failure of a modest attempt to apply compulsory education in certain parts of the country, enlightened opinion in Iraq is strongly in favour of educational development. Because of the economic, political and social obstacles which will have to be overcome before a real approach to universal compulsory education can be made, few if any of the country's educators feel that this desirable objective is likely to be achieved in a short time. As educators, however, and for educational reasons, they are anxious that the practicability of achieving a realistic approach towards compulsory education should be soberly investigated. This enlightened minority are likely to be assisted in their demands by pressure of nationalist opinion, which sees in the development of education a means of spreading national culture and national sentiments among the people.

There are other important reasons why the time is ripe for assessing the ways and means by which compulsory education can be approached. Although Iraq, like many other countries is, economically, passing through a difficult stage, rapid development in thought and ways of life is taking place. The country is at present at the cross-roads between traditional and modern or western civilization. Change and development, in one direction or another, seem to be the order of the day. It is for this reason that a contemporary Iraqi educator urges that the present time 'affords a unique opportunity for making a good start in education'.

Before, however, considering the practicability of making a 'good start' or at any rate a new start in the direction of compulsory education, consideration must be given to the educational needs of the country at its present stage of development and the extent to which these needs are being met by the existing system. It will then be possible to consider, in the light of prevailing economic, political and social conditions, ways and means of achieving further advance.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

If developments of this kind proceed it is likely that the agricultural productivity of Iraq will increase considerably. Although most of the profits will find their way into the pockets of a few, more taxable wealth is likely to be produced which could wisely be devoted to the development of educational and other social services. Indeed, if means could be devised of applying income tax to such profits, considerable additional revenues for public services would accrue.

The Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. But perhaps the most hopeful and significant economic and social development which is taking place in Iraq is the Dujaila Project of Land Settlement. Some years ago, as one of the first attempts at land reform, the Government distributed parcels of land to small, independent farmers. The Government provided the irrigation facilities and, on the land which could consequently be brought under cultivation, allowed families to settle. The scheme was not nearly so successful as it should have been, partly because some of the tenants lacked sufficient farming experience but mainly because it was not accompanied by a scheme for providing agricultural advice. Further, because of the failure to institute adequate drainage arrangements, there is a danger that much of the land in the settlement area will lose its fertility through otherwise avoidable salinity.

In the Dujaila area, in the province of Kut, the Government are now in process of organizing a much more satisfactory and intelligently conceived scheme of land settlement. In 1945 a large tract of hitherto uncultivated land, roughly seventy kilometres long and about half that distance wide, was selected as an area for land settlement. The scheme is being organized by a department known as the Dujaila Directorate to which a reasonable delegation of powers has been given. Its main features may be summarized as follows:

(1) Each settler, who must have had previous agricultural experience in or near the locality, is provided with a holding of about sixty acres. The settler has to sign a well-devised form of contract which binds him for a period of ten years to farm his holding in accordance with advice given by the agriculturalists and horticulturalists attached to the Directorate. At the end of ten years the holding is apparently vested in the holder in a form of limited freehold.

(2) Each settler is eligible to apply for an initial grant not exceeding £100 for the purchase of equipment, assistance towards the building of his house and farm buildings.

(3) Each settler must plant sufficient trees around his holding,

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

must establish a horticultural plot, and on his arable land must maintain a balance between summer and winter planting. He must also devote sufficient land for stock pasture.

(4) Each settler must, from his own resources, level, hedge and provide irrigation ditches for his own plot.

(5) A co-operative society is formed and run by the holders. So far some 1,026 holdings have been established in the Dujaila area, and the total population of adults and children is between 12,000 and 15,000. At present there are only two schools with a total roll of 300 children, but the parents appear to be pressing for more educational facilities and two new schools, of good design, are in process of construction. The Provincial Director of Education, who takes a keen interest in the scheme, has plans for a distribution of primary schools throughout the whole area to avoid long travel by young children, and also wishes to establish intermediate and secondary schools situated in a central village which is about to be built. He is anxious that the upper forms of the primary schools shall develop a rural bias and that the intermediate and secondary schools shall have 'agricultural streams'.

It is perhaps early to judge the success of this scheme, which has been in operation for only four years and is still in process of development. From carefully checked evidence, however, it appears that the holders, most of whom were previously landless cultivators living at a low subsistence level, are making an average income of between £300 and £400 per annum. The sponsors of the scheme also maintain that, whereas the average grain produced from one dunum of land on privately owned farms in the neighbourhood is 100 kilos, the average from the same area in the Dujaila district is 250 kilos. From admittedly superficial observation the tenants would certainly appear to be living a richer and more robust life than their neighbours who remain landless cultivators. Many of the tenants have provided themselves with houses which, by local standards, are comfortably designed and furnished. The men have an appearance of dignity and independence. Indeed, it is claimed that 'you can always recognize a Dujaila man in the streets of Kut because of his confidence and bearing'.

The scheme has, possibly, certain deficiencies in that the tenants, apart from improving their holdings by tree planting, hedging and irrigation channels, are required to pay no rent. True they make a certain contribution to the public purse through the sales tax, but it may be wondered how wise it is to encourage an attitude of 'something for nothing'. Public services are badly needed in Iraq and even new land settlers should realize that they must be paid for. It is understood, however, from discussion

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

with some of those concerned that the question of rentals is to be considered. Capital also will soon be needed for drainage works and, here again, the tenants should be expected to make their contribution.

With this possible drawback which may soon be set right, the Dujaila Scheme of Land Settlement is important as a pointer towards one means of altering the prevailing land tenure system. As has been suggested earlier in this study, so long as this system remains unaltered it will never be possible to produce sufficient national wealth and to release that part of it which is necessary for the finance of projects such as the provision of compulsory education. Radically to reform the land tenure system at the present time would not be possible, because those who profit from it are a powerful influence in the country. Fortunately, however, there exist great tracts of uncultivated government land throughout the country which, when water is brought to them in a way similar to that in the Dujaila area, will be amenable to similar development.

Projects of this kind are being applied in five or six other regions, although most of the others are not at the advanced stage of the Dujaila project. The scheme of land settlement is significant in relation to the future development of education in that, if it continues as present indications suggest, it is both providing more taxable wealth for public services and is raising the standard of living of its participants who should thus be more ready to seek educational opportunities for their children. Equally important, it is producing men with a greater freedom and independence who are bound to be more articulate concerning social affairs and who will ultimately be able to play their part in democratic local government. One of the features of Iraqi political and social life which strikes a visitor to the country is that, apart from the official class who, incidentally are mainly men of urban background or urban education, there is little in the way of a middle class in the towns and nothing approaching a middle section of the community in the villages. It may well be that, by providing the participants with a better standard of life and consequently of self-esteem, land settlement schemes of this kind will have the effect of promoting a rural middle class who will not only bridge the existing wide gap between the very rich and the very poor but will demand their share in local affairs and thus help to promote a more vigorous local government.

Great credit must go to the Government for fostering such a bold social experiment, to the Director of the Dujaila Project for his obviously selfless devotion to the work, and to the Provincial Director of Education for attempting to plan a schools system in

3: Clark S-6 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

CHAPTER SIX

A POLICY OF ADVANCE TOWARDS COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

So far in this study an attempt has been made to ascertain the main educational needs of Iraq, to evaluate recent developments in primary education both quantitatively and qualitatively, to demonstrate the enormous obstacles to further advance and to illustrate, from examples, the ways in which some of these obstacles are being overcome. It is clear, however, that while some circumstances and conditions exist which suggest that the time for further advance is propitious, such advance will only be possible by the adoption and persistent implementation of a policy which takes into account both the desired objective and the obstacles which still have to be surmounted. The obstacles are clear enough. The desired objective is also clear, always provided it is appreciated that quantitative advance is not in itself sufficient. What is needed is not only a policy of advance which will get more children into school, but one which will ensure that children enjoy forms of primary education which are related to their individual needs and to the special needs of Iraq.

Before considering possible lines of advance towards compulsory education for all children in schools of the right type, it is necessary to call to mind the magnitude of the task quantitatively. With a potential primary school population of 750,000 children which is rising daily, with not more than twenty-four per cent of this number now attending school for periods of varying duration, with a national budget which is barely balanced, with a country which is badly in need of other public services, it would appear to be unrealistically idealistic to assume that any effective advance towards universal compulsory education could be achieved over any short period of years. The present total education budget would have to be more than doubled to provide primary education for all children at existing standards, some 15,000 additional teachers would have to be trained, and a sum of money which it is not possible to estimate would be required for capital expenditure on school buildings.

The magnitude of the problem, however, is not new to the Ministry of Education. In 1946 a special committee of the Ministry drew up a 'Ten-Year Plan' in which it was suggested that, provided

3t Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

871 645 185 certain administrative reforms were introduced into the Ministry itself, and provided a vigorous educational drive was made, it should prove possible within ten years to achieve a total school attendance of fifty per cent of all children of primary school age. Under this plan it was hoped that it would be possible to train 400 additional teachers in the first year and provide for an increased school attendance of some 12,000 children. At this rate of progress some 42,000 additional children should have been attending primary schools by the end of 1949. Actually the total increased primary school attendance between 1946 and 1949 amounted to some 34,000 children. This increase took place despite the fact that, apart from some not too satisfactory measures for the short-term training of teachers, the reforms advocated by the special committee of the Ministry of Education were never put into operation. In other words, the recent quantitative advance appears to have resulted not so much through any 'Ten-Year Plan' as because of continued public pressure.

871 185 There is no doubt that this public pressure for more schools will continue and that, unless a more vigorous policy of coping with the demand is initiated, quantitative demand will continue for some years to outstrip primary school provision. Indeed, when one looks back over a period of years and realizes that, whereas in 1931 there were not more than 35,000 children attending primary schools, there are now 175,000 children, there is little cause for any immediate pessimism so far as numerical advance is concerned. It is for this reason that some Iraqi educational reformers maintain that, on the assumption that quantitative development goes on at the same total pace, i.e., another five-fold increase over the next twenty years, compulsory education of a type could be achieved by 1970. It is not possible, however, to predict the future rate of progress even in general terms because, although quantitative growth has been rapid since 1930, it cannot go on beyond a certain point until some of the economic, political and social obstacles already outlined have been solved. Although numerical development has increased five-fold since 1930, that rate of increase will undoubtedly drop when the children of the relatively higher income groups are in school and when the Ministry of Education is confronted with the task of meeting the needs of the children of very poor parents and those who are living under semi-settled or nomadic conditions.

If these suppositions are valid, the broad lines of a policy of genuine advance towards compulsory education become clearer. First, steps must be taken to cope with the present unsatisfied demand for primary education. Secondly, consideration will sooner or later have to be given to the measures which will need to be

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taken to provide both for the children whose parents cannot yet afford to send them to school and those who are living under partly or entirely nomadic conditions. Equally important, preparations will need to be made for ensuring that qualitative accompanies quantitative progress. If real advance towards compulsory education is desired, some of these measures will have to be taken immediately; others will have to be developed more gradually. Consideration must, therefore, now be given to a policy of advance towards compulsory education which includes both immediate and long-term measures.

A SHORT-TERM POLICY

COPING WITH EXISTING DEMANDS

The most immediate necessity is that measures should be taken to meet the demands of parents who wish to send their children to primary schools. Some advocates of educational advance do not recommend this immediate action, urging that the more important task is to improve the quality of the existing schools. It is doubtful whether this view could be sustained: it would provoke further parental disillusionment and deprive many children of a fair start in life.

An attempt should, therefore, be made to ascertain the extent of this immediate problem by asking every Provincial Director of Education to give, from his local knowledge, details of the number of children in the province who would attend school under existing conditions if accommodation were available for them, the number of new schools needed and the extra teachers required. The results would probably be surprising in that they would demonstrate a public desire for education in the provinces of which the Ministry of Education may not be entirely aware.

These needs should be met forthwith and financed by a special allocation from the central budget in the next financial year. The extra teachers could be found partly by abandoning uneconomic rented premises which are wasteful of teaching staff, but mainly by 'stepping-up' existing teacher training provision as an emergency measure. Some new buildings would be necessary but many of these, at any rate in the smaller towns and villages, would be provided voluntarily from local resources. In the larger towns, consideration should be given to a suggestion made by an Iraqi economist that new school buildings could be provided through

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

000 the floating of local public loans which could be partly redeemed by the gradual release of the large sums of 'dead money' which are at present being spent on rented premises which cannot be used economically.

In other words, what is needed at the present time is a vigorous administrative gesture which would assure the public that the Ministry of Education is controlling the existing pressure for primary schools rather than being jockeyed along by it.

REFORM OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

871 But perhaps before the Ministry of Education can itself promote
185 immediate measures of this kind with the vigour required,
645 consideration will have to be given once more to two major administrative reforms which were advocated by the special committee appointed to draw up the 'Ten-Year Plan' in 1946.

The Minister as a Trustee of the Public Educational Interest. Until very recently the advent of a new Minister of Education has tended to be accompanied by abrupt changes and reverses of educational policy, and sometimes by changes in official personnel. This is certainly not calculated to assist that continuity and persistence in educational policy which is so essential at the present time.

Some maintain that this unfortunate tendency has been due to the intrusion of party politics and sectarian interests into the Ministry. If this is true, it should be emphasized that a Ministry of Education, while being responsive to sound educational opinion, should always endeavour independently to attach itself to national educational policy which is free from these non-educational considerations.

It is probably nearer the truth to suggest that these fluctuations in educational policy are due as much to the influence of the individual opinions and plans of the Ministers themselves. It is perhaps natural in a young and rapidly developing country that Ministers should wish to leave their own impress on the country's educational affairs. It is not desirable, however, that they should have the unrestricted power to do this, and in any event they should be required to justify proposed changes before men who have had long experience of education and educational administration. It is refreshing, therefore, to gather from conversations with some of the recent holders of this important office that the time may be approaching when the Minister tends more and more to regard himself, not as one who is entitled to control

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

educational policy in the light of opinions and schemes based on his own inevitably limited educational experience, or by considerations of his own political group or sect, but as a trustee of the educational interest of the whole country.

The Formation of a National Council of Education. It was also suggested by the special committee referred to that a means of assisting successive Ministers to pursue a consistent policy of educational advance would be the creation of a National Council of Education which would be composed of Directors-General of Education, the Deans of Institutions of Higher Education, representatives from other Ministries whose co-operation is essential in educational progress, representatives appointed by Parliament, and other leading personalities in the country. It was suggested that 'the principle function of this National Council of Education should be to ensure that educational policy is well-founded and that there is stability in its application'. In other words, the National Council of Education would be a continuing body pledged to an agreed national policy of educational development from which successive Ministers of Education would find it difficult to depart.

It appears that a properly constituted National Council of Education has never been formed. Some such bodies have been established and abolished from time to time at the discretion of successive Ministers. One reason given for failure to maintain a National Council of Education is that the Minister should justify himself, not to a Committee of 'experts' but to public opinion. Theoretically there is much to be said for such an explanation but, in a country where the bulk of the population have not had educational opportunity and cannot therefore be articulate in public affairs, it is difficult to decide what constitutes a sound public opinion in matters educational.

A new Education Law giving the Ministry of Education the necessary powers and duties to cope with present pressing demands and needs is overdue. Such a law should include categorical provision for the establishment of a well-balanced National Council of Education with a dignified status. It should have definite powers and duties and meet at regular and legally stipulated intervals. The Minister should be required to consult the Council on major changes of policy, and should not make changes without a majority decision by it. The Council should approve all major plans and developments and regulations of the Ministry before they become effective. Most important, the National Council should have the power of initiating discussion and enquiry as it thinks fit, and should not necessarily await the invitation of the Minister before so doing.

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

871 There are signs that the present time is opportune for the formation of this body. The writer had the privilege of being present at a recent *ad hoc* gathering of men prominent in the educational affairs of Iraq, presided over by the Minister of Education. The level of discussion was exceptionally high, and one advantage of the meeting was that the Minister was both able to be made aware of trends of opinion and in turn to bring to the notice of the 'experts' practical administrative considerations which might prevent him from applying all their advice. If such a body could be transformed into a regularly meeting National Council of Education and given the powers indicated, it is likely that that consistent policy without which advance in the direction of compulsory education cannot be achieved would be considerably assisted.

871 645 *Concentration of the Ministry of Education on Major Issues of National Educational Policy.* If the Minister were guided in the formation of policy by a properly constituted National Council of Education, the way to consideration of an agreed national policy of educational advance would be facilitated. However, before these reforms could achieve their object, they would need to be accompanied by a reformed conception of the Ministry of Education itself. At the present time, the Ministry is more in the nature of a national administrative office than a policy-making body. In addition to controlling all forms of education and exercising most minute financial control in small matters, the senior officials of the Ministry appear to be occupied with a mass of detailed administration, much of which could very well be left to the Provincial Directors of Education.

It is suggested that, at any rate in the sphere of primary education, many of the existing administrative tasks performed by officers of the Ministry of Education should be transferred to the offices of the Provincial Directors of Education. If this were done it would enable the senior officials of the Ministry to concentrate their talents on major issues of national policy which, at the present time, need considerable thought and investigation. If compulsory education of quality is ever to become a reality, matters of major policy which at present receive insufficient consideration must be investigated by officers of the Ministry before the facts concerning them can be adequately considered by the Minister and the National Council of Education which it is hoped he may soon have to assist him. Plans for improved training and distribution of teachers badly need mature consideration, as do investigations into the most suitable types of school building for a country with the climatic conditions of Iraq.

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COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN IRAQ

It is understood that there is a
871 possibility that one of the most enlightened sheikhs of one of the
185 largest tribal groups in Iraq would be prepared to co-operate by providing premises, together with accommodation for the team consisting possibly of teachers, an agriculturalist and health officer.

A LONG-TERM POLICY

These then are some of the short-term measures which it is suggested should be considered as the basis of a practical policy leading towards the establishment of compulsory education. They are, of course, only 'short-term' in the sense that they constitute lines of fairly immediate action, most of which will need to be carried forward and embodied within a more long-term policy. It is now necessary to discuss other measures, more of a qualitative nature, which will take longer to materialize but which must be put into operation over a much longer period if quantitative advance is to result in the provision of the right type or types of school.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE TEACHER

The Training of Teachers. The establishment of more schools must be accompanied by the training of more and better qualified teachers. If the Ministry of Education could be freed from its serious overload of administrative detail on the lines indicated, one of its most important tasks would be the development and gradual transformation of existing arrangements for the training of teachers.

As was indicated in Chapter Three, the output of teachers from training institutions during the current year is likely to be 754. Some of the training institutions are doing excellent and lively work. They are handicapped by the fact, however, that many of the students did not complete a full secondary education before they entered the training institution. This means that the period of training for these teachers has to be devoted too much to the task of repairing deficiencies in educational background, and is not sufficiently a professional college course. Many of those who had the advantage of a full secondary education before they took up training do not enter a training college proper but attend a one-year course attached to a secondary school with limited facilities.

Training devices of this kind were essential if the output of teachers was to keep pace with the rapidly growing demand for more schools. The effects of inadequate training are, however,

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now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradition at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

I K 653 185

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

I K 721 361

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Semis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

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6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

645 669 Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,[1] caused less resentment than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment of Baghdad, the murder of Ja'far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,[2] Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions of many 'Iraqīs held to be capable of raising opposition.

645 185 [207] Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government by its promises issued through the press,[3] and for the first time in the history of 'Iraq, by means of the radio[4]: distribution of land to the tribes and the *fallahīn* individually, amnesties,[5] freedom of the press[6] and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

645 648 The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,[7] although individual members of the new 'Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realized as have other 'Iraqī Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

[1] One of Hikmat Sulaimān's first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-'Iraqī friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into 'Iraq.

[2] On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsin Pasha al-Hāshimī died suddenly of heart-failure in Beirūt.

[3] *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Baldgh*, December 14th, 1936.

[4] November 5th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja'far abū Timman.

[5] According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

[6] *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *At-Tarīq*, *Al-'Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *An-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 12 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

[7] See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936..

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6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high. 164

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's 241 has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahīn* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering 439 features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan 648 may take 'Iraqī wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.[1] The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.[2]

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not 433 existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, 466 have been under consideration for some time. The Department 647 of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqī labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.[3]

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, 175 economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis 185 of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

[1] *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937. [2] *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.
[3] *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

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so recent in origin and a people so recently brought into contact with larger ideas than have motivated them for centuries past, that a relative standard of judgment should be applied. On such a standard the League of Nations itself was obliged to assess the readiness of 'Iraq for independence, in response to the firm insistence on the part of the Mandatary, which declared in its special report presented to the League in 1931:

> His Majesty's Government have never regarded the attainment of an ideal standard of administrative efficiency and stability as a necessary condition either of the termination of the Mandatory Regime or of the admission of 'Iraq to membership of the League of Nations. Nor has it been their conception that 'Iraq should from the first be able to challenge comparison with the most highly developed and civilised nations in the modern world.[1]

On the basis of a similar standard it can be confidently stated that 'Iraq not only achieved unprecedented development in the period from 1914 to 1932, and particularly since 1921, but much of the development has been maintained since 1932. The development at the time of 'Iraq's entrance into the League may not have been so great as put forward in the Official Reports or in the statements made by British representatives to the League of Nations, nevertheless it has been very real. Less than a score of years previous to 1932, 'Iraq was an isolated lethargic maladministered portion of the Ottoman Empire. In 1932, as since that time, 'Iraq has occupied a strategic position on the highway of air-communications. It possesses the machinery of a modern democratic state although the control is now centred in a Government backed by military force. It belongs by general acceptance to the international community, having assumed the obligations of a sovereign nation for international agreements.

In reaching this state of development, 'Iraq has undergone a period of direct British control, first under military and then

[1] *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 11.

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under civil administration, followed by a period of tutelage. Under the first of these regimes, the administrative and economic development took place according to the dictates of an Anglo-Indian administration, apparently determined to make of 'Iraq an Indian province. Under the mandatory regime, extending from 1920 to 1932, 'Iraq was forced to accept the restricting hand of the mandatory Power but, at the same time, was able to count upon its support and assistance.

The British Government, as Mandatary, had assumed definite responsibilities from the League: the granting of assistance for the development of 'Iraq's political and social institutions, for its economic regeneration and for its protection from external enemies. These obligations it was not unprepared to honour but only on its own conditions, imposed in a manner which, as has been indicated, guaranteed its position in the country. These conditions do not seem to have been laid down because of any inherent lack of sympathy with 'Iraq's national aspirations. On the one hand, the British Government felt unable to relinquish the Mandate, for fear of losing prestige, until it had satisfied world opinion that as Mandatary its obligations had been fulfilled. On the other hand, the British Government was unwilling to give up its favoured position in 'Iraq until it had achieved the aims for which, in accordance with British policy in the Middle East for the past century and a half, it had occupied 'Iraq. These aims included the control of the land route to India, now vital to the British Empire as the result of the development of air-transport; the assurance of peace and order in the strategic centre of the Middle East; the extension and protection of British commerce; and the control of the existing and potential oil-producing districts of 'Iraq and Persia. Until these objectives were achieved, through the establishment of a stable government, 'friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligations to H.B.M. Government',[1] the 'Iraqī Nationalists seem to

[1] Instructions of H.M. Government to the High Commissioner of 'Iraq, cited *Admin. Report*, 1927, p. 11.

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have had little effect on British policy. Although agreeing to the progressive restatement of its relations with 'Iraq, the British Government diminished no whit of its insistence that its advice, through the High Commissioner and the British officials, be taken; that its assistance, as outlined in the Treaty and the Agreements, be employed; and that its will as the mandatory Power be the ultimate authority.

If the formal relinquishment, October, 1932, by Great Britain of her right to control the affairs of 'Iraq except in accordance with the Treaty and Agreements still in force, marked another stage in 'Iraq's political existence, the work of development has not been completed. In the continued reorganization of finances, in the perfection of the Judicial system, in the raising of education standards, and in the extension of agriculture, irrigation and means of communication still lie much to be done. Hopeful signs of governmental action would seem to appear in the current version of the frequently altered Five Year Capital Works Plan with its provision for irrigation projects, roads, bridges, 130 schools and numerous health centres,[1] in the proposed Health Campaign,[2] and in the recently created Agricultural Bank,[3] and in the many new proposals laid before the Chamber by the new Government. 'Iraq's recent treaty of friendship with Sa'ūdī Arabia, April 2nd, 1936,[4] and her amiable relations with Turkey seem to point to the removal of these two external dangers. Within the country still lie the problems of the creation of a social class of citizens, now beginning to appear, capable and willing to assume political duties from a sense of public duty and not of personal aggrandizement, the evolution of a free Press motivated by public spirit rather than by individual or party grievances, the assurance of free elections, and the elimination of sectarian and sectional animosities which will eradicate the antipathies between tribesmen and townsmen, will bring the Shī'īs into

[1] *G.B. and E.*, April 9th, 23rd, 1936.
[2] *N.E. and I.*, August 8th, 22nd, 1935.
[3] *G.B. and E.*, March 26th, 1936. [4] Text: ibid., April 23rd, 1936.

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the body politic, will create a real bond between Kurds and Arabs, and provide adequate protection to all minorities within the State.

If the past progress of 'Iraq has been a matter of concern to a wider group than merely the people of 'Iraq, so also is the problem of its future. The first of the mandated territories to achieve the right 'to stand alone' as contemplated by the drafter of the League of Nations Covenant, 'Iraq, the model Mandate, has been the object of special interest to believers in the mandate system, to whom its future will bring additional proof of the success or failure of the Mandate idea. 'Iraq's progress, followed in the past as providing confirmation or refutation of Great Britain's assurances that she had fulfilled the obligations laid on her as Mandatary, will furnish new evidence concerning Great Britain's trusteeship. To the Arab Nationalists in Syria and Lebanon, whose demands for independence have been both stimulated and assisted by 'Iraq's achievements, 'Iraq's future will either provide new arguments for treaty revision or supply France with reasons for resisting Nationalist demands. Of even greater importance will be the effect of the future on the welfare of the 'Iraqis themselves: Kurds and Arabs; townsmen and tribesmen; *fallahīn* and landowners; and Muslims, Jews and Christians.

The future is not without its dark aspects, but if the new regime can provide stability with a much needed discipline, if it will be motivated by foresighted and courageous statesmanship, and if the people of 'Iraq can and will devote themselves to the tasks which lie before them with the same energy which they expended in achieving independence, the position of 'Iraq among the progressive states may yet be assured.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

however, had to be kept small. In the field of industry the government sought to stimulate private enterprise by according special tax benefits and protection and by establishing the Industrial Bank.

The Development Board

With the prospect of a rapid rise in oil production and therefore in government oil revenues, the promise of a much wider field of activity developed. Accordingly a law was enacted in 1950 establishing a Development Board and assigning to it all the oil revenues as well as the proceeds of any loans contracted by it or by the government on its behalf. The Board consists of two ex officio members—the Prime Minister, who functions as its president, and the Minister of Finance—and six executive members appointed for five years. The Board was directed to draw up a general program for the development of Iraq and, upon its approval by Parliament, to proceed with the detailed plans and specifications of the projects included in the program and with their execution in accordance with an approved order of priorities. Each year any revisions in the program, an annual budget and an annual report are to be presented to the Parliament. The Board is also to consider and coordinate development schemes which may originate in the various ministries of the government.

The establishment of this Board is evidence of the government's determination to see the extraordinary oil revenues used for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living and to insure some continuity in development which frequent changes in governments have made virtually impossible in the past.

The Board was constituted and began operations toward the end of 1950. The British and American governments each nominated one of the executive members in accordance with a request by Iraq. In the spring of 1951 the Board submitted its preliminary over-all program involving a total outlay of ID 65,674,000 over a five-year period beginning with the fiscal year 1951-52. About ID 29,401,000 of the Board's projected revenues, consisting of the income from oil anticipated at that time and nearly all of the proceeds of the $12.8 million loan obtained from the International Bank for the Wadi Tharthar flood control project, were reserved

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

for subsequent programming. Expenditures for the five-year period were allocated by broad fields as follows (in dinars):[5]

Water storage and irrigation schemes	30,044,000
Roads	15,826,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	12,618,000
Miscellaneous projects	6,216,000
Administrative expenditures	970,000
Unprogrammed reserve	29,401,000

Because of the brief time devoted to its preparation, this program will necessarily undergo modification as more detailed study is given to requirements and the cost of individual projects and as some of the over-all allocations are programmed in detail.

The magnitude of this projected outlay is in startling contrast to the financial stringency which has characterized public expenditures in the past. The government has had great difficulty in making both ends meet. Severe economy has been the rule. Development outlays were pared; government salaries were not increased despite the increasing cost of living; and local administration was starved of funds.

Government Budgets

The trend of government finances is indicated in Table 16. It will be noted that, despite economies and tax increases, the government's total budget showed substantial deficit in 1948-49 and 1949-50, primarily because of the bad harvests in 1947 and 1948 and the effects of the war with Israel. Of the government's principal autonomous enterprises, the railways also ran considerable deficits on capital account which were defrayed only by using reserve funds, by borrowing ID 1,000,000 from the government and contracting a loan of ID 3,000,000 through the Export Credits Guaranty Department of the British Government. The Iraqi government borrowed at home to meet its own needs, its domestic debt rising from ID 4,500,000 on March 31, 1948, to ID 10,800,000 on March 31, 1951. Borrowing had to be limited, however, because the market for government securities was virtually restricted to the banking system. As of March 31, 1951, the National Bank and the commercial banks held ID 9,200,000 of the domestic debt.

[5] For a more detailed breakdown, see Table V in Appendix.

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TABLE IV

Expenditures Projected by the Development Board

(in millions of dinars)

	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55	1955-56	Total
Irrigation projects:						
Wadi Tharthar	1.3	3.6	3.1	1.5	0.2	9.6
Habbaniya	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	—	2.1
Diyala Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.1	2.2	1.9	6.1
Dokan Reservoir	0.2	0.7	1.0	1.8	2.0	5.7
General drainage	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.0
Other irrigation projects:						
New projects	0.4	0.9	1.2	0.9	0.9	4.2
Completion of projects begun previously	0.3	—	—	—	—	0.3
Total	3.0	6.6	7.4	7.5	5.5	30.0
Roads and bridges:						
Main roads across Iraq from south to north (Basra - Baghdad, Kirkuk, etc.)	0.8	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.6
Other roads	1.3	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	9.4
Total	2.1	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.5	15.9
Buildings:						
Hospitals	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Schools	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	3.8
Other buildings	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.0
Total	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.9	12.6
Other projects:						
Small settlement projects	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Artesian wells and water for drinking purposes	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.2
Special projects in northern Iraq	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.3
Reforestation and filling of swamps and marshes	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5
Telegraphs & telephones	0.5	—	—	—	—	0.5
Other projects	0.2	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.4
Expropriations	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	—	1.1
Total	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	6.2
Administrative expenses	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.0
Grand Total	9.4	13.7	14.8	15.0	12.8	65.7

Note: Totals do not necessarily add up because of rounding.

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exclusively grown by farmers who specialize in these commodities and who market their produce in the towns.

Planning the Improvement of the Villages

Clearly it will not be possible to bring about any substantial and lasting change in the state of some thousands of villages until the root causes of poverty, ignorance and insecurity have been tackled. Only then can thriving communities replace the present villages with their primitive and almost static mode of life.

Legislation for the improvement of villages is already in existence. In 1936, a law (No. 70) for the construction of new villages was passed, empowering the Ministry of Interior to construct or renew villages, having regard particularly to health requirements, such as the construction of sanitary facilities and public baths, the hygienic disposal of waste and the provision of drinking water. A draft law on similar lines, but placing the responsibilty on the Ministry of Social Affairs, was put before Parliament during 1951. Parliament sent it back to the Council of Ministers for amalgamation with the earlier statute. Both are admirable in objective, but both are focussed primarily on the reconstitution of villages on more hygienic lines without regard for the urgent educational and economic aspects of the problem and without recognizing the need to enlist the cooperation of the people. Only a comprehensive and popular program can really reach the people and encourage them to help themselves. That little, in fact, has been done under the 1936 law is itself eloquent testimony to this.

The task of remaking the villages is typically one for the new Community Planning Office. In cooperation with all the government departments concerned and with their advice, it should be able to formulate and issue the necessary regulations, of which those that affect health are only a part, under the power conferred on it by the projected planning enabling act.

The Mission has elsewhere made a number of recommendations designed to raise the standard of living of the rural population. On the agricultural side, these include the organization of an extension service, the creation of cooperatives, measures to improve livestock and the provision of better drainage. Medical recommendations include the opening of more village dispensaries, the

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ment, which are usually forthcoming only at irregular intervals. The loans usually have to be amortized over a period of 10 years or less, which places an onerous burden on municipal finances. The municipal authorities in a number of northern cities, which were allocated funds in the fall of 1950 and had spent a large part of them at the time of the Mission's visit, were still in doubt as to whether they had received a grant or a loan. Uncertainty as to income or capital funds inhibits advance planning. Moreover, when the authorities do receive funds, they are apt to spend them as fast as possible for fear that, if they have not actually been spent, they may otherwise be withheld. The usual way of overcoming this situation, and possibly the only way in the circumstances, has been to build new streets, which are relatively easy to plan and execute. In addition, the municipality is by law entitled to recoup part of its expenses from the owners of land that has increased in value.

The provincial authorities, who are responsible for carrying out the projects of the central government and who might be expected to cooperate more closely with the municipalities, have been faced with similar difficulties. They, too, have had hand-to-mouth experience with capital expenditures. Nearly completed buildings have sometimes been left standing for months, because funds ran out before the construction could be finished. Furthermore, the projects to be undertaken are normally prescribed by the central government. Apparently, some advance on this procedure has been made recently and the *Mutasarrif* and the Provincial Administrative Councils have been given more latitude in planning their own development.

Planning in the Future

The opportunity now exists to substitute an entirely new approach to urban development for the old haphazard methods. An example of how well the development of a town can proceed, given the right spirit of cooperation, is provided by the small town of Bedrah, which lies near the Iranian border in Kut province and which has a population of about 4,000. This project involves the reconstruction of the old town on a new site.

Several streets had been constructed and 24 dwelling units were ready for occupancy when the Mission was in Iraq. Thirty more units were scheduled to be finished during the year. Besides

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361 185 these residential structures, there were a number of community facilities: a dispensary staffed by the Ministry of Social Affairs; a primary school building for 200 students and a secondary school building for an initial enrollment of 30 students constructed by the Ministry of Education; and a clubhouse which had been paid for by the people themselves. The municipality intended to erect a market and to install an electric generator. Residences for the *Qaimmaqam* (the administrator of the *qadha*) and the physician were also scheduled to be constructed.

Plans for the development of the new site for Bedrah were prepared by the Planning Office and followed by the local officials in the construction of the project. Work has been proceeding for several years and has been financed largely out of past savings. The whole project has, in fact, been carefully thought out and planned ahead. The initiative was due largely to the *Mutasarrif* of Kut and the success of the project to his close personal relation with the Planning Office.

361 647 This example is, unfortunately, an isolated one. In fact, the present status of the Technical Section for Planning and Organization in the Ministry of Interior does not permit comprehensive planning. It has neither the authority nor the staff to guide the planning of public works or buildings that are currently the concern of other ministries. The need for coordinated planning undoubtedly exists, but the function can only be discharged adequately if the Authority is given sufficient staff, trained not only in architecture and civil engineering, but in all the economic and sociological aspects of town planning.

General plans for the development of each municipality could then be based on facts and drawn up with a schedule of priorities, and future work should only be sanctioned if it is in conformity with these plans. Such plans should be practical and preferably designed so that they could be carried out in stages and changed and improved as conditions may demand. The new Community Planning Office should be made clearly responsible for approval of these plans or any changes in them. As a safeguard, funds for municipal development should be disbursed only for purposes which are in accordance with approved plans. This will require amendment of the present Roads and Buildings Regulations, which

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forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1952 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the economic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which stern and continued action against Communism and incipient plans for national development have not so far availed to counteract. The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred. The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil [185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious [722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

Government and Constitution

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an honourable past in the service of the Government and the country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

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874 ics in agricultural areas. Foreign advisers and instructors are being extensively employed. *Commercial:* secondary commercial schools in Baghdad, Mosul, Najaf, with night classes in Baghdad and Najaf. Commercial classes have been introduced into the ordinary secondary school curriculum in various cities. *Nursing and Domestic Science:* Schools of Domestic Science, Nursing, Midwifery in Baghdad. It has been proposed that instruction in the state vocational schools should be of such a standard that graduates could proceed at once to the relevant higher institutions. Other vocational establishments are the Iraq State Railways workshop training school in Baghdad and the IPC's technical training centre in Kirkuk.

873 An Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad gives instruction in music, painting, sculpture, and drama and trains teachers in most of these subjects.

873 217 *Department of Antiquities.* The Department of Antiquities maintains an extensive programme of excavation, restoration, research and publication and has gained recognition for its work in international academic circles. It controls five museums in Baghdad, one each at Samarra and Babylon, and has recently opened one in Mosul.

Economic Survey

651 439 433 The greater part of Iraq's national revenue will soon be drawn from her oil, which represents an important fraction of the world's supply. Her general economic organization is nevertheless agronomic. Agriculture and animal husbandry practically suffice for her internal requirements of foodstuffs and provide, after oil, most of her exports.

135 Apart from oil, raw materials are sparse. There are deposits of salt, low-grade bituminous coal, gypsum, and sulphur and, in more limited quantities, of potassium nitrate, crystal quartz, sandstone, and dolomite. Building stone is found only in the 339 hill districts; in the alluvial plain mud and reeds are the com- 342 mon building materials of the poor, but houses of locally made burnt bricks are common in the towns.

185 652 [511] In 1950 a Development Board was established with the function of drawing up and, after parliamentary approval, executing a general economic and financial plan for developing the country's resources and raising the standard of living; it was to include but not be limited to projects for water conservancy, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, and improvement of river, land, and air communications. For the execution of its programme the Board has been allocated 70 per

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cent of Iraq's oil revenues. The cost of the initial programme of the Board, as approved by Parliament, covers the years 1951–6 and is estimated at ID155,374,000. It provides for studies and research and training of Iraqi engineers and technicians; an ambitious plan for irrigation and drainage, including a number of major projects; the construction of roads, bridges, hospitals and health institutes, schools, housing for labourers and officials and public buildings; land reclamation, afforestation, agricultural research, animal husbandry; development of water-supplies, health resorts, aerodromes; industrial and mining projects. The programme of the Development Board has taken account of the report[1] of the mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which, at the request of the Government of Iraq, visited Iraq in 1951 to review the country's economic potentialities and assist the Government to formulate a long-term programme for the further development of productive resources.

By the end of 1953 measures had been taken towards the implementation of practically every item of this programme. Of the major projects, work on the Tharthar scheme for Tigris flood control was well in hand and its completion scheduled for March 1956. The Habbaniya scheme was sufficiently advanced to permit flood control of the Euphrates; work had already begun on the barrage, which would be completed at the end of 1955. Preliminary work was in progress for the construction of dams on the rivers Diala, Lesser Zab, and Greater Zab, and schemes were under investigation for drainage and water utilization in the south and the generation of hydro-electric power. The construction of a bitumen refinery at Qaiyara, south of Mosul, was imminent and designs were complete for cement plants at Mosul and Kirkuk and a cotton textile factory of an annual capacity of 25 million square yards in Mosul.

Agriculture

Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country. It is estimated that about 80 per cent of the population derives its living directly or indirectly from the soil and, apart from oil, exported products are almost entirely agricultural. Nevertheless only some 20 per cent of the total area of the country is cultivable, and only some 36 per cent of this is actually under cultivation. The cultivable area has two main divisions: first the region to the north and east of a line running south of Mosul and Kirkuk to Khanaqin, where the rainfall is sufficient to permit the cultivation of winter crops without irrigation; and second, the

[1] IBRD, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1952).

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yield of nearly twice that of wheat, it is more popular with farmers. In normal years Iraq grows sufficient barley to ensure an exportable surplus of some 300,000 tons. The main importers in 1950 were Holland and Great Britain.

Rice is grown mainly in the marshes of the Lower Tigris and Euphrates near Amara and Suq ash-Shuyukh and in the Hilla and Diwaniya *liwas*, especially in the marshes around Shamiya. A small quantity is grown by irrigation in the valleys of the Kurdish areas. It is sown as a summer crop for harvesting between September and November. Its yield and price are usually higher than those of wheat or barley, but it is more extravagant of water and its cultivation is therefore restricted by law (1932). Before the war there was a small exportable surplus, but exports in recent years have been confined to limited amounts of the inferior qualities.

Dates. Iraqi dates constitute four-fifths of the world's production; the Government has a special interest in their cultivation and marketing. The Shatt al-Arab area above Basra, where growing, packing, and marketing are managed by a Date Board representing all interests, has 18 million[1] trees; the other main producing area in Iraq is on the Euphrates upstream from Nasiriya. Date-palms need a plentiful supply of water, but its quality and that of the soil is less important. Some 350 varieties of date are said to be grown in Iraq, of which only four are usually exported in quantity. Total annual production in normal times averages about 288,000 tons; of this about half is exported and half consumed within Iraq, either as food—dates are a staple item of diet—in natural form or as date syrup, or as raw material for the spirit industry. Of the by-products, the fibrous trunk is used for rope-making and the powdered stone for cattle fodder. Selection and packing for export are improving greatly under the supervision of the Government Date Board. The main importers of Iraqi dates were, in 1950, India, the United States, Egypt, Great Britain, Canada, and Pakistan.

Forests

The forests of Iraq, covering an area of 18,000 square kilometres, are of variable density. They were at one time far denser and more extensive, but have been and are still being reduced by shifting cultivation, fires, and uncontrolled cutting and grazing. The Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is undertaking a programme of conservation and afforestation, which will safeguard the soil, increase timber and

[1] The official figure; the IBRD report gives a figure of only 9·7 million.

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charcoal production with consequent encouragement of secondary industries, and improve climatic conditions.

Problems of Agriculture

Among the natural difficulties which attend agriculture in Iraq are those imposed by drought, floods, dust storms, diseases, pests, and soil erosion, of which the first two are being attacked by a large-scale programme of irrigation and flood-control. The major diseases are the inflorescence rot of dates, wilt diseases of tomato and watermelon, gummosis of citrus, rusts of cereals, and various mildews. The major insect pests are the Moroccan locust, whose ravages have from time to time caused immense damage to cereal crops, the grasshopper, the Mediterranean fruit fly, the date-fruit mite and Dubas bug, and the Sunn pest and bug *Aolia acuminata* which attack wheat and barley. The Ministry of Agriculture is combating these diseases and pests by modern methods; in locust-fighting Iraq is among the most advanced countries in the world. The problem of soil erosion can to some extent be met by the activities of the Forestry Department.

Irrigation

The aim of water-control in Iraq is to even out the seasonal flow in the two great rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, so as to prevent both drought and flooding in the irrigated areas and to increase the area under cultivation. Irrigation itself imposes the necessity of drainage, to prevent the salting up of irrigated land and the further spread of malaria.

Three methods of irrigation are employed: direct inundation at flood-time, which is used for rice cultivation and is of comparatively limited importance; distribution of water from rivers and canals by direct flow on to the land through a network of small channels and cuts; the lifting of water into the channels and cuts by various methods which include the use of mechanical pumps. The date-palm groves of the Shatt al-Arab benefit by natural irrigation; twice a day as the tide rises and falls fresh water is forced into the creeks and channels and then drains out again.

Irrigation—often highly organized—has been a feature of Iraqi agriculture since the Sumerian civilization, in decline since the seventh century, and especially since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Serious reconstruction began in this century, with the Hindiya barrage, completed in 1913, for which the Euphrates was diverted, and the Kut barrage on the

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Tigris, completed in 1939; both of these control the flow of water and serve extensive irrigation schemes. In 1952 8 million acres of land were under irrigation—five times the area in 1918; in 1949–50 3,600 pumps were in use as against 143 in 1921. Two more major projects are in process of execution: the first on the Euphrates, for which the Habbaniya Flood Relief and Storage Scheme has just been completed, and a barrage across the river at Ramadi is awaiting construction; the second for the Tigris, whose waters will be drawn off into the Wadi Tharthar as a means of flood prevention. Cultivation will be increased by dams at Darband-i-Khan, Bakhma on the Diala, Dukhan on the Lesser Zab, and possibly at Bakhma on the Greater Zab, the first also serving for flood control. Schemes of lesser construction and extension are also being planned and executed for southern Iraq. In all, the Development Board has allocated nearly 53½ million dinars for projects of irrigation and flood control during the years 1951–6, of which 4 million dinars are devoted to drainage.

Land Tenure and Conditions of Cultivation

The system of land tenure and the conditions of cultivation are responsible for a further major problem in Iraqi agriculture. There is very little peasant proprietorship. Much of the land is held on various terms by Arab tribal shaikhs and Kurdish aghas (barons) or by wealthy townsmen, who divide their land in small plots among sharecroppers, to cultivate under the supervision of their agents for a return which may be as little as 30 per cent of the yield. Of the area covered by cadastral survey, 67 per cent is held in holdings of over 1,000 dunams and 24 per cent in holdings of over 10,000 dunams. Agriculture remains, on the whole, primitive and wasteful in tools and technique because of the lack of interest, on the part of the landowners, in organization and development and because of the ignorance, poverty, and lack of security or incentive—since the landlord secures the advantages of all improvements—of the cultivators. This backwardness is illustrated by the generally low yields. The disadvantages of feudal and absentee land ownership have been perpetuated by the land settlement of the last fifteen years, which, by tending to confirm the existing procedure, has made reform more difficult of fulfilment. The establishment of large farms worked directly by their owners with modern machinery is usually prevented by the almost total absence of a class of farm labourer working for cash wages. The expansion of the cultivated area, particularly in south Iraq, is hampered by the sparseness of population. Labour is specially scarce at harvest

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time, which, prolonged by primitive methods, may interfere with or even prevent autumn tillage and sowings. Because of the low density of population, an improvement in the water-supply of a given area in the irrigated zone usually causes a shift of population from less favoured areas, which consequently go out of cultivation. This tendency is greatly increased by the unstable nature of the rural population, a great part of which have settled to cultivation within the last century and have no lengthy attachment to their locality. Political circles are alive to the need for reform, and recently an attempt has been made to establish small-holders on lands newly introduced to irrigation (for example, on the Abu Ghuraid and Dujaila canals), and to establish co-operative organization. In 1951 a law was passed for the distribution of state land in parcels of varying size to selected settlers, up to 20 per cent of each area to be allocated to graduates of agricultural schools and former members of the police and army, and up to 25 per cent to civil pensioners and unemployed school graduates. An Agricultural and Industrial Bank, formed by the Government in 1936, contributes to the welfare of small landowners by providing cheap credits, though its resources are inadequate for the need.

Livestock

Raising livestock is of major importance both in the internal economy of the country, by providing food, transport and traction, and raw material for essential manufactures, and also in foreign trade. In the period 1948–50 livestock and their products—wool, hides and skins, intestines (casings)—accounted for about 13 per cent of Iraq's total exports excluding oil.

Most of the rural and much of the urban population depends to some extent on animal husbandry for a living, but methods have hitherto been mostly primitive and unsystematic, being semi-nomadic and divorced from crop-raising, with little attempt on the part of the owners to supplement natural feeding except in winter, or to improve the breed or combat disease. Quality and productivity are consequently low. The Government Department of Animal Husbandry, however, is experimenting to improve the breed of cattle, sheep, and mules and the Government controls the importation of animals to safeguard the native stock from diseases from which it is at present free, such as rinderpest and contagious pleuro-pneumonia. By irrigation, water conservation, and control of pasturage a more permanently settled system could be evolved, integrated more closely with the production of crops.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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level plains and raise, by means of the scanty rainfall, a meager amount of wheat and barley in favorable seasons.

Along the rivers in their upper courses are a few gardens, irrigated by means of various draught animals and water-wheels, which elevate water from the stream to the level of the land above. At Gurna the Tigris and Euphrates join to form one river and at Mohammerah the Karun empties into this united stream. The three rivers thus flow into the ocean as one enormous waterway, known locally as the "Arab River." For the last hundred miles before the sea is reached, the fresh water of the river ebbs and flows with the tides, and by cutting outlets along the river banks gardens may be automatically irrigated twice a day if so much water is desired. Along these lower stretches each bank of the river is lined with beautiful gardens, which reach a depth of some miles in places and extend in practically an unbroken expanse all the way up to Basra and in less prolific culture even as far as Gurna. These date gardens are beautiful things, beautiful for what they are now, and more beautiful still as a suggestion of what all Mesopotamia might be. They are also one of the most melancholy things in the world as reminders of what the past developed and the present has wasted.

The land has enormous resources for agricultural development. That whole vast district may be made into the garden spot of the earth. The soil is the best in the world, river silt hundreds of feet deep. It is as level as a parlor floor, with just enough pitch between the big rivers, and between the north and south, to make irrigation easy. All that is necessary is a perfected system of irrigation, and although the necessary investment would

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312 be large, running up to hundreds of millions of dollars,
185 it should bring excellent returns. The trouble hitherto has been the unstable character of the government and the consequent risk to which any such investment would be exposed. During the time of the spring high waters, a disaffected tribe might obtain control of some important dam and with one stick of dynamite destroy nearly the whole system. But with a stable government the project should be one of great promise. The water is at
311 hand, three riverfuls of it, and as if to prove the prac-
312 ticability of the dream, we know that in the ages of an-
185 tiquity these resources were utilized for this purpose and with the most splendid success. Whether there is actually water enough to transform every square mile of the country into a garden or whether the supply of available land will prove to be more than the water can care for, especially now since the area has so greatly increased, can only be told after the project is tried. Certainly there is water enough for hundreds of square miles, enough indeed to make Mesopotamia one of the richest countries of its size in the world. Already one new irrigated area has been developed by the Hindiya Barrage built by a British concern between 1911 and 1913 as the first step in the reconstruction of the ancient irrigation system. The erection of this great barrage on the Euphrates River was due to the Young Turks, the dam being the first unit in a comprehensive irrigation project for the entire country which had been drawn up for them by the noted engineer, Sir William Willcocks. It is only a beginning, but it has made the desert rejoice and blossom as the rose over many square miles of territory.

311 With the exception of the rich petroleum deposits
162 which are said to exist throughout the Mosul district and

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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try rather than fostering the development of something indigenous and natural. Under such a system the enforcement of law may become of necessity very mechanical, as when an Indian Sepoy nearly knocks down an inoffensive Arab pedestrian by a blow with his fist for no greater crime than walking on the wrong side of the road to avoid a mud puddle. In the courts, too, a crowd of lawyers and an abundance of red tape, with venal underlings, may serve to make the paths of justice tortuous and uncertain in spite of the best intentions on the part of the presiding judge.

Nevertheless, even under such handicaps as those we have indicated, there is no questioning the very great material progress that is to be seen in Mesopotamia. Even before the war one of Baghdad's streets was paved, and since the British have taken over the administration of the kingdom, all sorts of improvements have been introduced. The railroad system of the country now extends 360 miles from Basra to Baghdad and from there on nearly to Mosul. There are several subsidiary lines, the total amounting to over 1000 miles. By far the greater part of this mileage was constructed by the British for war purposes. Under British rule, also, the Hindiya Barrage and other less important irrigation works have been kept in order and improved and extensive harbor improvements at Basra undertaken.

British sanitary and health officers have been appointed for Mesopotamia and no praise is too high for their largely unappreciated but nevertheless unselfish and extremely efficient labors in that country. The hospital work that has been undertaken in Basra, Baghdad and Amara, the inspection of eating houses, and the maintaining of sanitary conditions have been excellently done.

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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364 764 Unfortunately the fact that this work is practical benevolence of the finest sort and carried on in the finest spirit has not served to commend sanitary regulations to the Arab, who regards them as a nuisance, a hindrance to business and an infringement of his personal liberty.

871 185 177 Mesopotamia has also grappled with the whole problem of education most courageously. An educational system has been organized which includes normal schools for teachers and a large number of primary and secondary schools for both boys and girls. There are a smaller number of high schools, and a central university is planned. Fifteen years ago the dominant European influence in this community was French, and no one could claim to be educated who could not talk that language fluently. There was a marked change a little later, and before the Great War German was the commanding influence. Now, of course, the predominant western influence is English, and it seems likely to remain so, for commerce will probably talk the English language for many years, whatever political upheavals the country may be destined to experience. It is true that the educational system has not as yet taken very deep root and that much of the work done is very superficial, but it is none the less exceedingly creditable and encouraging. Moreover, this western system of education will probably be more or less permanent, for it will always be the gateway to remunerative positions.

185 177 In general, the people of Mesopotamia have been brought into contact with conditions of modern life and are anxious for further progress. New wants have been created, and a certain increase in the commerce of the country is the inevitable result. All manner of western dress goods and shoes are to be found in the bazaars, as

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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well as many western food products, such as candies and fancy crackers. The country is lighted by kerosene oil, much of which comes from America. Numbers of automobiles are to be seen, and in some places even electric lights. All these things represent the gratification of wants that did not exist previous to the entrance of western influence.

There has also been a development of the export trade of the country. However, the articles for export are not many nor of great amount. Dates are the principal product, together with a certain amount of wheat and rice and some hides and wool. In the long run, of course, no more can be brought into the country than is sent out of it, and the trade of Mesopotamia cannot increase to any great figure until her own natural resources are developed.

Just how far these various modern improvements will go remains to be seen. If the British continue in power, there is no doubt that material development will be steady and sound. If they evacuate the country and leave it to an independent local government, progress will be much slower, to say the least. During the war wages went up to fabulous heights, and although prices of food and rent advanced even more, there is no doubt that the sum total of the war's influence was to raise the standard of living in the cities and to stimulate enormously the desire for many western products and for western education. Just now there has been a very sharp reaction; times are hard, work is scarce, wages are poor. Everything western is discounted, and the cry is for an independent national development with the elimination of every foreign influence. The common people long for the golden days of the Turks, forgetting with a completeness quite as-

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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tonishing the nature of those golden days, now only ten years and less in the past.

The fundamental difficulty is that the new régime, with all its virtues, is essentially an alien system imposed upon the country from without by virtue of superior military power. Thus it shares the unpopularity of alien systems the world over. The opposition to the present ruler and his British advisers is not simply the frothing of irresponsible and ambitious nationalist agitators. It is all that, but there is something far more significant underneath. I was once entertained for an afternoon by a rabid nationalist of Mesopotamia who attempted to show that the system of education introduced by the British was inferior in curriculum and in number of students to the pre-war system of the Turks, which proposition was about as reasonable as that two and two make twenty. But it would have been a great mistake to conclude that the man was primarily concerned to vindicate the Turks. He was not even primarily concerned over the educational system of Mesopotamia. Nor was he simply a fool. The thing that troubled him was the fact that his country was ruled by aliens. The tremendous following that such men have is not due to any outstanding ability they possess and still less to any profound insight into the various problems of the day, but rather to the fact that the average Arab, the man in the street in Mesopotamia, also resents that alien domination very intensely. It is hard for the unimaginative Westerner to realize that what the Arab wants is not efficient government or even good government. What he wants is self-government.

On the whole, in spite of many encouraging signs of progress, a more intimate acquaintance with affairs in

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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185 177 Mesopotamia distinctly dampens enthusiasm. It appears gravely doubtful whether we are on the road of progress at all—whether, in fact, we are not on a road with a very different ending. The sanitary and educational systems are both of them expensive, and it is doubtful if either can be continued now that Great Britain is no longer willing to spend large sums of money on the country. The railroads have hardly been brought to the point of self-support, and the harbor facilities of Basra, which were constructed to meet war needs, are ludicrously excessive. The local administrators now are at their wits' end to find funds sufficient to maintain them. All work on the irrigation system is at a standstill for the same reason. The whole government structure is a showy shell, vastly more expensive than can be properly shouldered by such a country. Its alien character makes this expense inevitable. The rulers who come from Great Britain demand salaries which are enormous judged by local standards, and much the same exaggerated scale of remuneration prevails throughout their staff of indigenous assistants. Creating a government that shall be modern enough to foster progress and at the same time cheap enough to sit lightly upon the community and be at least tolerable if not popular, constitutes a problem which is by no means solved.

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
IRAQ MH1

On February 16, 1950, the Prime Minister issued a statement of governmental policy in which he gave emphasis to land reform. He stated that small family farm ownership will be made the basis for agricultural expansion as undertaken by the Government in the future. In June and July 1950 the Government issued decrees by means of which the application of Law No. 23 of 1945 was extended to additional areas of state domain: in the provinces of Hilla and Kerbala in the south, in Diyala in central Iraq, in Suleimaniya and at the Hawijah irrigation project in the north.

It might be argued that all of these measures do not amount to much as yet. This is true; but the important fact remains that the present governments of the region are doing something about the matter. This is an indication of at least some concern on the part of national leadership. Through the extension of moral, technical, and material support by the United States and other cooperating countries, these beginnings could be transformed into great national realities for the whole Middle East.

2. *Progressive elements and groups are working at land reform.* In Egypt and Syria, in Lebanon and Iraq, there are leading individuals and organized groups who have been giving serious thought to the problem. Some have begun to do something about it; others stand ready to lend their support once a national project is launched. Some have worked out sound plans and proposed draft laws for reform; others have established improved tenancy terms on their estates; and many others have written pointedly on the subject, depicting the problem and urging a solution. These enlightened elements have been increasing in numbers and in influence; they constitute the real hope of the Middle East. The encouraging reality is that we find these elements not only among the intellectuals and professional groups, but also among the tribal chiefs and large landowners.

In November 1950 a large group of professional and governmental leaders, representing most of the Arab countries, met in Cairo in a Social Welfare Seminar under the auspices of the United Nations. Reports already received indicate that the subject of land tenure and land reform received serious consideration, the gravity of the problem and possible solutions being discussed in detail.

25: Warriner S-5 Goddard 1948 MI Middle East
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427 Out of this 40 per cent the fellah must also pay a rent for the upkeep of the canals which irrigate the holding; this may amount to 20–45 per cent of his share.

426 At the beginning of the season the fellah receives in advance from the employer:

	Dinars
300 kg wheat	1.800
150 kg barley	.525
Cash in 3 instalments	3.750
	6.075
Seasonal interest 30 per cent	1.800
TOTAL	7.875

1 Dinar = £1 sterling

He is not as a rule able to repay the loans from the sale of the produce, and so gets deeper and deeper into debt to the landowner. Thus there has evolved a particular kind of debt-serfdom: a landowner who needs labour from one estate can pay an advance to a whole village or several villages, and so obtain 'the right to demand the transference of the land workers thus "freed" from their debts to his lands.'[1]

65 Changes in taxation have also benefited the big landowners. To promote the expansion of pump irrigation, land irrigated with pumps was partially exempted from taxation. The reform of taxation under the Istihlak law of 1931 has also operated mainly to the advantage of the large landowners.[2]

427 Thus the former tribesman in Iraq has been reduced to the position of a serf-tenant, who is entangled in crushing indebtedness, and so is tied to the holding which he cultivates.

422 In spite of the wise recommendations of Sir Ernest Dowson's report, and the advisory efforts of British officials to improve the security of the small cultivator, it cannot be said that land settlement has succeeded in removing the oppressive character of the land system. Nor has any reform been made to permit the development of State land.

423 As regards water-rights, there is the same situation as in Palestine and Transjordan; attempts at legislation have been frustrated by local interests, and here the need for legislation is

[1] ibid., p. 55.

[2] See P. W. Ireland, *Iraq, A Study in Political Development* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1937), pp. 440–1.

still greater. Rights are recognized *ab antiquo*, which means by custom established beyond the memory of man, but since all the pumps have been installed in the last thirty years, no rights in connection with them can be recognized. The main problem has been that sheikhs or town notables put in pumps on a holding and then claim the whole of the land. Where there has been a settlement of title, claims have usually been settled on a share basis, but in other cases the pump owner has succeeded in getting the whole of the land. This is not a satisfactory position; in 1938 a draft irrigation law was prepared by the British expert on land tenure, but it has not been enacted.

The Government which came to power in Iraq after the *coup d'état* of 1936 severely criticized the policy of granting enormous blocks of land to individual owners. The fact is of course that previous governments were unable to resist the power of the sheikhs, or of the pump owners, and allowed them to jump claims to land before settlement. As a result of these criticisms, a new act was passed in 1938, which somewhat modified the powers of the pump owners, and gave the existing cultivators stronger rights.

But little progress has been made since that time. The Government's conception of reform was revealed in 1943 when the Ministry of Finance began the sale of the State leasehold (*miri sirf*) lands by auction, as an anti-inflationary measure. This was an illusory remedy for inflation, and threw away some of the State's power to reform land tenure and develop agricultural resources. In view of the fact that cultivation is likely to extend in the future as a result of new irrigation schemes, it is clearly important that the Government should decide on the principles which ought to determine future policy. If Iraq is to receive large loans for development, a settlement of the rights of the cultivators will become even more important.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

In Iraq, unlike the other countries of the Middle East, the reform of land tenure is the subject of genuine political discussion. Although in its economic life Iraq is far more backward than Egypt, it is politically more alive, and it is realized by the official class at least that reforms are needed, and that a new system of tenure must be evolved. Discontent with the land

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 MI Middle East
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Discontent with the land
579 system often takes a very active form: clashes between officials and peasants in regard to the collection of revenue, for instance, are quite common, and there are long-drawn-out conflicts about land occupancy, as for instance in the Muntafiq district.

• 185 But although there is discontent, there is not much hope that the land-tenure system will be reformed with reference to standards of social equality or economic efficiency. Land tenure is mainly a controversial subject because it has been linked with British administration, and its abuses attributed to British mistakes. The difficulty has been that the British influence was only advisory, and that the Government did not control an administration efficient enough to carry out the recommendations of the expert advisers, nor could it take measures against the landowners.

Hence there is no agreement as to the object of reform. Some consider that the small cultivator ought to be given freehold tenure; others consider that settlement in larger units, with the sirkals as owners, is desirable.

The real problem is to propose a reform of tenure on lines which would reconcile the need for national planning with security for the small cultivators. From this standpoint the only proposals which have been made are those drawn up by an official of the Land Department, who has had long experience in this field.

These are:

1. Reform of the present system of *tapu* tenure (i.e., the freehold type) by making non-cultivation a cause for loss of title, as is at present the case for land held on *lazma* tenure.

2. Reform of the *miri sirf* category of land by dividing it into two categories:

(a) Those which Government intends to develop by canalization, for example, land covered by the Greater Iskandariya scheme, or by the scheme for development at Abu Ghuraib and on the Greater Musaiyib. Grants of title should not be made in these regions without decision of a special committee, and should be approved by the Council of Ministers. These regions should be reserved for grants of *tapu* land in plots of not more than 100 dunums, and no person should be allowed more than one

25: Warriner S-5 (no date) 1948 M1 Middle East
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● 185 plot; they should, in fact, be reserved for peasant proprietorship.

(b) Those which the Government does not intend to develop by canalization. In this category development will of necessity be by utilization of private enterprise and capital. It is recommended that this land should be granted in *tapu* ownership by auction in plots of not more than 10,000 dunums.

This last proposal seems difficult to approve in the districts where tribal system still holds sway, since in these districts the granting of large areas of land would serve simply to bolster up the powers of the sheikhs and would not necessarily lead to
622 development. Some of the sheikhs are modern business men (as,
185 for instance, the sheikh of the Beni Shammar who, although illiterate, has converted his enormous properties into a limited company registered in New York). Others are still tribal chiefs whose authority rests on the traditions of religion and war, and who are not likely to plan for the development of their land.
185 Other proposals which have been made are:

1. The development of colonization schemes on new land, with favourable leasehold conditions for the small cultivator, which would attract labour from the sheikh's estates by offering better conditions. By causing a shortage of labour, this would induce the large proprietors to offer better conditions.

This proposal has been advocated by Salih Jaber, the present Prime Minister, and is probably the most practicable under present conditions.

2. Settlement of title on the basis of sirkal ownership. The sirkals are, as has been explained, minor sheikhs or agents of the large sheikhs. They perform an indispensable service in organizing production, because they organize the digging of canals and the planting of the cultivated area in relation to it. They are in fact a sort of irrigation service, and a type of farm manager which does not occur elsewhere. Whether they should really become the basis of the property system seems doubtful, but the proposal is mentioned because it does take into account an essential feature of the Iraqi land system which might be difficult to replace.

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PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The difficulty in the way of these proposals is that they all presuppose some limitation on the power of the large proprietors which the Government must carry though. Yet the Government itself is composed of the large proprietors. In many parts of the country the sheikhs are still an essential part of the administrative system, and are local authorities who can, if need be, oppose the central Government. In the programme of the present Iraqi Government it is stated that one of the aims of economic policy should be 'to encourage small ownership and make it a basis for agricultural development in all parts of Iraq, and to set maximum and minimum limits for ownership on all future agricultural projects to be undertaken by the Government in *miri sirf* lands.' But it seems improbable that this proposal, which would necessitate revision of the titles granted under land settlement in recent years, will actually be put into effect. Indeed it is as useless to expect that the existing regime will take steps to reverse or check the extension of large ownership as it would have been to expect the oligarchic governments of nineteenth-century England to stop the advance of enclosures. There is as yet no political force to counterbalance the large landowners, and until one develops there is not likely to be any limitation on their power.

59: Allen et al MH1 Iraq MH1

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[For the recommendations of the United State Mission of 1952 to study community organization and development in Iraq, see Middle East file, Category 116, pp. 38-54.]

Egypt mR1
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647 652 185 "We have been impressed by the ingenuity of the attempt to cover a large part of the cost of the existing centres by the voluntary contributions of the direct beneficiaries. It is clear, however, that the method of raising funds by voluntary contributions is preventing the rapid expansion of the benefits of the scheme to cover the majority of the rural population. It may therefore be desirable, as part of the land redistribution and fiscal reform of the country now in progress, to set aside a large proportion of the national revenue resulting from taxation to provide free basic services for the welfare of the fellaheen, as and when the necessary personnel and supplies become available.

"If the provision of free services is thought to compromise the principle of self-help upon which the centres have been founded, an alternative might be to maintain the existing structure of State subsidy to locally contributed funds, but at the same time to introduce the principle of compulsory membership, and individual contribution to running expenses, on a system of local option. That is to say, in each village the majority of adult inhabitants would decide whether the local contribution to the cost of a centre (which would be open to all free of cost) should be met from a graduated levy. The amount of each individual contribution would be determined on according to capacity to pay or on some other equitable basis."

OOU 42. At the meeting of the inter-ministerial committee which we attended at the close of our mission, we were invited to participate in a discussion of ways and means of ensuring that the technical advice and guidance, - which already exist in each of the departments of public service and have been created for the welfare of the community at large - are better co-ordinated and decentralised and made available more directly and more extensively to the fellaheen. A full exchange of views took place and we were happy to find that the Ministers had anticipated many of the criticisms and suggestions that had occurred to our minds.

IRAQ

(Visited 8 - 12 January)

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642 131 161 434 423 43. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy, with territory covering 168,400 square miles and a population of approximately 5,000,000. The country has great economic potentialities which until recently have not been adequately exploited. Income per capita does not yet exceed 30 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$84). In the past the predominance of the tribal system has impeded a redistribution of lands now recognized as necessary. The abundance of government-owned lands which will become cultivable under modern methods and extended irrigation is expected to facilitate the distribution of land on the basis of small property ownership without intermediary of tribal chiefs.

483 185 Iraq has large possibilities of land reclamation: i.e. the country can feed a larger population than it actually has, and there is in the near future no danger of over-population, even assuming that the death rate is lowered by various measures.

657 185 44. We were assured by one Minister with whom we had the privilege of discussing the standard of living of so many of the poorer sections of the community that the evils from which the country was suffering were well known, and that a partial explanation of many of the difficulties hitherto experienced in effecting necessary improvements was to be found in a lack of co-ordination between existing health and education

services. "The disease has been recognised", he said, "what was required was that medicine for the prescription should be supplied and the patient taught how to take that medicine". The same Minister informed us that he himself, as a young man called upon to draft a new educational programme, had included in it the provision of community centres, but that unfortunately this feature of the scheme had not materialized. 657 185

45. Community welfare organization on a self-help basis in Iraq is, indeed, as yet in its infancy. Some observers consider that an indispensable preliminary to its development is to create in the minds of a people long under the influence and domination of a feudal tribal system an effective desire for self-government.

46. As is generally known, Iraq is rich in oil resources and it is the policy of the Government to transfer mineral wealth into productive capital for the general welfare. A statutory Development Board was established in 1950 to ensure continuity of economic policy, regardless of political changes. Seventy per cent of the income from oil revenues is allocated to the Board as revenue for projects of water conservation, flood control, irrigation, drainage, industry, mining, etc. The Board is also responsible for co-ordinating the development schemes in these fields initiated by the various ministerial Departments. Over 200 foreign technicians are listed as working in Iraq in formulating a variety of development schemes, mostly relating to economic improvements. Some of the experts are in the direct employ of the Iraq Government; others have been assigned to the Government for short periods for specific purposes by agencies and organizations furnishing technical assistance on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Relatively few technicians have so far been concerned with social developments, but the country's needs in this respect have, we understand, been partially surveyed. 651 382 185 471

47. In the absence of detailed documentation, we left it to the Government agencies most directly concerned with the subject of our mission to determine whom we should see and to suggest which projects or institutions we should visit. 000

48. During our short stay in Baghdad we were able to visit at Tal Mohamed a well-constructed modern building designed to serve as a centre for community activities for the residents of a model housing estate constructed by the Ministry of Social Affairs for low-income government employees. Cheap transport facilities were available between Baghdad and the new estate, in which some 500 houses were already in occupation and more would be constructed as funds became available. The imposing building in which it is intended that community activities shall be carried out has been ready for use for more than a year but only some of the equipment and furniture (including seven beds for maternity cases) have been installed. A difficulty in finding suitable qualified staff has delayed the opening of the centre. When it is in full working order it is planned to offer nursing, educational and indoor and outdoor recreational facilities on modern lines. The general appearance of the centre and model village was marred by the state of the roads after heavy rains. 657 185 362

49. It is understood that centres similar to that at Tal Mohemed are planned for other urban areas. The Ministry of Social Affairs, which until recently formed part of the Ministry of Health, has also other plans under consideration for creating, with external technical assistance, pilot projects of community organization or demonstration centres, in urban as well as in rural areas.

50. A survey of Iraq villages jointly conducted by Mr. Gordon MacGregor (TCA adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs) and Dr. Yusuf Khaddoury, M.D. (Officer in charge of international relations of that Ministry) reveals: 185 657

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"an almost universal need among the people for training in the fundamentals of farm practices and farm management for greater food production and income; training in the building of better homes; training of women in better home and child care; and for improvement of sanitation and general health conditions. Underlying these conditions are two basic problems: the lack of land owned by farmers on which they can build houses and raise sufficient food for themselves, and the lack of credit facilities by which they can advance themselves.

"The survey finds in general little development of strong local leadership and group organization among the villagers, through which self-help, management and development of their own affairs can take place.. There appear as general characteristics dependence upon others, great expectations of help from the Government and few patterns of co-operative effort and confidence among the village people, beyond the confines of the family or local groups of relatives.

"The survey finds a framework of a governmental organization to serve the rural [illegible] and a land development programme on irrigated public lands. As yet, and [illegible] many very practical reasons, only a limited extension of government services in education, health and agriculture with assistance from several technical cooperation agencies is reaching the villages..."

The Survey accordingly recommends a national rural improvement programme to be undertaken eventually as a co-operative activity by the Ministers of Agriculture, Education, Health and Social Affairs, with assistance from her Ministries, the Development Board and Technical Assistance Agencies. With this recommendation we would have concurred but for the suggestion that in its early stages co-ordination should be effected by a new Department to be created in the Ministry of Social Affairs.

51.. As will be gathered from an earlier chapter of our report, we had misgivings on this aspect of the proposal, the ultimate effect of which might be to alienate the sympathies of the other Ministries concerned and to lead to duplication of effort, instead of the desired co-ordination, at the village level of departmental activities intended to serve the community as a whole.. Time did not permit of our discussing our point of view in detail with Dr. Khaddoury or his colleague, Mr. MacGregor, who was absent from Baghdad. We were informed that it was hoped to make provision for this scheme of rural reform in the 1953/1954 Budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The scheme has not been adopted or approved by the Council of Ministers at the time of our visit, and informal discussions which we had in other Departments left in our minds the impression that under closer examination modifications might be suggested from the outset.

The joint report of Mr. MacGregor and Dr. Khaddoury is included as Appendix (III), although the plan does not appear to have reached the stage at which it can be described as representing Government policy.

52. In some, if not all respects, the MacGregor-Khaddoury plan appears to have much in common with what we are able to learn of UNESCO's experiment in Fundamental Education now being carried out as part of the land reclamation and resettlement project at Dujailah, near Kut, some 110 miles south of Baghdad. Adverse weather conditions and the state of the roads prevented us from visiting the project but, by a fortunate chance we were able to meet Mr. Trowbridge, the present Director, during our stay in Beirut. Bad weather also made impossible a visit to another land scheme at Kirkuk to the north of the capital, which had only been started and where, we were told, some of the mistakes of the pioneering project had been avoided.

53. In the course of our interview with the Ministers of Health and Social Affairs and their officials, we were offered facilities, of which we were unable, however, to avail ourselves, for visiting single-purpose centres, e.g., homes for the aged and for the blind, a rehabilitation centre for crippled boys, hospitals, and maternity clinics all under official patronage and in some, if not every instance, receiving a State subsidy. In a working class district of Baghdad we did, however, visit a maternity clinic that had been started by the Red Crescent Society. It had recently come under the direction of an English woman doctor, assisted by, possibly, the only certified Iraqi Public Health nurse in the country. Both spoke of the improvement in health which was to be observed amongst the out-patients, and of the evident appreciation by the latter of the assistance afforded, but the shortage of milk for the infants was a matter of concern. Some benefit may come in this respect from the discussions then in progress between the Iraq Government and UNICEF for the provision of a pasteurising plant. The Ministry of Social Affairs have recently taken over from the Red Crescent Society the responsibility for the staff employed at the clinic and for providing certain necessary supplies and medicaments.

54. It is perhaps worth adding that the remarks made during our visit by the staff of the clinic on the subject of attempts to teach sewing to the out-patients while waiting for attention and the difficulty of keeping amused the numerous children who came with their mothers, suggests that there is scope at the clinic (and no doubt other similar institutions) for better educated women of leisure, many of whom contribute generously from their purses to such works, to undertake another simpler form of voluntary social service for which little or no preliminary training is required. Indeed, it is not impossible that with such assistance and under favourable conditions a rudimentary club or community centre might be developed for the women in the district whose standard of life is very low but who have shown a desire to improve it. A development on these lines would have the merit of encouraging educated women of leisure in Baghdad to take part in voluntary social services. It will be long before trained, professional social workers will be available in sufficient numbers for such duties. We had however, no opportunity of discussing these suggestions with anyone in a position to transform them into actuality.

55. We heard from Miss Govan (UNTAA expert) of a scheme with which she had been associated for training 25 young women as social workers. The scheme had made some progress but was momentarily hindered, partly by difficulties in providing local facilities for completing practical in-service training and in persuading the girls' parents to permit them to take up duty away from home.

56. Although we were met with every possible courtesy during our visit to Iraq, the fact that a caretaker Government was in office and a general election was about to take place created a situation in which it was pointless to discuss in detail with the departments concerned, future plans and policies for social development.

57. Recommendation. Until the MacGregor-Khaddoury scheme has been more closely studied by the departments concerned and the necessary financial provision has been approved, we are unable to make any recommendations.

64: Shwadran S-4 (no date) 1955 M1 Middle East
IRAQ MHI

651 The methods of collection reveal the attitude of the general public to personal taxes. In 1945 the total number of individuals who paid income taxes were 18,482; one-third of these were Government employees, ten per cent were from other salaried groups.[18]

185 651 These random facts about Iraq and its population indicate, on the one hand, a low standard of living and general underdevelopment; and on the other hand, excellent potentialities for expansion and improvement in agriculture and industry. The importance of the income from oil and its utilization for capital improvement were realized from the very beginning. In 1931 the Five Year Capital Works Program was enacted in order to hypothecate the revenues from advance oil royalties and dead rent. The monies earmarked for the Capital Development Works Scheme Account were never, however, completely used for capital works projects, and from time to time the Government used the funds to cover the accumulated deficit.[19] The Iraqi Parliament subsequently adopted two yearly budgets, ordinary and extraordinary.[20] The latter, for development schemes, was derived mainly from oil revenues and income from the Iraq Currency Board, but its revenues were frequently diverted to other than the intended purposes.[21]

The various Iraqi governments—as a rule they had a high frequency of change and a low rate of duration—not only realized the importance of the oil revenue to the general development of the country, but also the need for expert surveys and development plans. From time to time specialists were invited to prepare reports for the Government. The most im-

[18] United Nations, Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Public Finance Information Papers, Iraq* (New York, 1951), 21. Henceforth cited U.N., *Public Finance Iraq*. For a further breakdown of the composition of income tax payers between 1944 and 1947, see *ibid*. The British report stated that in 1949 there were 24,000 income tax payers. Great Britain *Iraq Review*, 22.

[19] This was done, for instance, in 1931 and 1932. Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development*, 437; *Report to the Council of the League of Nations*, '32, 30.

[20] For a table of both ordinary and extraordinary budgets for the years 1938-1949, as well as a brief discussion of Iraqi finances, see United Nations, Conciliation Commission for Palestine, *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, I (New York, 1949), 43-44; for the years 1949-1951, International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 170-176. See also Alfred Michaelis, "Economic Recovery and Development of Iraq," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, III, 101-106, Apr., 1952.

[21] In the prewar years when the ordinary budget showed a surplus, oil royalties provided "nearly 50% of the total revenue." Great Britain, *Iraq Review*, 5.

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portant of these, prior to the International Bank Mission, was perhaps the Haigh Irrigation Commission, which worked from 1946 to 1949 and recommended a £100 million development plan which would have increased the irrigated area from 8 to 17 million acres.[22] Yet in 1949 the United Nations Survey Mission reported that the financial resources available to the Iraq Government, not only from oil royalties but also from the accumulated wartime sterling surplus, had been largely diverted to financing consumption imports and the operating expenses of the State.[23]

In this statement the Mission touched on the basic problem of the area, even of those sections which have available financial resources for development projects. The realization of the importance of investment in development projects which will bear returns in the future necessitates self-denial of immediate consumption goods. Such long-range visualization, especially when resources for gratification of immediate needs are readily available, is, however, a quality with which neither the masses nor many of the political leaders are endowed. It is perhaps in the lack of this quality that the explanation for the failure of all the numerous development plans of the Middle Eastern oil producing countries may be found. The ability to curtail current spending for the sake of investments which will increase not merely the individual's returns but the wealth-producing potential of the nation as a whole would be a *sine qua non* for any growing and even highly developed economy, and certainly for underdeveloped areas. But the temptation to utilize the "external" income—from oil—for current needs which could never before be afforded, for alleviating the tax burden, for improving political standing with the electorate, proved too strong, and sooner or later all succumbed.

The Development Board

To return to Iraq. In May 1950 the Government promulgated a law (1950 No. 23) creating a Development Board to which was to be assigned the revenue derived from the oil com-

[22] U. N., *Review 1949-50*, 29; "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.
[23] United Nations, *Final Report of the Survey Mission*, I, 36.

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panies; in 1952 the law was amended assigning only seventy per cent of the revenue to the Board. The Board with the Premier as chairman, the Minister of Finance as member *ex officio*, and six non-political full time executive members, was charged with preparing an overall development plan and given the authority to execute major capital development projects. On October 10 of that year Iraq officially requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send a survey mission to review the economic potentialities of the country and make recommendations for a development program.[24] The Mission arrived in Iraq on February 25, 1951 and a year later, on February 11, 1952, the report was submitted to Premier Nuri es Said. It proposed a development plan for the years 1952-1956 involving a total expenditure of some $470,000,000, to be derived from the oil revenue for the same period. Basing itself on the Mission's report, the Development Board worked out the following five-year plan:

Table V. *Iraq Development Board Program*

Projects	*Cost* (in I.D.)
Irrigation schemes	53,400,000
Roads	26,700,000
Other communications	4,100,000
Buildings, including hospitals and schools	18,000,000
Public utilities	4,100,000
Agriculture	7,500,000
Industry (including erection of a chemical factory)	31,000,000
Miscellaneous	10,600,000
Total	155,400,000[25]

As far as the financing was concerned, the Development Board had no difficulty. As mentioned in the previous chapter, oil production in 1952 and 1953 ran ahead of schedule, and the Board's share of revenue in those two years alone was about ID30,000,000.

[24] International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, ix. The terms of reference agreed to were: "The Mission will be expected to undertake a general review of Iraq's economic potentialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist the Government of Iraq to formulate a long-term program for the further development of the country's productive resources." *Ibid.*

[25] This differs in some respects from the recommendations of the Survey Mission both in total expenditure as well as in the allotments for the various items. See International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 73.

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The general progress of the Development Board under the existing conditions was tolerably satisfactory, but the long-range objectives and the conditions necessary for their realization were not appreciated either by the people or by the politicians. In 1953 the Development Board Law was amended and a new Ministry of Development was created. Though the Development Board was retained, the execution of the development plan was placed under both the Board and the Ministry. The Minister of Development became an additional *ex officio* member of the Board, responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his Ministry and of the Board. The original intent of the law to remove the Board from the vagaries of political change was thus negated. Moreover, because of the general educational and technological level of the population, the Development Board found itself in the unusual, if not unique, position of not being able to spend the constantly increasing revenue.[26] The Board consequently resorted to lending its funds to other Government agencies not concerned with long-range development, and a goodly portion of its income was diverted to other regular expenses.[27]

Despite inherent limitations and basic difficulties, the awareness of the people and the Government that the oil revenue could be used as a means of advancing the development of the country has had some positive and some negative effects on Iraq's growth. One might note a general tendency to depend exclusively on oil income, to the exclusion of all other resources of governmental and economic operations. For obvious reasons the Government adopted a policy of reducing taxes[28] in view of the gigantic income from oil.[29] Such a policy, combined

[26] In 1952-53, ID11 million of the Board's allotment remained unspent. *The Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 6, 1953.

[27] For a description of the various projects, see U.N., *Final Report of the Economic Survey Mission*, I, 71-74; International Bank, *Iraq Mission Report*, 183-457; Norman Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, IV, Summer, 1951, 362-370; Fuad Jameel, "Development Projects and Economic Progress in Iraq," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954; Mohammed Zaki Abdul Kareem, "Beehive of Construction," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, June 12, 19, 26, July 3, 1954; *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Dec. 13, 1954, 3.

[28] In 1953 the Government lifted the consumption tax on fresh fruits and vegetables, increased the reductions in the real estate tax and announced substantial cuts in customs and excise taxes. Jameel, "Development Projects," *Al Aswaq al Tijariya*, Apr. 3, 1954.

[29] The 1952-53 total Government budget amounted to $134,000,000, of which about 42 per cent came from direct oil revenue (only 30 per cent of total income, the other 70 per cent being assigned to the Development Board). U.N., *Summary 1952-53*, 60.

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433 with enormous spending, brings in its wake a host of problems
185 and dangers: inflation, a great strain on a primitive economy,
● shortages of human resources (civil servants, teachers, doctors, engineers), and the overburdening and eventual breakdown of transportation and communications. Nevertheless, progress was registered. Many irrigation and drainage projects were undertaken, and some were completed; a beginning of agrarian reform and rehabilitation through such projects as Diyala was made.[30] In 1952 the United Nations reported that a slight expansion in industry had been achieved and a basis for more
454 rapid development laid. Capital investments in major indus-
464 tries rose from a cumulative total of ID3.18 million in 1948-1949 to 5.84 million in 1951-1952; the value of output rose from ID 1.4 million to 4.4 million, and the number of workers increased from 1,650 to 4,550.[31]

In its report for the fiscal years 1952-1953 the Development Board stated that considerable progress had been made on some of the construction and irrigation projects although it had not used up its revenues and had granted ID6.3 million to municipalities and Government departments to carry out new programs.[32]

185 The impact of the oil industry on Iraq was not as great as it could have been. In spite of Government effort, and in spite of the belief held by some governmental leaders that it was an unconditional, integral part of the overall development program, industry made very little progress. There have been some advances in agriculture, but not as much as hoped for. There exists a serious danger that after the irrigation projects are completed and the land available for cultivation increased, unless the Iraqi peasant is educated—psychologically as well as technically—to utilize the additional acreage effectively and constructively and to keep the irrigation machinery in working order, the enormous expenditures may well have been wasted. Neither will the new hospitals and new school buildings be able to fulfil their proper functions unless there are enough trained doctors, nurses and teachers with a social consciousness and a deep-seated and genuine desire to help the impoverished,

[30] Burns, "Development Projects in Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, V, Summer, 1951, 362-366.
[31] U. N., *Summary 1952-53*, 22.
[32] *Al Zaman*, July 24, 1953.

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uneducated masses. The investment in education may be a 185
complete waste if children continue to drop out of schools in
great numbers as they progress to the higher grades in the
primary schools.

The consumption of petroleum and petroleum products, which cost less in Iraq than anywhere in the world, according to the International Bank Mission, does not indicate that the Iraqis are taking advantage of the opportunities presented by cheap fuel for the general development of their country. The difficulties which the Development Board experienced in getting ahead with its work, the political interference with its efforts, and the inability to spend its income on long-range approved projects are indications of the inherent obstacles to the achievement of transforming a "backward, semi-feudal state into a prosperous, progressive modern nation."[33]

It might therefore be concluded that with the basic conditions of backwardness, illiteracy, inadequate health conditions, lack of educational (vocational and professional) facilities, a country—even though it is endowed with a plentiful supply of land, abundant water resources, cheap fuel and tremendous financial resources—cannot by its own efforts utilize these advantages to rehabilitate itself at a pace which would seem warranted by the favorable conditions. The will to achieve realization of the development plans is no doubt there, at least on the part of the leadership; the intentions are no doubt good; the various plans and projects prepared by foreign experts would no doubt be operative under normal conditions. But for any of these plans to succeed two basic conditions are prerequisite. The masses for whom the projects are intended must cooperate fully with the authorities; they must understand the objective, they must be prepared to work diligently for its achievement, and they must be prepared to wait for its maturity. Above all else, they must identify themselves and their effort as part of the plan and its realization. Those in charge of the execution must have not only good intentions and willingness to work with foreign experts both on the preparation and execution levels, but must possess deep understanding and have faith in the social and national objective.

[33] "The Economic Development of Iraq," *The Times Review of Industry*, Sept., 1953, 93.

433 There has been little change in the crop pattern in recent years. In 1950, under the stimulus of rising world prices, the area planted to cotton increased, but the damage caused by pests, together with the fall in prices, caused heavy losses and led to a shift to other crops. There has also been an extension of the area planted to fruits and vegetables.

242 The Government has taken several important measures to aid agriculture. In 1952, in order to improve the quality of dates, the government-owned Iraqi Dates Association contributed 49 per cent of the capital of a company which will market the crop. In 1953, the Government appropriated funds for the building of grain silos with a capacity of 150,000 tons, in order to improve quality, since low grading depresses export prices. The Agricultural Machinery Administration rents "machinery to farmers and, in addition, is responsible for testing and demonstrating new machinery, licensing of imports and controlling the distribution of the limited supply of spare parts". 1/ The activities of the Agricultural Bank are discussed below.

423 Among the major obstacles to agricultural development has been the land
241 tenure system. The uncertainty of land titles has by now been largely eliminated by the work carried out since passage of the land settlement law of 1932. By the end of 1953, titles to 16,126,000 hectares had been settled; this represented 68.4 per cent of the area of the country, excluding the desert regions. Another obstacle is the unequal distribution of land. The agricultural census showed that there were only 125,000 holdings, with an average area of 51 hectares per holding. Of these, 24,000 holdings were under 1 hectare, 26,000 between 1 and 5 hectares, 16,000 between 5 and 10 hectares and 19,000 between 10 and 20 hectares. Thus, 85,000 holders, or 68 per cent of the total, owned about 3 per cent of the total area. At the other extreme, some 33,000 holders, with over 100 hectares each, owned some 85 per cent of the total area. The majority of the agricultural population is landless.

311 The Government has attempted to remedy this situation by settlement schemes
241 on government-owned land, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of the settled
185 area. Following a successful experiment at Dujaila, 4,284 farmers were settled, in five projects with a total area of 198,000 hectares, and by the end of 1954, 10,200 farmers had been settled on 510,000 hectares. 2/ Farmers are organized in supply and marketing co-operatives. They are given the land free of rent for ten years, after which those who have made good are granted title without charge. 3/ Further projects are under way, including the distribution of 1,125,000 hectares in Mosul province, the distribution of 100,000 hectares near Baghdad, the expansion of the Hawijah settlement and the distribution of land near Basra and along the southern Euphrates. 4/

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, page 20.

2/ The Iraq Times (Baghdad), 25 October 1954.

3/ For further details see United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, Progress in Land Reform (1954), page 105.

4/ The Iraq Times, 14 December 1954, 4 January 1955, 8 January 1955 and 7 February 1955.

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obtained in 1950. It was not fully drawn upon, and has been repaid. The other major foreign debt was a loan of $12.8 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 1950, to meet the foreign exchange requirements of the Wadi Tharthar irrigation scheme. In addition, the Government obtained several advances free of interest from the oil companies, totalling ID 4.5 million, which have now been repaid.

Five domestic loans, totalling ID 7 million, were used to finance the railways and irrigation schemes. Two of these, of ID 1 million each, at 3 per cent interest, issued in 1944 and 1947 with maturities of 3 and 5 years respectively, were redeemed. Other outstanding bond issues comprised a one ID 1 million loan with 3 1/2 per cent interest, issued in 1948, and two twenty year loans, issued in 1944 and 1948, for ID 1 million and ID 3 million respectively. The above mentioned total does not include outstanding Treasury bills and the loans and advances made by the National Bank, commercial banks or other institutions. However, the public debt of Iraq is comparatively small and does not constitute a real burden on the economy of the country. In fact, the Government now has almost no difficulty as far as revenues are concerned, in redeeming not only foreign debts but also domestic ones as well. It is believed that the floating of domestic loans is intended to absorb "idle money" and is an anti-inflationary measure, while the foreign loans were to provide foreign exchange required for various development schemes. The repayment of the United Kingdom loan and the announcement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that the Government of Iraq had cancelled the unused balance of $6.5 million on its loan are evidence of Iraq's ability to meet its needs from its own resources.

Development programme

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The rapid increase in revenue anticipated from the expansion of petroleum production and the revision of the terms of payment by the oil companies led the Government to initiate an over-all plan to develop the resources of the country. In 1950, a Development Board was established and a comprehensive five-year (1951 to 1956) development plan, involving an estimated expenditure of ID 65.8 million, was drawn up.

In 1951, at the request of the Iraqi Government, a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development visited Iraq and submitted a report, which included a five-year plan with an estimated expenditure of ID 168.5 million. 1/ The Iraqi Government accordingly, in the light of the Bank's recommendation, replaced its earlier plan by a six-year plan (1 April 1951 to 31 March 1957) calling for expenditure of ID 155.4 million (table 30).

1/ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq (Baltimore, 1952).

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Table 30. Iraq: Proposed Expenditure and Revenue of the Development Board, 1951/52 to 1956/57

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1954/55	1955/56	1956/57	Total
Revenue:							
Oil revenue	10,150	18,690	32,900	34,300	34,300	34,300	164,640
Proceeds of Tharthar project loan	320	1,850	970	640	185	-	3,965
Miscellaneous receipts	2	8	50	35	20	20	135
Total	10,472	20,548	33,928	34,975	34,505	34,320	168,740
Expenditure:							
Administrative and research expenses.	170	460	600	650	650	650	3,180
Irrigation projects:							
Tharthar	1,250	3,600	3,140	1,450	185	675	10,300
Habbaniya	450	300	500	500	200	250	2,200
Diyala reservoir	200	450	1,800	2,100	1,700	1,000	7,250
Dokan reservoir	200	600	1,400	1,700	1,550	1,250	6,700
Bekhme reservoir	200	1,000	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	8,700
Udhaim barrage and construction of canals	-	550	250	500	500	500	1,800
Other irrigation projects	724	1,500	2,000	2,450	2,700	2,950	12,324
Major drainage projects	200	400	750	750	1,000	1,000	4,100
Total, irrigation projects	3,024	7,100	10,840	11,950	10,335	10,125	53,374
Roads and bridges	2,666	5,800	4,700	5,300	5,450	5,450	26,766
Buildings	2,368	2,650	3,100	3,300	3,300	3,300	18,018
Reclamation of land, etc.	1,686	3,450	4,150	4,400	4,600	4,700	22,986
Industries	950	3,000	5,000	6,000	8,000	9,000	31,050
Total	9,364	20,460	28,390	31,600	32,335	33,225	155,374

Source: Compilation of Laws concerning the Development Board (revised), Schedule A (Baghdad, 1952), pages 8 and 9. Figures represent planned expenditure and revenue for fiscal years ending 31 March.

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Previously the Government had carried out several schemes in various fields but development projects had had to be kept small and had been aimed at the more immediate needs. Financing was carried out by means of yearly capital works appropriations, totalling about ID35 million from 1931 to 1950. It is not, however, clear whether these appropriations were fully spent.

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The execution of the Six-Year Plan was entrusted to the Development Board, established in the spring of 1950 under Law No. 23 of 1950 as amended by Law No. 6 of 1952. It was constituted under the presidency of the Prime Minister; the members were the Minister of Finance and six executive members, nominated by the Council of Ministers for a term of five years, including three experts, one each in finance and economics; in irrigations; and in an unspecified field to be prescribed by the Council of Ministers. The Board was entrusted with the duty of preparing "a general economic and financial plan for the development of the resources of Iraq and the raising of the standard of living of the people"; with undertaking "a general survey of the exploited and unexploited resources of Iraq"; with the execution of the plans "in accordance with their determined priority"; and with co-ordinating the various ministries' development schemes in relation to the general development of the country. The Board has its own budget, and its revenue consisted, at the outset, of the total revenue received from the oil companies, but in 1952 this was amended to 70 per cent plus such other sums as may be allotted to it by Parliament and the proceeds of any loans, domestic or foreign.

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In July 1953 the Ministry of Development was set up, headed by a new cabinet minister who became the ninth voting member, the Board's representative on the Council of Ministers and the link between Parliament and the Board. The new law did not change the Six-Year Plan or the financial structure of the Board, although it changed the latter's organizational framework and required the new minister to prepare a new development plan to be executed after the completion of the present one. Furthermore, with a view to administrative decentralization, a distinction has been made between "capital development projects" to be carried out entirely by the Board and "small development projects" which, though financed by the Board, are to be entrusted to the appropriate government departments for execution. The Board held its first meeting on 30 November 1950 and in May 1951 prepared its general programme, which was approved by Parliament in June 1951. The Six-Year Plan (1951 to 1957) calls for a total expenditure of ID 155.4 million and an estimated revenue of ID 168.7 million.

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Actual expenditures on development plans for the financial years 1951/52 to 1953/54 totalled ID 26 million. They fell short of planned expenditure, which amounted to ID 58.2 million, thus leaving an unspent balance of ID 31.9 million. The building programme and reclamation of lands and other projects ran nearest to schedule while irrigation and industry lagged behind (see table 31). In addition, the Board has granted a number of loans to municipalities and semi-governmental [illegible] the end of March 1954 as follows (in thousands of Iraqi dinars):

Omnibus service, Baghdad	1,000
Agricultural machinery and tools	500
Oil refinery service	6,000
Baghdad Water Board	660
Directorate General of Iraqi Railways	2,500
Industrial Bank	500
Eight municipalities	3,953
Total	14,113

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The increase in oil production and other earnings of the Board resulted in a higher revenue during the years 1951/52 to 1953/54 than that originally estimated, in spite of a smaller withdrawal from the ID 12.8 million Wadi Tharthar project loan granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the meantime, the Board's over-all expenditure during the same period amounted to about ID 40 million, including loans and advances; accounts deposited with the National Bank of Iraq for the disbursement of the Tharthar project; and the sum of ID 10.5 million paid to the Ministry of Finance for the schemes undertaken by the various ministries on behalf of the Board (see table 32). Furthermore the Board has authorized government departments to finance various plans on its behalf, and has awarded several contracts for its major plans to various foreign and national companies. Some of these plans have already been completed and the rest are to be completed in the next few years. Thus the actual expenditure plus the obligated expenditure of the Board have been estimated to be about ID 45 to ID 55 million.

The most important reasons for deferring the expenditure of the allocated amounts provided for in the Board's budgets since its operation have been the delay in the approval of the programme by Parliament; the inability of the different departments, particularly in the first two years, to execute the projects entrusted to them by the Board; and the necessity for providing adequate time to study, survey and prepare the estimated cost and specifications for inviting tenders for the various projects. Most of the projects outlined in the original programme needed further studies and surveys, several of which have since been completed. Many have been submitted by various engineering consultants of international repute, and are under consideration by the Board. The Board hopes to accelerate the execution of such projects as were planned since it has almost reached the end of the planning stage.

Major projects

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One of the main purposes of the Six-Year Plan is to control floods in the Tigris and Euphrates by storing surplus water which can be used for irrigation. An over-all programme has been prepared, at an estimated cost of ID 335 million, providing for the construction of ten dams; 1/ it is expected to increase the cropped area by 75 per cent and raise net annual agricultural income from its present level of ID 62 million to ID 222 million; part of this programme is being implemented under the Six-Year Plan. The plan also provides for industrial expansion, the building of 3,500 kilometres of metalled roads and improvement of a further 3,000 kilometres.

1/ See Knappen, Tippets, Abbott and McCarthy, Report on the Development of the Tigris and Euphrates River Systems (Baghdad, 1954).

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Table 32. Iraq: Revenue and Expenditure of the Development Board, 1951/52 to June 1954

(Thousands of Iraqi dinars)

Item	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54	1954 April to June
Revenue:				
Oil receipts	6,702	22,876	34,824	9,471
Proceeds of loan for Tharthar project	764	1,118	227	49
Miscellaneous receipts ..	1	5	226	95
Total	7,467	23,999	35,277	9,615
Expenditure:				
Development expenditure .	3,131	12,838	7,282	2,116
Net balance of loans and advances	769	6,227	9,799	2,245
Net balance of deposit accounts	- 267	- 2,591	2,676	- 5
Total	3,633	16,474	19,757	4,356
Surplus	3,834	7,525[a]	15,520	5,259

Source: National Bank of Iraq, Quarterly Bulletin, No. 11, July-September 1954 (Baghdad). Figures are provisional returns for fiscal years ending 31 March.

a/ Including ID 5 million transferred to the ordinary budget according to ordinance No. 7 of 1952.

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There are several other projected dams and barrages on the Tigris and its tributaries (see map). The dam on the Tigris near Eski Mosul is estimated to have a capacity of 8 billion cubic metres and to cost ID 16 million. The Bekhme dam, on the Greater Zab, will have an initial capacity of 3 billion cubic metres and an ultimate capacity of 8.3 billion; its costs are estimated at ID 21.8 million and ID 39.6 million, respectively. The dam would provide irrigation for 625,000 hectares and a capacity of 600,000 kilowatts of electric power.

Two projects are planned on the Diyala, another tributary of the Tigris. A dam at Derbendi-Khan would have a storage capacity of 3.7 billion cubic metres and would increase the water supply for 309,000 hectares at present receiving light irrigation; its costs are put at ID 21 million. Preliminary work has begun. A barrage at Bani Saad, costing ID 1.75 million would, when complemented by the Mahrawan irrigation works, provide water for 223,000 hectares. In addition to the Dokan dam, a barrage is to be built on the Lesser Zab, at Hawija; it could irrigate 50,000 hectares. The Gharraf scheme will channel water from the projected Eski Mosul or Bekhme dams to 429,000 hectares in the Amara region. Another project, falling outside the Six-Year Plan, is a dam at Dumir Kapu, on the Adhaim river, providing irrigation for 175,000 hectares, as well as electric power.

The total area which will be irrigated by the various projected schemes on the Tigris and its tributaries was estimated at 1.24 million hectares, and that by the Euphrates schemes at 560,000 hectares, a total of 1.8 million hectares. Work is also proceeding on the drainage of 233,000 hectares, and the Six-Year Plan provides for an expenditure of ID 23 million for land reclamation, agricultural research, afforestation, improvement of animal husbandry, filling swamps and marshes and various other schemes.

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Industrial development plans aim at both increasing the output of consumer goods and utilizing Iraq's petroleum resources to produce certain basic products. A cotton spinning and weaving factory is under construction near Mosul; it will have 20,000 spindles, thus doubling the present capacity 1/ and is expected to produce 20 million square metres of cloth per annum; a sum of ID 3,115,000 has been allocated for the project. 2/ Some expansion and improvement is also taking place in the privately owned woollen and rayon industries. 3/ Cement plants are being built, or planned, by both the Government and private enterprise. The Government is setting up factories at Mosul and Sarchinar, with a daily capacity of 350 tons each; completion is scheduled for 1956 and costs are estimated at ID 2,200,000 and ID 3,115,000, respectively. 4/ In addition, a privately owned plant at Mosul with a capacity of 350 tons a day is scheduled for completion by June 1955, another privately owned plant, near Baghdad, is doubling its present capacity of 600 tons a day, and a third private plant, with a daily capacity of 700 tons, is to be established near Hindiya barrage. 5/ The completion of all

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1/ Salman, loc. cit.; existing capacity is privately owned.

2/ The Iraq Times, 5 February 1955 (Baghdad).

3/ Al Shaab, 28 February 1954 (Baghdad).

4/ The Iraq Times, 5 February 1955 (Baghdad).

5/ Ibid., 26 January 1955.

these schemes would raise annual capacity to over a million tons. Other projects include a sugar factory using locally grown beets to produce 10,000 tons of sugar per annum and refine 25,000 tons of imported sugar, at an estimated cost of ID 1.78 million; a pilot paper plant; a glass factory; a rayon factory; and a tobacco factory. 1/

The most important project connected with petroleum is a refinery with an annual capacity of one million tons, at Dora, near Baghdad. Completion was scheduled for 1955 and total costs have been estimated at ID 10.5 million. A pipeline supplying the refinery with crude petroleum, from Baiji, on the Euphrates west of Kirkuk, has been completed and five pipelines are under construction to carry the refined products to Baghdad and Um Al Adham. 2/ An asphalt refinery being built at Qayara, near Mosul, at a cost of ID 1.15 million, is expected to produce 60,000 tons of asphalt per annum, as well as 24,000 tons of gas oil. A smaller plant at Muftiya, near Basra, with an annual capacity of 6,000 tons, was scheduled to start operations at the beginning of 1955. 3/ A lubricating oil refinery has also been approved near Baghdad; it will produce 25,000 tons and cost 3.4 million.

The major project under consideration is that for utilizing natural gases from the Kirkuk oil wells to produce chemical fertilizers, cement, sulphur and electric power. Two alternative projects have been submitted, one of which would cost ID 33 million and produce 500,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizers, 200,000 tons of cement and 100,000 tons of sulphur, while the other would cost ID 20 million and produce half these quantities.

A survey of mineral resources is being carried out by a group of foreign consulting engineers. Negotiations are proceeding with a United States sulphur company regarding the exploitation of Iraq's sulphur deposits, which are believed to be large.

Other development projects include a highway and bridge building programme, the expansion of Baghdad airport and improvement of telecommunications. In addition, a large-scale building programme is under way, including hospitals, schools, low-cost housing and public buildings.

The new Five-Year Plan

The Ministry of Development and the Development Board have approved the new Five-Year Plan for the financial years 1955/56 to 1959/60. Subject to approval by Parliament, the plan calls for an estimated total expenditure of ID 303,306,100. Revenue estimates total ID 252,658,000. These are calculated on an estimated annual revenue of ID 43 million derived from a 70 per cent share of the oil receipts making a total of ID 215 million, plus a sum of about ID 38 million from previous years. The deficit of about ID 50 million is to be balanced by an anticipated increase in oil revenue during this period.

1/ The Iraq Times, 20 October 1954.

2/ Ibid., 6 December 1954.

3/ Ibid., 19 November 1954.

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186 ETHNOCENTRISM--exaltation of the ingroup (e.g., consciousness of kind, local pride, patriotism, class consciousness, old school tie); unfavorable judgments of other groups (e.g., race prejudice, religious intolerance, national antipathies); overt manifestations (e.g., snobbishness, discrimination, ethical dualism, nationalism); symbolic representation (e.g., flags, anthems, emblems, national heroes); channeling of hostilities (e.g., sports rivalry, ethnic scapegoats); etc. See also:

Sports and games 82
Prejudice and discrimination toward ethnic and other stratified groups 86
Ingroup antagonisms 578
Behavior toward nonrelatives, strangers, and aliens 609
Moiety rivalries 616
Development of nationalism 619
Citizenship 641
International relations 648
Political parties 665
Nationalistic and nativistic movements . . . 668
Military morale 703
Religious persecution 706
Ideas about race 829

186, 728, 648, 668

Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
● Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

668 but fatalistic acceptance, which was mixed in Shi'i quarters with theocratic as well as emotional repugnance, and in Sunni often with genuine if paradoxical respect for the Caliph. To none at this time was an alternative conceivable. At the best, reform of some present abuses could be hoped, and the persistence of Arab race-consciousness and the slow growth of a critical spirit were already bringing such hopes to birth. But there was heard in 'Iraq no echo yet of the literary and political movements in the Lebanon and Egypt, where even now an Arab Movement was coming to birth.

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

excitement among possible deputies, and convulsed the diwans of the three provincial capitals. The visits of C.U.P. committee men from Istanbul to the 'Iraq cities were received with an initial enthusiasm which was soon stifled by the inept bad manners of the visitors and the frowns of the reactionary element already mobilizing its forces. Deputies duly elected[1] left Istanbul, and a public holiday marked the assembly of Parliament in December 1908, followed four months later by another for the accession of Muḥammad V.

With the departure of leading 'Iraqis to Istanbul to try their hand at politics and to influence 'Iraq affairs, if they could, through the higher appointments, a new element entered 'Iraq life. At Istanbul the 'Iraqi deputies with the Syrian formed, from the first, a compact group in the Chamber as well as participating in a literary club—al-Muntadā al-Adabi—more political than cultural; and, returning to 'Iraq for recess, they spread ideas long strange to the territory. Some leading families, indeed, scornfully opposed these vulgar dangerous innovations and regretted their paternal Sultan; tribal shaykhs, disappointed of their naïve first hopes that 'freedom' would mean non-government, clamoured for separate seats in Parliament. The minorities first hoped for equality and progress, then learned that conscription and full Ottomanization were all their gains. All alike could threaten senior officials with 'political' reprisals, take a hand at electioneering, form political clubs, and flirt with the Liberal Party which after 1911 challenged the C.U.P. But on the whole the latter, in the 'Iraq of 1908 to 1914, dominated political circles, survived periods of secession and reaction, and alone maintained a country-wide organization. And when, as in Baṣra, it was strongly opposed, such opposition arose less from the Liberals than from the greater seduction of other ideas which were now coming into full expression in 'Iraq: those of Arab nationalism.

The emergence of such a nationalist movement was as inevitable as that of reform in Turkey itself. The sense of anachronism and frustration was common to the protagonists of both; and the Arab character, proud and individualistic, is incapable of admitting permanent inferiority. The emancipation of the subject races in Europe was increasingly known to them. The Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph destroyed almost the only bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government. The attainment of high office by 'Iraqis in southern 'Iraq, rumours of political life in

[1] The first Members for Baghdad in the Turkish Chamber were: Muḥammad Bey (an Istanbuli): Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi (p. 140): Murad Bey: Fu'ad Bey al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Zahawi the poet (both members of leading Baghdad families): and the Jew Sasun Ḥasqayl (p. 127).

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Egypt, hints of a claim to nationhood itself put forward by Arab *émigrés* in Paris—all these, with developing intercommunication and greater awareness of world thought, had prepared the ground for nationalism in 'Iraq even before the final impetus of the Turkish revolution.

The 1908 revolution, while it created an active Turkish-political life in 'Iraq, soon indicated also the gulf between Turkish and Arab aspirations. An 'Arab Brotherhood' group, formed in the first Turkish Chamber, was summarily suppressed by the Young Turks; the proportion of Arab to Turkish deputies and senators in Parliament was unjustly low. Incoming Walis of the 'Iraq wilayas showed less sympathy than ever with decentralization or the suggested use of Arabic; more 'Iraqis than ever groaned at the hateful prospect of conscription in Turkish armies—perhaps to fight brother Arabs in the endless warfare of the Yaman. It followed that the politicians of 'Iraq soon after 1908 began to mix various strains of Arab separatism with their pro- or anti-C.U.P. polemics: and to treat seriously tentative ideas of greater local privilege, a higher proportion of appointments, wider local powers and, finally, local autonomy itself.

For such claims there was basis in Arab character and culture, in 'Iraq's geographical separateness, and perhaps still more in the personal aspirations of ambitious 'Iraqis, who could imagine a great career in an Arab or 'Iraqi State more easily than in a Turkish. Meanwhile there were the beginnings of contact with coteries formed abroad to foster Arab ambitions and to frame demands. Such were the secret but short-lived Qaḥṭaniya in Istanbul, whose members favoured an Arab Kingdom within the Turkish Empire, and such the Young Arab Society which, moved from Paris to Beirut in 1913, was to play a heroic part in 1915. More important in 'Iraq were the local circles in contact with the Ottoman Decentralization Party of Cairo: a society which, founded in 1912 with its conception of local autonomy within the Empire, came nearest to expressing the political ambitions of the 'Iraqis of the day, and took root in Baghdad and Baṣra. The relations of Arab officers in Turkish regiments with their brother officers became strained, and 'Iraqi Qa'immaqams found odious the task of applying Turkish repressive measures. From 1910 to 1914 a surprising development of the press in 'Iraq marked the new political age. In place of the half-dozen colourless official newspapers of the wilaya capitals and Najf in Ḥamidiyan times, sheets of every colouring appeared in Arabic or Turkish month by month, to a final total of some fifty; they advocated various programmes—brilliant or foolish and always irresponsible—of pan-Islam, local or pan-Arab nationalism, Turkish patriotism or anti-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

foreign suspicion. A number of 'Iraqi officers and young 'notables', who were later to attain high positions under the 'Iraq Government, were active in these politics before 1914.

Of the three wilaya capitals Mosul showed at first the least enthusiasm for the Arab Movement, dominated as it was by families of the old régime, reactionary 'Ulamā, and a deep hinterland of Kurds. Baghdad political society was split into half a dozen factions—the pro-Turk (C.U.P., Liberal, or Ḥamidiyan), the Decentralizing, those in close touch with Syria, those with Egypt, those with Baṣra, and from somewhere among all these a secret Arab Patriotic Party was formed in 1912 with a vague programme of autonomy. In the Holy Cities the Mujtahid leadership, professedly eschewing all worldly politics, was little interested in an Arab nationalism which could offer it nothing, though driven at times to favour it by detestation of all things Turkish. The priesthood adopted in general a line of anti-Christian xenophobia, with a measure of positive pan-Islamism, while the Shi'i tribes hoped only for the joys of non-government.

Baṣra, farthest from Turkish interests and nearest to independent Arabia, took an unquestioned lead in the Arab Movement. It was inspired or terrorized by Sayid Ṭalib, a younger son of the venerated local Naqib family. An able, charming, unscrupulous and ambitious statesman, gang-leader, and patriot, he had been Mutaṣarrif of al-Aḥsā, had close contacts in Najd, Kuwayt, and Muḥammara and dominated Baṣra. He was at the opening of the century already well known in Istanbul as a man of the highest promise or danger, prepared to adopt whatever allegiances would favour his rise to an independent Amirate of southern 'Iraq. He reversed, after a year, his first adherence to the C.U.P., became its bitterest enemy, and sought to be at once the leading agent of Istanbul in his wilaya, and the first of Arab patriots. In 1912 he made overtures to the British in Egypt and in Simla, in 1913 was active in collecting war funds for the Turkish armies and declaring his support of the Empire. A month later he formed a Committee of National Defence, and communicated to the Wali and the Sadr-i-A'dham—Grand Wazir—a memorial pressing for the immediate summoning of a General Council of the wilaya 'to elaborate a scheme of reforms'.

In March 1913 spokesmen in Baghdad were organizing a 'united demand' for decentralization on the model just published amid applause by a strong Beirut Committee, and were watching anti-Turk placards exposed by night in the Baghdad streets. Sayid Ṭalib meanwhile convened at Muḥammara a meeting of himself, Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, and high officials of Baṣra wilaya, to formulate self-government proposals.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

In May some results appeared, induced perhaps more by the Beirut than the Baṣra pressure. A new Wilaya Law ordained the increased use of Arabic in Arab wilayas, and the formation of a not ineffective General Council in each. Sayid Ṭalib telegraphed vainly to Istanbul in protest against so hollow a concession and informed Mr. Crow, the British Consul, that a trial of strength was now inevitable. The Consul thought it prudent to summon a British warship, H.M.S. *Alert*, which anchored for a time off 'Ashar; but Sayid Ṭalib decided after all on a policy of moderate pressure, until the resounding murder of the local general, Farid Bey—a crime inevitably ascribed to Sayid Ṭalib—diverted attention from less vivid politics. In the same month, June 1913, the Wali of Baghdad arrested four leading nationalist spokesmen, including Yusif al-Suwaydi, for the excessive freedom of their anti-Turkish expressions; but all save one were promptly released. In July and August hopeful-seeming Turko-Arab negotiations took place in Istanbul after the Arabs had organized a meeting in June in Paris which, attended by two 'Iraqis, pressed for decentralization; and in August a decree promulgated in all wilayas seemed to grant a substantial part of Arab demands. Military service was to be performed only within the Inspectorate; the schools would teach in Arabic, with higher education in Turkish; officials in Arab territory would be Arab-speaking, and all but the highest appointments would be made locally; progressive foreign experts would be employed, grants of funds could be expected, the resolutions of the General Wilaya Councils would be executed, three ministers of the Central Government, five Walis, ten Mutaṣarrifs were to be Arabs. But these provisions, felt with excellent reason to be a mere placation of Arab demands, evoked more of 'Iraqi scepticism than confidence.

The gulf between Arab and Turkish views was by now profound and explicit. Most foreigners, not unsympathetic to Arab demands, still felt their nationalism to be a premature and unreliable candidate for support; they distrusted Arab administrative powers even as compared with Turkish, and noted the mutually hostile groups into which the Arab nationalist world was already divided, and in which no one spoke for 'Iraq, since such a unit was not yet imagined. But, on whatever level, agitation in every form continued, and interchanges with the movements in the Levant increased. A secret society, al-'Ahd—the Covenant—was from early in 1914 to embrace scores of 'Iraqi officers in the Turkish Army. The Baṣra 'Reform Committee' with Sayid Ṭalib as President, published an inflammatory pamphlet. Telegrams still poured from 'Iraq to Istanbul, demanding Arab autonomy. Writers in the newspapers abandoned restraint, nationalist clubs were formed

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khudḥayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca.1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

interested in Arab affairs—G. E. Leachman, Hubert Young, Trenchard Fowle, A. G. A. Hore-Ruthven, and others—and writers of distinction who included the gifted and scholarly traveller Gertrude Bell. Among private British residents were interesting or outstanding personalities: Dr. W. A. Wigram of the Archbishop's mission, Arthur Tod of Lynch's, Captain C. H. Cowley of the river steamers. But even while personal relations with the Pashas remained cordial, a policy of pinpricks which reflected a jealous and suspicious xenophobia was at times directed against British interests. Expropriations without compensation, capricious refusal of the right to use commercial codes, baseless demands for registration fees, permission to practise withheld from British doctors, mean treatment of British employees recruited for technical functions: these were episodes of an intermittent campaign of petty malice. The refusal of British Consuls to listen to shaykhs or notables who begged for British 'protection', and their manifest sympathy with distracted Governors, availed little to overcome the suspicion that the British had, somehow, sinister designs on the 'Iraq wilayas. Nevertheless, life in 'Iraq was found pleasant enough by resident Englishmen, and many warm friendships were formed between them and 'Iraqis.

British Residents and their Consuls during the period maintained a high level of loyal and disinterested service. At Baṣra A. C. Wratislaw was Consul from 1898 to 1903, E. F. Crow from 1903 to 1914; both were loyal friends of successive Walis. At Baghdad Colonel L. S. Newmarch was Resident and Consul-General from 1902 to 1906, Colonel J. Ramsey and J. G. Lorimer from 1906 to 1909 and 1909 to 1913. These, and not these alone, were outstanding public servants and good friends of the 'Iraq peoples. The tragic death in 1914 of Lorimer, author of the encyclopædic *Persian Gulf Gazetteer*, was a grievous loss.

British-Indian interests did not diminish. The extraterritorial Post Offices continued to be resented by Turkish officialdom, the Indian pilgrim-agents at Samarrā and Kadhimiya served their visiting fellow countrymen in spite of official interference, trading firms developed their businesses. Visits to the Holy Cities by the rich and great of Indian Islam were events notable to the Indian communities which existed in most of the larger towns of central and southern 'Iraq; but these, with partial assimilation into the local population, had little community organization and few eminent members.

To turn now to 'Iraq's Arabian and Persian neighbours, Shaykh Mubārak at Kuwayt maintained his delicate triple position of nominal Qa'immaqam, treaty-bound British protégé, and effectively independent ruler. He survived the embarrassing visit of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

1. MIDSUMMER 1914

Two few countries in the world were greater changes brought by the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Government by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, confined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

habitual, and much admirable work was done by the departments. Few indeed could deny the improvement in the honesty and justice of the Administration, its prevailing security, its achieved and expected progress in material matters, over the familiar Turkish standards. Nevertheless, the charge that the type or tone of this Administration were among the causes of the lawless outbreaks so soon and so disappointingly to follow cannot completely be denied.

It was, first, that of a Christian Power. To some indifferent, this fact was objectionable to many, and not least to the Shi'i hierarchy whose status and powers would be lost for ever if a foreign secular Power were to be installed. In Sunni minds a nostalgic feeling for the Califate as the true and sole legitimate source of power, even in its temporary defeat, was nearly allied to their religion; and the indulgence of such feelings was the easier, and the new régime must remain the more rootless and untrusted, while peace with Turkey was delayed. Religion and Ottoman loyalties apart, the British régime was foreign and unfamiliar. Its spokesmen, often weak in Arabic, differed from their predecessors, to the point of strangeness, in dress, manner, and social customs. The use of Indians as clerks and departmental subordinates was universal, and was resented. The efficiency at which the Administration aimed was no desideratum of the governed, and its ranking as a paramount objective has been alleged as a chief defect of the régime. The charge is doubtfully true; but in fact little was done to render the machinery of Government easy or acceptable to its public. It tended to rigidity of standard, mixed little tolerance with its uncomfortable and not always desired justice, and was pitiless to long-familiar laxities.

The disappearance of many restrictions with the Armistice still left the military occupation of notables' houses, military roads or camps which blocked canals, and other galling inconveniences. These grievances increased with time. With them came the disappointment and disillusion of post-war retrenchment; projects were abandoned, departments restricted, military expenditure greatly reduced. After all, it seemed, no golden age had arrived! The Railway, Indian-staffed, was slow and expensive. The outcry for schools and English lessons was unmet. The agricultural experts had not transformed agriculture, those of irrigation had cured neither drought nor floods. The Land Registry settled few disputes. And the insistence on full revenue collection on every crop and garden was galling alike to rich and poor, who, in spite of lowered demand-rates, found themselves paying more taxation than ever before, with little or no improvement in the old and evil assessment methods.

In the towns the Administration, desperately short of subordinate

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[1- British civil administration following World War I -- Analyst]

1: Longrigg G-4.5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

staff, insisted nevertheless on standards of education and knowledge of English necessarily lacking in the hundreds of unemployed 'Iraqi ex-officials. These, idle and aggrieved, crowded the coffee shops; and the return of many more from Turkey increased the body of malcontents. Wilson's Administration in fact made little effective effort to use in senior or even junior posts the considerable experience and goodwill possessed by the available 'Iraqis.

Such are among the considerations which can explain the willingness of large elements of the fickle and disillusioned 'Iraqi public, by the end of 1919, to support any anti-British movement which might appear. The leadership which such movement was in fact to follow was that of nationalism: that Arab nationalism which the Wilson Administration, and notably its head, largely through too local and too limited an experience of Arabs and ignorance of the political conceptions now new-born or coming to birth in Europe, belittled and distrusted. The development of this movement, and the successive uneasy stages by which 'Iraq was to advance to a new constitutional status, are next to be recorded.

3. OPPOSITION TO THE BRITISH

The Ḥijaz correspondence of 1915–16 between the Sharif Ḥusayn and Sir Henry McMahon had accepted the idea of a post-war Arab State to embrace, with named exceptions, all Arab territories in Asia. It could indeed be argued that 'Iraq stood apart from other Arab lands, with differing needs and conditions; it could be shown that the McMahon letters called for 'special administrative arrangements in Baṣra and Baghdad'. But such exclusion from the Arab State could, the Sharif had replied, be only temporary 'for a period to be settled by negotiation': 'Iraq was a historic and sacred Arab land. A British policy of mere selfish acquisition of 'Iraq was after this, to any serious statesman, unthinkable; and in fact War Office instructions of March 1917 had already visualized specifically an Arab Amirate of Baṣra and Baghdad. The formation of an Arab State or States was an objective of idealists and realists alike, in Syria and in London; it was visibly realized under the Amir Fayṣal in Damascus before the end of 1918; and a policy of self-determination for the ex-Ottoman Arab countries had by that time been clearly expressed by the British Prime Minister in January 1918, again by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points, yet again in the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November 1918. The last quoted declared 'the goal envisaged by France and Great Britain' to be 'the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of National Governments and administrations

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that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.'

The 'Iraq public, among whom this hopeful declaration raised high and immediate hopes, had throughout the War shown no visible signs of nationalist feeling. The political leaders of the period 1911–14 were scattered, Sayid Ṭalib abroad, the Clubs dead or inactive, the press non-existent, communications with other countries severed. But the movement was not dead; the end of the War, it might have been anticipated, must inevitably revive it with greater vitality than ever. Meanwhile no British act or speech in 'Iraq, save only the vague flamboyance of the Maude speech of March 1917, had given any indication of future self-government. Surprisingly, no use had been made in 'Iraq of Arab forces against the Turks, in spite of the success of these in the Ḥijaz and Syria, and the tentative prompting of the War Office itself. The British Military Command was deterred, it seemed, by the impossibility of guaranteeing the finality of Turkish disappearance, by the difficulty of equipping and training Arab recruits for serious warfare, by its lack of contact with the best 'Iraqi material such as the officers then fighting with the Amir Fayṣal: and perhaps not least by the attitude of the Government of India, which frankly disapproved of Arab national ambitions and of any movement which would encourage them.

The provisions of the administratively absurd and morally lamentable Sykes–Picot Agreement, signed by France and Great Britain in May 1916 and revealed to the world by the Russians in October 1917, seemed indeed if taken literally to weigh heavily against a self-determined régime for 'Iraq. It had provided that Mosul and part of its wilaya should be reserved for French exploitation, under Arab suzerainty, and that most of western 'Iraq should be of similar status but under British domination, with the body of central and southern districts placed under direct British rule. These provisions, which the French did not lightly abandon, were patently incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Sharifian commitments; and indeed the need to conciliate French feeling, especially in Syria, was a main and inescapable British post-war embarrassment.

Meanwhile the Anglo-French Declaration, the relaxing of many war-time restrictions, the return of 'Iraqis from abroad, the prospect of security and development in the territory, all raised its future as an immediate issue, and brought 'Iraqi nationalism back to life in a day.

Nourished from various sources, it was to grow rapidly during the first half of 1919, and thereafter. The central core of the movement was, no doubt, the claim of a part of the 'Iraqi educated

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

186 668 classes to 'complete independence', and resentment that this was withheld. Contributory to it as anti-Government—that is, anti-British—forces were at this stage the strains of propaganda entering the country from Turkey, from Bolshevik Russia, and from the eagerly nationalistic 'Iraqis with Faysal in Syria. Contributory also were the fears of the Mujtahids for their own position, since nothing could be more damaging to the Shi'i theocracy than a British Administration, and the specifically anti-British and anti-Christian exhortations which radiated from Karbalā and Najf from 1918 onwards. The real or fancied shortcomings of the Administration itself, elsewhere described, could add to a growing dissatisfaction: every frustration, every delay or disappointment was the fault of the British, and created new nationalists. Among the tribes, the shaykhs' rivals in every group were ready always to join an insurgent movement and to dethrone a British-supported leader; and the hunger for loot and inveterate pleasure in raiding, the dislike of revenue payment, and the conviction that British forces were withdrawing, combined to prepare the way for wholesale non-obedience or worse. The history of 1919 and early 1920 is, therefore, one of the increase and coalescence of malcontent elements until the climax of July 1920.

727* Colonel Wilson, horrified by the Anglo-French Declaration, pronounced it wholly unsuitable as a basis for government in 'Iraq. He urged that nothing but firm British administration of whatever State might be created could keep the country from anarchy; and he reacted no less strongly against suggestions by his *bête noire*, T. E. Lawrence, for the facile establishment of a group of States, 'Iraqi and Syrian, under Sharifian princes. His own earliest proposal to Whitehall was for the cautious formation of an Arab State of 'Iraq to include Mosul and, placed under an Arab Amir, to be fortified by a British High Commission and a full complement of advisers. But the difficulty of choosing an Amir was at once obvious, and the Acting Civil Commissioner reviewed in vain the claims of a Mosul notable, of the Naqib of Baghdad, of an unspecified Egyptian prince, and of a son of King Husayn. Finding serious objection to all or any of these he ended by preferring that the State should for five years be ruled by Sir Percy Cox, with no Amir at all; this if anything, he felt, should both ensure efficiency and keep nationalism within bounds.

In London, Middle Eastern affairs were at this time handled by an Interdepartmental Committee presided over by Lord Curzon. In this body the Western school of British doctrine on Arab affairs prevailed over the rival Eastern or Indian school: and in it the clashing temperaments and views of Lord Curzon and Mr. Edwin Montagu, Secretary for India, had ample play. The Committee

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

727* Treaty of Sèvres was to provide. Arab governors and Arab district councils would be appointed, British military and financial help would be made available. Curzon, resolute to postpone any British Government commitment over Mosul, preferred that that wilaya should form a separate Amirate ringed by 'independent' Kurdish principalities. The debate continued. The clash of French and Arab ambitions in Syria: the long failure to make peace with Turkey: American pressure in Paris for a free right of choice by the Arab populations, as exemplified by their King–Crane fact-finding commission which visited Syria in 1919: the attitude of the Council of Ten in Paris, who in January 1919 had decided on the detachment of 'Iraq from Turkey, and in March were near to agreeing on the distribution of Mandates: the wide differences of view among the British Government's own advisers on Arab affairs: the increasing call for post-war economy—or even for bag-and-baggage evacuation, or retreat to Baṣra—in the British press and Parliament: all these were scarcely reconcilable elements in reaching a clear solution of 'Iraq's future. The Baghdad Administration had as yet no clear guidance from the peace-makers in Europe on the new Mandatory idea which, propounded at Versailles by General Smuts, was incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations coming to birth early in 1919, and was held especially applicable—as Article 22 of the Covenant provided—to the ex-Ottoman territories. Acceptance of this conception by Powers concerned was implicit in the Versailles Treaty, which was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified on 10 January 1920.

728* 647* In 'Iraq, meanwhile, the Army visibly diminished. Garrisoned posts were abandoned, camps shrunk, effective mobile forces were fewer and ever smaller. The Civil Administration retained, indeed, always a very considerable body of popular acceptance in town and country among moderate unpolitical elements and the general public. But, as 1919 advanced, signs were not lacking that opposition to Government in its present form, so unsatisfying to nationalist aspirations, was on the increase. The local disorders in Kurdistan were reported and exaggerated. Messengers and considerable funds reached Baghdad and the Euphrates from the 'Iraqi officers now in Damascus and Aleppo, and these addressed a memorandum to the British Command in Syria, and another to the Foreign Secretary, on the need for an early national régime in 'Iraq. A distinguished Baghdadi lawyer and administrator, Naji Bey al-Suwaydi, invited from Damascus by Wilson to accept an advisory post in Baghdad, found the atmosphere uncongenial and returned unhappy to Syria. Other 'Iraqi visitors from the West reported a 'colonial' attitude in Wilson's Administration, which seemed to belittle or ignore 'Iraqi abilities. Rumours grew in

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Baghdad of the proposed Mandate over 'Iraq, soon to be allotted by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. British women and children were reported as pouring into the country as into a British colony, and in fact over 500 so entered late in 1919. The work and plans of the British civil departments seemed to suggest permanence of occupation. There had been arrests and deportations of trouble-makers—that is, said the nationalists, of patriots. Month by month the ranks of the politically-conscious were swollen. The national secondary school was established as a centre of propaganda. With the autumn the results of political preaching emanating from Syria, from Baghdad, and with increasing violence from Najf and Karbalā, became more obvious among the Euphrates tribes; and in Baghdad, where secret meetings and societies began to be reported, new and significant contacts were observed between the Sunni and Shi'i communities, with joint politico-religious conclaves and exchanges of courtesies without precedent. So passed the winter of 1919.

In spite of the wide extent by this time of a potentially violent political movement, a precarious outward peace was kept throughout these months save in one district, the upper Euphrates. Threats and rumours re-echoed here from the Turks at Mardin as well as from agents of the Arab Government at Aleppo; and in mid-December 1919 Dayr al-Zur was occupied by excited Syrian tribesmen escorting a Sharifian 'Governor of the Euphrates'. A critical and humiliating situation in the town, where the Assistant Political Officer was held prisoner, ended only on Christmas Day by an arrangement between representatives of the Civil Commissioner and those of Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, Governor of Aleppo, whereby Dayr was abandoned by the British. It became a centre for propaganda, for raids, and for loud threats to annex Mosul itself. Tribesmen entered and looted Albu Kamal, Syrian tax-collectors operated far into 'Iraq. The next Governor at Dayr, himself a Mosulawi, maintained a violent and well-subsidized campaign of Sharifian propaganda, and refused all suggestions for a diplomatic settlement of the frontier. The British authorities, physically powerless in the whole area, could do no more than protest and threaten reprisals by air. The return of the Amir Faysal to Syria from Europe in March 1920 led to the withdrawal of the invaders, and early in May a frontier conference, convened at 'Ashara, agreed on a boundary line immediately west of al-Qa'im. But this settlement wholly failed to improve conditions. The Syrian-inspired looting parties and demonstrations spread over all Dulaym and Shammar territory. The belief in British apathy and impending withdrawal was universal, the Mosul–Baghdad road and railway became unsafe, and violent propaganda posters of the

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668 'Ahd al-'Iraqi appeared in Mosul city. The efforts of Turkish agents based on Jazira-ibn-'Umar aided those of the Sharifian officers and envoys—whose funds, as the Civil Commissioner complained, were from those supplied by the British Government itself to the Sharifian ruler of Syria. How far the Amir was aware of his too zealous supporters' activities in 'Iraq can never be known; his own attitude was correct. In the first week of June a tribal force under an 'Iraqi officer, Jamil al-Madfa'i, entered Tall 'Afar, murdered two British officers, Captain J. E. Barlow and Captain B. Stuart, and two sergeants, and moved on to threaten Mosul; but a small British column from that garrison dispersed the tribesmen and re-occupied Tall 'Afar. A precarious calm settled thereafter on the upper Euphrates and the Jazira, the Damascus Government prudently disassociating itself from this and other acts of its agents.

The situation in Baghdad and central 'Iraq had by the late spring of 1920 further deteriorated. The significant Sunni–Shi'i meetings continued, with rivalry only in inflammatory speeches. Turkish and Bolshevik agents were reputed to be at work in addition to those of Arab nationalism, of Mujtahid reaction, of tribal lawlessness, of anti-British venom. Security in Baghdad itself was affected, the bazaars closed intermittently, ugly episodes occurred. Warnings to political leaders—two Shi'i nationalists, Sayid Muhammad al-Ṣadr and Ja'far abu al-Timman, and two Sunnis, Yusif al-Suwaydi (p. 46) and 'Ali al-Bazirgan—were unavailing, and the arrest of a petty agitator provoked angry crowds and rifle shots. Fuel was added to these flames by the Resolution of a group of 'Iraqis in Damascus which elected Faysal King of Syria; it resolved that the 'Iraq throne be forthwith offered to Faysal's elder brother, the Amir 'Abdullah. The tone and substance of House of Commons debates on Middle Eastern matters was keenly studied by 'Iraq politicians. The unpopular features of the local Administration, and its exclusion of 'Iraqi elements, continued unimproved. Finally came the news, confirming persistent rumours, that at San Remo on 28 April a Mandate for 'Iraq had been offered to Great Britain by the victorious Powers in conclave. This seeming death-blow to 'Iraqi hopes of immediate 'complete independence' was announced in Baghdad early in May with vague reassurances by the Civil Commissioner. The effect of these was not increased by the known, though unannounced, recommendations of the Bonham-Carter Committee, which Wilson had set up in March to draft a future 'Iraq Constitution: recommendations which, while well in advance of Wilson's own original views, were, with their insistence on continued British control over a structure of 'Iraqi deputies and officials, cautious and grudging to

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the point of complete unacceptability in the eyes of 'Iraqi nationalists.

An interview on 2 June, two days before the Tall 'Afar murders, between Wilson and a body of fifteen self-appointed nationalist delegates—to whom he added twenty-five more notables, selected by himself—served only to make clearer the gap between Wilsonian and nationalist views. The latter were unsatisfied by his explanations and assurances, while he continued to treat their demands for immediate independent 'Iraq nationhood as those of a malcontent clique, and to affirm that the main public of 'Iraq would be tolerant of, and safest under, what amounted to direct British rule.

The Curzon Committee, less cautious or more liberal than Wilson, had meanwhile considered the Bonham-Carter proposals and criticisms of them, and had decided that the time was ripe for an announcement on 'Iraqi constitutional advance. Under instructions from London, accordingly, the Civil Commissioner proclaimed on 17 June that a general Elective Assembly would be convened, and early progress sought towards the Constitution of an Arab State whose self-government would, while incomplete, be real and effective. But the announcement came too late. Nationalist emotion and expectation had gone too far, and forces in town and tribe were in motion that no suave phrases of a proclamation could now arrest. A few days spent in Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox, now leaving the post of British Minister in Teheran, made little impression, for all his personal prestige. A Mandate, hated word, had been awarded; British rule effectively continued; of true independence there was neither sign nor early hope; and a committee of ex-Turkish deputies, headed by Sayid Ṭalib, who had returned to 'Iraq in February 1920, pursued without effect on public opinion its labours on the machinery for holding the promised elections.

Meanwhile the drift of British armies out of 'Iraq had proceeded far. Effective troops were few and scattered. Lines of communication in 'Iraq and in Persia were long and barely defensible; and the static duties of guarding stores, Turkish prisoners, and Christian ex-Turkish refugees were calculated to employ nearly the whole surviving force. The British soldiers' families, recently arrived, were now concentrated at Karind in Persia. The military command had been held since March 1920 by an elderly General new to 'Iraq, Sir Aylmer Haldane, who showed from the first little confidence in the warnings of the Civil Commissioner and his officers: warnings which by now were those of an imminent outbreak.

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work in Baghdad. The Hakkari clans were settled, as far as great efforts and British expenditure could effect it, in the Government-owned villages of Dohuk and 'Amadiya districts, while hundreds of their more optimistic households passed over—ill-led, distraught by faction, and weakened by malaria—into their native hills across the border. Aghā Petros, their evil genius, was thankfully dispatched to Europe where he died in Paris soon afterwards. The Patriarchal household settled at Baybad, near 'Amadiya, sustained by the vigour and loyalty of Surma Khanim, the boy Patriarch's aunt. But the troubles of the hapless Assyrians, due so largely to their own fierce indiscipline, folly, and disunion, were not at or near their end.

For the Armenian refugees, who numbered some 15,000 at the time of their dispatch late in 1920 from Ba'quba to camp at Nahr 'Umar near Baṣra, other means of dispersal were sought. But their passive non-co-operation and sullen refusal to accept work in 'Iraq long defeated all the efforts made for them. Some measure of absorption in the cities or into Persia or among the Assyrians reduced their numbers, and most of the surviving main body of some 8,000 could at last be transported by ship to Batum—at the cost, as ever, of the British Government—by agreement with the new Armenian Government in Transcaucasia. The residue, still resisting all suggested forms of self-help, were induced by March 1922 to leave Nahr 'Umar, and the camp was closed.

2. THE FIRST TREATY

The proposal of the British Government to express the Anglo-'Iraq relationship by treaty, rather than by undisguised mandatory Government, was approved by the Amir before his arrival in 'Iraq, and seemed not to be opposed, initially, by nationalist spokesmen there. To both sides it appeared likely to minimize the odium of a humiliating guardian–ward relationship, and to invest 'Iraq from the outset with the dignity of an independent treaty-making State. It was, in fact, unquestionably the most prudent and most imaginative way to handle a situation which lacked all precedent; but, to the resentment of 'Iraqi patriots and the poisoning of Anglo-'Iraq relations for the next ten years, the Mandate itself remained. Unmentioned in the draft Treaty, it had nevertheless notoriously been awarded to and accepted by Great Britain, and was even now in draft and awaiting League ratification in the last days of 1921. The remoteness of such a situation from the 'Complete Independence' claimed by the nationalists was all too obvious, however the Mandate be interpreted, excused, or kept out of sight.

A view hostile to the Mandate, and suspicious of a Treaty however otherwise generous which merely veiled it, was inevitably

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

adopted by the King and his entourage from the first. He had been led by Mr. Churchill in London, he complained, to envisage a very different form of Treaty: the Mandate must go, disappear, be repudiated! And if it be urged that a debatable nicety of constitutional or international law was an unrealistic or scarcely sufficient basis—and one important only to a tiny minority of 'Iraqis—on which to found, as did the political 'Iraqis of 1921 to 1930, a ten-year campaign of political struggle, marked by civil resistance, murder, and intended insurrection, it remains true that the Mandate did in fact involve an imperfect independence and an affront to national pride damaging, it was claimed, to 'Iraq in Islamic eyes everywhere.

As Treaty discussions in the Cabinet proceeded early in 1922, the strata of public opinion on the matter became clearer. Extreme nationalists, who included, for their own different reasons, the Shi'i 'Ulamā and leading supporters and even intimates of the King, cried out against mandated 'slavery' and demanded complete British evacuation: an outcry which did not fail to produce by reaction an 'English' party of notables and shaykhs favourable, they said, to effective British rule. More moderate nationalists, whose views the King personally shared, stood for abrogation of the Mandate, a friendly and equal Treaty, and continued British support. The cleavage in opinion grew more specific after a conference called at Karbalā in April 1922, nominally to protest against Ikhwan raiding, by Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi, a Shi'i 'Alim devoted to politics. The conference, attended by some 200 Shi'i notables, 'Ulamā, and tribesmen, was watched with uneasiness by the moderate parties, and, in spite of the colourless resolution finally passed, was effective in rallying anti-Treaty opinion; it was productive also of indiscipline and near-anarchy in the sensitive Muntafiq and Shamiya districts. A further evil now clearly visible and likely to increase was the 'political' administration in some of the Euphrates areas, by strongly nationalistic Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams. These, ignoring their advisory British colleagues, openly favoured the 'patriot' shaykhs in their land disputes and revenue assessments, and frowned upon the 'English' faction. Newspaper articles in the capital grew ever more violent, street demonstrations were attempted in Baghdad, deputations waited upon the King. The Cabinet sustained changes in March 1922, by the resignation of five ministers, who included Naji al-Suwaydi, 'Izzat Pasha of Kirkuk, and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil of Baṣra. The ministers who replaced these included Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi, a senior official of superior type who had been a Turkish deputy and lately Mayor of Baghdad: Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, a Turko-Kurd of outstanding energy and rich humour: 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey al-Sa'dun,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a Baṣra ex-deputy of moderate views and high character: and a Shi'i business man and politician and strong nationalist, Ḥajj Ja'far abu al-Timman. This Cabinet, with the loss of Abu al-Timman, accepted the Treaty late in June 1922, but it added the proviso, resisted in vain by Cox, that it must be ratified, with the Organic Law and the Electoral Law, by the coming Constituent Assembly.

The Electoral Law had been published in May, and Cabinet approval to the Treaty was followed by a first beginning of electoral processes. Anti-Treaty feeling continued to be excited, to the grave danger of public order, by the irreconcilable 'Ulamā, by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by a locally partisan administration. The Muntafiq situation was especially threatening, and Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, as a dominating nationalist figure, was sent there as Mutaṣarrif. Conditions elsewhere in the provinces—Dulaym, Ḥilla, Najf, Diyalā—were uneasy or even threatening. In other liwās great efforts were made by anti-Treaty (which had become synonymous with anti-British) politicians and divines to disturb tribal order, and violent trouble was momentarily expected.

Under a new Law of Associations, published in July 1921, Shi'i political elements in Baghdad formed two parties, the Waṭani (Nationalist) and the Nahdha (Awakening); these were matched by the moderate Ḥizb al-Ḥurr (Free Party) of the Naqib's eldest son, Sayid Maḥmud al-Gaylani. Early in August, further 'patriot' meetings were held in Najf and in Baghdad. The new Shi'i parties and a press characterized more by violent and irresponsible rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded that the public reject the Treaty and refuse to participate in elections. al-Khalisi, veering at times towards pro-Turkish views, preached hell fire against all who compromised their independence. The Cabinet, realizing that the King was at least tolerating much of the extremist opposition to themselves and their more moderate councils, resigned in a body on 14 August.

The days following were critical for the 'Iraq Kingdom. The King's attitude had, indeed, lately been one of seeming identification with the elements most violently opposed to the Treaty: a Treaty which represented the policy not only of the British Government but of the 'Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the almost infinitely patient High Commissioner were rapidly worsening. Two days before the awaited Coronation-day celebrations, 23 August, the two parties issued a violent manifesto, protested openly to the King against British influence, and demanded as Prime Minister a Shi'i leader, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. At the levée itself, Sir Percy Cox was insulted deliberately by anti-British

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1921–6

These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a nahiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroitness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Haydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Taḥsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners similarly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic

[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 648* [665] a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

665 668 186 The Sunni–Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahḍha Party lost support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

* 645 'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

that the incomparable services of King Faysal would not be available for another twenty years, capable as they were of neutralizing many of the conflicts and unstable features of 'Iraqi public life. That this was not to be was mercifully concealed at the hour of Independence; equally, it could not be foreseen that one of the agencies of security and national unity—the promising and hitherto correctly subordinate Army—was to take the lead in revolution and embitterment.

The most effective of unifying features—though in fact one of division also, since it was espoused by different factions with very different degrees of passion—was that of nationalism, the strongest single force in contemporary 'Iraqi politics. It had taken the form usual in 'new' nations, who adopt with enthusiasm the attitudes of which older, disillusioned countries have already wearied. Pride of country and desire for its political freedom have been generally hailed as laudable emotions, and by 1932 many 'Iraqis had shown ardours of patriotism as respectable as any in any country. But, in common with that of other countries, 'Iraqi nationalism had been in some measure vitiated by elements less respectable. Their friends would have wished to purge it of features morally and materially damaging to it, and to diffuse conscious pride of country throughout the public rather than see it concentrated in a small political class. They would have preferred political aspiration, which used nationalism as its war-cry, directed towards securing a better life for the masses rather than towards political goals as ends in themselves. If strident xenophobic nationalism had been less crudely in evidence, and a broader-based, more tolerant patriotism had taken its place, hopes for sound progress could have been the brighter. It was a defect of this nationalism, reacting against the country's social backwardness and resenting the material and international superiority of Europeans (and, often enough, their airs of social superiority also) to indulge in uncritical self-flattery and distorted history; and it added, as a unifying element, the encouragement of common hatreds directed sometimes against internal minorities, sometimes against 'the foreigner'. The local nationalism showed, save in a few individuals, little appreciation of what Western European civilization had at its best to offer—in tolerance, generosity, true freedom, and equality of opportunity—and little sense of the practical self-preserving wisdom, for small nations, of accepting a friendly place beside stronger Powers. An excessive or morbid sensitiveness reacted instead against imagined insults, fears of interference or suspected moves of 'imperialism'. Wrongly identified with patriotism, nationalism in fact was a field for political competition: the more anti-foreign the politician, the greater patriot. This persistent feature of 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

186 politics cost the careers and sometimes the lives of some of its best sons, and deprived its people of real advantages.

648x In the international field, three main tasks would devolve after 1932 on the 'Iraqi nation: the first, to profit to the full from the support and help which its ally was prepared, without interference or self-seeking, to offer it: the second, so to align itself in world politics as to secure its own safety in whatever power-struggles might lie ahead: and thirdly, to take such steps as popular feeling might indicate in the direction of closer relations with the rest of the Arab world. The first of these tasks, which called for nothing more than the maintenance of mutually friendly relations with the British, was no arduous one; there was indeed no field of clashing interest between the two allies, and the anti-foreign extravagances of the press could no doubt be rightly assessed by both parties. In world affairs outside 'Iraq, its Government had no choice to make until the rise of Nazi power in Germany, and the attractiveness to many 'Iraqis of its forms and methods, created the temptation of a move of 'Iraqi policy away from Great Britain and towards her probable enemies: a temptation which an 'Iraq Government, a decade later, failed to resist. In the Arab world, forward movement was inevitable and was likely to be viewed with general sympathy. 'Arab Unity' had made its appearance in ministerial programmes before the end of the Mandate and, though not all statesmen gave it identical interpretations or priority, to none did it fail to appeal. Unity of a sort, indeed, was implicit in the shared linguistic and cultural environment of Arabs, their common traditions, religion, and pride, from 'Iraq to Morocco; and politically it both reflected the inspiring memory of the medieval Islamic (though in fact mainly non-Arab) empires and was the heir of the generalized Arab nationalism of the early years of the twentieth century. 'Iraqis were mindful, more particularly, of the war-time promises to King Husayn, when a single Arab State seemed to be envisaged, and of the urge to weld a greater Arab nation as a heavier counterpoise to the dominance of Europe, to correct the resented post-war parcellation of the Arab lands, and to enjoy a wider economic and social life. But there were factors, not easily to be dissipated, which must be expected to render political unity difficult to achieve. Such were the effects not only of sheer geographical separation but of the distinct local loyalties which, with the fullest encouragement of their respective Governments, had developed since 1918. Such were the differences in orientation, commercial interests, personal leaderships of dynasty or statesmen, and stages of evolution reached in the various Arab lands: and such the difference, in general, between inherited but untested fraternal sympathy, and the uneasy and exacting demands of

1: Longrigg G-4, 6 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was notorious that the strike in the Port of Basra during the summer had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed Zionism, backed by American money and competing political interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan' which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent and potential violence which were actually present and were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks. Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western, narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tive followings. Both, while moderately reformist and relatively responsible, were founded less on a body of agreed principles than on the personalities of their leaders, on their hopes of freedom from disturbance and on a natural fear of sudden and unpredictable changes. The official programmes of all the parties were of remarkable similarity; the blending of ambition and personal self-seeking with idealism and high principle was perhaps not greatly different in each; some had few, some had no provincial branches, though the two last mentioned were by far the widest in extent of support; all recited the greatest blessings which, in the whole field of national life, they would desire for their people, and stated these to be their programme. Party bitterness was nourished chiefly by the impatient resentment of the Independents and the National Democrats at the continued dominance of the satisfied property-owning and power-possessing strata of politics, with their penchant for the West and Great Britain, their restrictions on the press, their control (through the executive) of elections, and their irritating failure to produce the millennium forthwith. Between the moral level and the patriotic sincerity of all parties there was probably little to choose. Most leaders and writers were both less violent and more persuasive when in private conversation they substituted reasonable grievances and much social charm for the meaningless and often crudely false rhetoric of their speeches or leading articles. Nuri Pasha remained the only statesman of international stature, and one of the very few to have profited from a full generation of realistic experience at home and abroad.

In the probable absence for many years of political parties based on genuinely differing yet practicable programmes, and on country-wide organizations making them reasonably representative of the electorate, it was difficult in 1950 not to anticipate that Cabinet Government would long continue, and with it the rootless precariousness of a régime which seemingly at any time a successful intrigue, or a military coup d'état of too familiar a pattern, could subvert.

Constitutional or political weaknesses apart, there were, it appeared, other factors present which must preclude easy optimism as to that sole condition for the fulfilment of all the country's hopes —the stability and continuity of its Government. The first of these factors was the unchanged Arab character which, with all its charm, intelligence, and responsive sympathy, is by its impatience and its rejection of give-and-take peculiarly ill adapted to the stresses, the restraints, and the needed compromises of modern politics and Government. The second was the nature of local nationalism which, violent and narrow, suspicious and over-sensitive, self-praising and unrealistic, had lost nothing of the

1f Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

character described on an earlier page (p. 227). Claimed as the chief of virtues, it remained, at its worst, damaging to confidence and progress, conducive to ill relations with 'Iraq's best foreign well-wishers, and more apt to involve the country in the disasters of other States than to benefit its own poor and backward masses. The third factor was the heterogeneity of the public, with its widely varying levels of evolution, its regional loyalties, and its strong sectional pressures—Shi'i or Kurdish, landowning or 'intellectual'. A fourth was the disruptive or distracting effect of recent blows (due to no fault of the 'Iraqis) which had fallen untimely on a State and society still politically rootless and immature: the loss of Faysal I, the powerful irritants of the brief Nazi empire and of the Palestine Question, the rancours and cleavages of the Second World War; these were unmerited trials to a young State, and had gravely unsettled it.

Behind all these forces could be felt the spiritual uncertainties and vacua of a people still culturally and intellectually unsure as between Eastern and Western values, between tradition and innovation, Islam and atheism. They were the more distressing, and the more dangerous, at a time of bewildering international menace in which far older and greater Powers felt scarcely surer how to conduct their affairs. 'Iraq was suffering from the malaise, frustrations, and fears of a period of rapid dangerous transition, in which it was all the harder to find its paramount requirement, tranquillity. In so far as the nation's own conduct could conduce to this, it was to be sought by processes and qualities easy to describe, difficult but not impossible to realize—the gradual and organic strengthening of its institutions, the increasing enlightenment and coalescence of its public, the uplifting of the living-standards of the poor, loyalty and restraint in its armed forces, the conduct of its foreign and especially its domestic policies with reason, integrity, and continuity. By such means the 'Iraq people might by their own efforts achieve such fortune and happiness as human limitations and the conditions of a disordered world, of which they were inescapably members, might allow.

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

An appreciation of the present state of education in Iraq and the possibility of advance towards the goal of compulsory education is not possible without some reference to the history and present circumstances of the country.

Following centuries during which a brilliant civilization flourished, particularly during the Abbasid period, the country remained under Ottoman domination from the middle of the sixteenth century until the first world war. British interest in the port of Basra and the development of the oilfields caused the people to fear a continuance of alien domination but, after an uneasy mandate, the country now known as Iraq emerged in 1932 as an independent nation with membership of the League of Nations. The long period of Ottoman domination with an administration centred in a distant capital left its mark. Administrative reforms and some social advance were attempted during the period of the mandate. When, however, Iraq became an independent State its Government was faced with a legacy of ignorance, poverty and disease among all but a very small minority of the population. Attempts have been made by successive Governments to liquidate the effects of this legacy and, in certain directions, rapid and significant progress has been made. But economic, social and political problems of great magnitude remain, all of which have their effect on educational progress or retardation.

Under its constitution the country enjoys a democratic form of government with a limited monarchy and a cabinet responsible to parliament. Despite the rapid educational advance of recent years, the majority of the people are illiterate, and effective participation in the government of the country must inevitably be confined to a few.

Iraq covers some 175,000 square miles, mainly of alluvial plain stretching from the Persian Gulf through the central uplands to the mountains of Turkish Kurdistan and from the Arabian and Syrian deserts to Persia. Apart from the four principal towns of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk, together with a number of

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MHI Iraq MHI

DISCUSSION

Mrs. SOANE-ELLIS: Might I ask if the lecturer has any information as to the whereabouts of Sheikh Mahmud? The last time I saw him he was a prisoner at Ramadi.

Major WILSON: I cannot say whether he is exactly a prisoner now, but he certainly would not be allowed to go back to Sulaimaniyyeh.

Brigadier J. G. BROWNE: May I ask what is the position of the Pizhder Kurds under the present Government?

Major WILSON: There has been a slight extension of police control, but, as far as I know, real administration has not yet been established over the Pizhder.

The CHAIRMAN: It remains, I think, only for me to sum up what we have learnt. We see here again the extraordinary importance of the question of roads in establishing the authority of the Government among mountain peoples. We are building roads on the North-West Frontier of India. And here we have seen the roads that are being built through Kurdistan, like Mr. Hamilton's very fine achievement, the making of the road through the Rowanduz Gorge. I believe the account of the building of that road is going to be published shortly, and it should make a book well worth reading.

We have seen some extraordinarily interesting slides. And we have learnt some valuable information about the present position of the Assyrians. From what the lecturer says, the best plan now would appear to be rather to leave them alone where they are. The other plan was to have been to move them to an extremely suitable site on the Orontes River. But unfortunately the lands chosen had been sequestrated from their original owner, who had been in trouble. When M. Blum came into office, he decided he could deal with this case, reinstated the man in question, and restored his lands. So that scheme necessarily came to nothing, and it is quite impossible on other grounds now for the Assyrians to go there. But one gathers that it is wisest not to agitate on their behalf, nor to stir them up, for that only makes them very unpopular in the country. They are finding employment to some extent in the oil-fields, and as guards and station masters on the railways and in similar employment, and one can hope things may settle down and that they will stay in their own country.

We must thank our lecturer, not only for the good work he has obviously done in 'Iraq, but also for the excellent and informative lecture he has given us this evening.

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/For an account of Arab Nationalism prior to 1914, and of Nationalism in Iraq between 1914 and 1920, see category 116, pp. 222-265./

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Arabs of Mesopotamia, notwithstanding the efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his associates to win Arab support in other directions[1] had far-reaching effects, not only during the period of hostilities but also long after the end of the war.

The British authorities in Mesopotamia lost thereby the wartime services of capable Arab leaders. Arabs of 'Iraq by the score, once in Turkish service, were gathered from the internment camps in India and Egypt, to serve as leaders and officers, not in the land of their birth, but in the Hijāz. In contact there with the sources of the Arab Movement, they were to imbibe and to pass on to 'Iraq, in the days after the Armistice, an intensity of Arab Nationalism hitherto unknown in 'Iraq. On the western side of Arabia, they had come into contact with English officers who, no less sincere in their allegiance to British interests than those on the eastern side of Arabia, were nevertheless sympathetic to this awakening Arab Nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that these 'Iraqīs felt the difference between the official mind in Mesopotamia and that on the Mediterranean side of the desert, nor that, appreciating the difference, they were all the more impatient with the attitude of the Civil Administration which prevailed at Baghdad after Sir Percy Cox had been sent to Teheran in early 1918. Such impatience was none the less because they had little or no experience or knowledge of the difficulties of the military or administrative problems of Turkish Arabia, of which the British had gained an intimate, first-hand knowledge.

The military authorities in Mesopotamia also lost the opportunity to learn what British officers in western Arabia had already learned: that the Arabs might be more than treacherous, self-seeking, half-civilized peoples. The end of the war,

[1] To the untimely death of Capt. W. H. I. Shakespear near Artawī, in January, 1915, has been ascribed the failure of Ibn Sa'ūd to take an active part in the war and the failure to develop in Mesopotamia an Arab Movement comparable to that in the Hijāz. See Philby, *The Heart of Arabia*, Vol. I, p. 21; Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1914-1917, p. 161; also, Coke, Richard, *The Arab's Place in the Sun*, p. 221.

Sāmarrā, the fourth of the Holy Cities. No declarations were taken in the Dulaim Division, either from the tribes or from Fallūja, Ramādī or other towns. One declaration signed by twenty Muslims represented 160,000 Arab Muslims of Mōsul Wilayet. Official pressure had to be brought to bear in Najaf[1] before its notables produced satisfactory declarations.

The plebiscite as 'an authoritative statement of the views held by the local population',[2] also failed to indicate the elements of opposition in the country and to reveal their relative strength. It gave no hint, for instance, of the large section of opinion, particularly strong in Basra,[3] which, while recognizing the benefits and the increased prosperity of British rule, found the constant growth of the military machine, including ports, camps and depots; the continuation of military regulations; the maintenance of demands for forced labour and the very efficiency of the administration with its insistence on promptness, probity and justice, too disturbing to their life-long habits of mind and of action and too much of a strain on their patience to be endured.[4]

The plebiscite gave no hint that the tribesmen, uncivilized, even barbarous, were already restive under the British tribal policy which gave the shaikhs relying on British support almost unlimited power over the details of tribal life, a power too often abused for the advancement of the shaikhs' own personal interests. It gave no inkling of such tribal feeling, which was to grow in intensity during the next eighteen months and which was to pave the way for the rebellion against both shaikhs and the British rule which maintained them in control.

The *Mujtahids* of the Shī'īs and the other religious dignitaries who, firm in their opposition to any but a theocratic Muslim State, would allow no idols other than of their own making,

[1] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.
[2] See Telegram, cited *supra*, p. 161.
[3] See statement by the Rev. J. Van Ess, cited Wilson, op. cit., p. 112, confirmed to writer, in April, 1934.
[4] *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 1.

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were dismissed, although their power over the masses was enormous, as too ignorant of modern state-craft, too self-centred and too alien to be allowed to influence the creation of a new state.

The Nationalist elements, composed of those who had worked for Arab autonomy before the war, those who prided themselves on being the intelligentsia of 'Iraq, and the religious leaders, were brushed aside, although they were destined to grow in power and influence during the coming months, especially under the stimulus of Nationalism in Syria, as being too negligible, too irresponsible and too full of sound and fury to merit consideration. No inferences seem to have been drawn from the fact that the anti-British declarations, almost identical in tenor and phraseology, pointed to a carefully organized opposition, just as the close resemblance of many of the pro-British declarations indicated the care and attention which the Civil Administration had devoted to the conduct of the plebiscite.

The failure of the plebiscite to represent all these elements of current opinion in their relative importance and to reflect local opinion in its true proportions, was destined to mislead H.M. Government in its attempts to set up a new State satisfactory to the inhabitants of 'Iraq, and, by making it complacently unaware of the need for quick and decisive action in settling the future of the country, to prepare the ground for the disastrous events of 1920.

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COMMITMENTS, ETC.

Lord Curzon, on the receipt of the telegram, which did not officially reach the Foreign Office until June 24th,[1] took the position that the creation of the sanctioned provinces, councils and advisory positions were steps in devolution and in decentralization from the temporary military administration. He could not understand, moreover, why the application of such steps should be dependent on the inclusion of Mōsul in 'Iraq or on any particular combination of provinces. The original sanction for the Acting Civil Commissioner's proposals had not implied that any combination of provinces or that even the guardianship of H.M. Government would be permanent. A telegram to this effect was dispatched to Baghdad, July 5th, which stated in conclusion: 'Any action which would give rise in Mosul Wilayet or elsewhere to the impression that the future political status of 'Iraq has already been decided upon should therefore be most scrupulously avoided.'[2]

Still unsatisfied, the Acting Civil Commissioner, instead of devoting his energies whole-heartedly to the execution of the proposals which he had himself drawn up, entered into further correspondence with H.M. Government, endeavouring to obtain their approval to the inclusion of Mōsul in the new regime.

Growth of 'Iraqī opposition

In the meantime, opposition to British control had continued to grow both in 'Iraq and in Syria. A letter in January, 1919, from the 'Iraqī officers in Syria, welcoming the Anglo-French Declaration as an indication that no part of 'Iraq was to be under foreign rule, had been followed in early June by another letter, supposed to have been written by Amīr Faisal himself, and addressed to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The letter suggested that the severity of the British officials in 'Iraq had begun to turn

[1] Young, op. cit., pp. 287-8.
[2] Telegram S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 5th, 1919.

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away the regard of the people, and that if the Anglo-French Declaration signified anything, the time had come for a change. His own officers felt strongly the need for the acceleration of a National Government and fully understood that the longer the present system existed the greater would be the difficulty in changing the system later.

Lord Curzon, however, believed that no further action was necessary. He had already, two months before, sanctioned what he believed was the limit of Arab self-government compatible with a military occupation. No reply was sent.

The incident of Nājī Beg as-Sūwaidī, in addition, confirmed both the Arabs and the British officials of the hostility and bad faith of those on the opposite side. The Acting Civil Commissioner, on his journey from London to Baghdad, had interviewed two of the 'Iraqī officers in Damascus. He had admitted that affairs in 'Iraq were not perfect, and that he was ready to do what he could to meet their views. He had pointed out his difficulty in obtaining good men for positions in 'Iraq. He had at once agreed when the two officers had asked whether he would consent to a representative being chosen from among their number to go to Baghdad and to make suggestions.

Accordingly, Nājī Beg, a capable and ardent Nationalist, of an old Baghdad family,[1] arrived in Baghdad, early in June. He soon found, contrary to the expectations which the interview with the Acting Civil Commissioner had aroused in himself and in his fellow 'Iraqīs, that he was to be merely a cog in the British machine and that his advice would not be heeded and was not even wanted.[2]

[1] Nājī Beg, now known as Nājī Pasha, was a son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī who, as a prominent Arab Nationalist in Baghdad before the war, had suffered imprisonment at the hands of the Turks (*Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913), and who took a large part in the post-war Nationalist movement in 'Iraq. Nājī Pasha had been a popular *Qaimmaqām* of Najaf under the Turks (ibid., April, 1913). He was Acting Civil Governor of Aleppo under the Damascus Government, and has been Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, etc., of 'Iraq.

[2] In an interview with the writer, Nājī Pasha stated that he believed that he had been asked to come to Baghdad to assist and to advise in setting up a National Government. On discovering his mistake, he resigned.

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His subsequent resignation and return to Syria confirmed the opinion of the 'Iraqīs in Syria that the British authorities in 'Iraq regarded them as active enemies who were trying to undermine British influence in the country, and that no real opportunities would ever be given to the 'Iraqīs to manage their own affairs. The Acting Civil Commissioner, in his turn, was convinced that his view of the Arab Nationalists was the correct one: that they were incapable and inconstant and that nothing constructive might be expected from them. When, therefore, the Acting Civil Commissioner's opinion was asked on a draft reply[1] to a Memorandum which the 'Iraqī officers had sent to the Foreign Office demanding the immediate establishment of a National Government, he gave way to a characteristic outburst, deprecating in no uncertain language that an important announcement should be drawn from H.M. Government by 'such small fry'. He suggested, however, that if a reply were believed to be necessary it 'should be restricted to an intimation that the writers appear to have been misinformed as to the progress of events in Mesopotamia, and that it is open to them to go to Mesopotamia to see things for themselves'.[2]

Some form of reassurance to the 'Iraqī officers was held to be necessary by both Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu. A new reply was drafted. After stating that 'pending the decision of the Peace Conference as to Mandatory power and nature of Mandate it would be premature to attempt constitutional experiments', it followed the Acting Civil Commissioner's suggestion for a reply and pointed out that if the officers would visit the country they would find that Provincial and Divisional Councils were already being formed 'to ensure measure of Arab participation compatible with military occupation and mutual interest in political future'. The appointment of Nājī

[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 15th, 1919.
[2] Telegram No. 8107, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, July 19th, 1919.

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Pasha was mentioned as evidence of the goodwill of H.M. Government.[1]

Whatever the effect of the reply at the time on the Acting Civil Commissioner to whom it had been repeated for his information, he was later to claim that it came as 'a serious blow, not less serious because it was addressed to Cairo, for communication to a group of prominent 'Iraqī Officers in the Sharifian service, and was the outcome of telegraphic correspondence extending over four months'.[2] The evidence available makes it difficult to understand how he could have regarded the reply, drafted by H.M. Government on the lines he had himself put forward on July 19th, as the unexpected and disastrous result of his own efforts extending over four months of telegraphic correspondence.[3] His correspondence during that period had been concerned principally with persuading H.M. Government to limit Arab participation in the administration and not to extend it, and with urging the inclusion of Mōsul in a British-administered 'Iraq. Nor is it easy to understand just how the reply which he had assisted in drafting was a blow or check to the carrying out of the proposals with the execution of which he had been entrusted in May. The excerpt which he later extracted from the telegram and presented in a setting of his own fashioning in his *Clash of Loyalties*[4] might well give such an impression if it were not known that he had already been informed in the telegram of July 5th that constitutional experiments, other than those already sanctioned, could not be approved. The telegram of August 9th, taken as a whole and in its proper setting, can be considered only as a blow to the demand of the 'Iraqī officers for immediate National Government. Far from being a rebuff to him, the telegram

[1] Telegram, No. 249, Foreign Office to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Cairo, August 9th, 1919, repeated to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.
[2] Wilson, op. cit., p. 124.
[3] Ibid.: 'I eventually elicited the following pronouncement from the Foreign Office (9th August) . . .'
[4] Ibid.

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indicated that the British Government stood behind him in his attempts to realize the measures he had proposed in April and should have been extremely welcome to him in his attempts to combat any scheme of Arab Government as implied in the Anglo-French Declaration. Indeed, so far was the Acting Civil Commissioner from being actually affected by the 'serious blow', as he has endeavoured to indicate, he was assuring H.M. Government within the following week that, while the constitutional proposals sanctioned in May would require a year to put into operation, they would meet the needs of the country for many years to come.[1]

In Syria, the agitation for a National Government at Baghdad continued, eventually overflowing into 'Iraq itself and swelling the local movement there until it broke into a flood of rebellion. The telegram of August 9th from the Foreign Office had not satisfied the 'Iraqī members of Faisal's staff. Nājī Pasha's appointment had been no answer to their aspirations; his resignation had been the confirmation of their fears. What they wanted, they declared, was assurance that the existing military administration was not to continue. They found

> the attitude of the British officials was more than that of administrators of a foreign population who were incapable, and would always remain incapable, of governing themselves than that to which the Baghdadi officers had become accustomed on the other side, of friendly advisers who started on the assumption that the Arabs were managing their own affairs, and that it was not for them to do more than make friendly suggestions for the improvement of their plans.[2]

The delay in setting up the various measures which had been sanctioned seemed to the inhabitants of 'Iraq no less than to the 'Iraqī officers in Syria to point to a lack of goodwill on the part of the Acting Civil Commissioner and to give substance

[1] Young, op. cit., p. 294.
[2] Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd to Major Sir H. W. Young, cited ibid., p. 297. Confirmed by Nūrī Pasha to the writer, December 18th, 1934.

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to the belief that no real aid to the achievement of their aspirations could be expected from that quarter.[1] Rumours were about that the mandate system was but annexation in a new form, and that colonization by the British and by the Government of India had not been abandoned. The coming of 550 English women, wives and relatives of officials, pointed to the establishment of the British for a long stay. The establishment of farms for experimental work in cotton-growing was interpreted as further evidence of India's intentions towards 'Iraq. Confidence was difficult to maintain in the face of so many facts and rumours. The 'Iraqis, like their fellow Arabs, lacked patience to await developments. They desired results, and these immediately and in a tangible form. Cool and far-sighted heads were not lacking, but they were not always in control. The majority believed, as Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī was to remark later to Miss Gertrude Bell: 'My lady, complete independence is never given, it is always taken.'[2]

The establishment of the Syrian State, immediately following the Armistice, encouraged the 'Iraqis to look to their own country where direct British administration continued.[3] The growing insistence of the Syrians that posts in the Damascus Government be given to Syrians only made it necessary for the 'Iraqī officers there to seek new outlets and opportunities for their energies. 'Iraqī officers, disguised as Beduins, had already toured Mesopotamia during July. They had reported that the temper of the country was rising, and that active agitation and continuous propaganda, backed with funds, might win independence from Great Britain if it were not freely given.

Other propagandists began to slip over the desert. Societies

[1] The attitude of the 'Iraqī Officers in Syria was ably reviewed by Gertrude Bell in her confidential note, *Syria in October*, 1919, pp. 3-4 *passim*.

[2] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 569. Lawrence had continually drilled the same principle into the leaders of the Movement in Western Arabia: 'I had preached to Faisal, from our first meeting, that freedom was taken not given.' Lawrence, op. cit., p. 274.

[3] *Syria in October*, 1919, p. 11.

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already existing throughout 'Iraq became the channels of Nationalist agitation. Anti-Government and anti-British sentiment and discontent in the towns, in the religious centres, among the tribes and among the unemployed ex-officials, were stimulated and then skilfully assimilated to the nucleus of Nationalist feeling already existing among those who believed in Arab and in 'Iraqī independence as desirable in themselves. Appeals to religious fervour and fanaticism, to pride of race, to Nationalist feeling, to cupidity, and to all the elemental instincts in each of the component groups which had been drawn into the movement, were working their spell during the days when politicians of the West, like Joshua of old, bade the East stand still until the battle at Paris over the spoils should be ended.

H.M. Government was not entirely unaware that public opinion in 'Iraq during the last months of 1919 was not the same as had prevailed in the final months of 1918. As early as August 23rd, when a police report of July 7th stated that

> every Moslem Arab of education in Baghdad was a member of a society, with branches in all the important towns in Mesopotamia, which was described as simply a pan-Arab and anti-foreign organization formed with a view to the expulsion of the British and the establishment of Arab rule.[1]

Mr. Montagu's suggestion that an announcement should be made that Great Britain would remain in the country, in some form or other, was negatived by the British delegation at Paris which deprecated such action as injudicious in view of the state of affairs at the Peace Conference.

In October and November, when even more disturbing news was received of the temper of the country, of the attitude of the 'Iraqī officers in Syria[2] and of the slowness with which the constitutional proposals were being executed,[3] Lord Curzon,

[1] Cited Young, op. cit., p. 294.
[2] *Syria in October*, 1919.
[3] After six months, only four of the nine Divisional Councils and none of the Provincial Councils had been formed. On further inquiry, it was discovered that the Acting Civil Commissioner did not contemplate moving in the matter that year. Young, op. cit., p. 298.

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in alarm, called a meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee, November 10th. The Committee agreed that the first condition for recovery of confidence and for the future settlement of the country was the return of Sir Percy Cox. This would be difficult, however, until the Mandate was announced and he could act with complete authority.[1] The Mandate would probably not be given before the New Year, but an early announcement of his impending return was desirable. It was hardly possible that he could take up his new duties until the autumn.

In his turn, the Acting Civil Commissioner also realized that the temper of the country was altering. He assigned, correctly, much of the change to trans-desert sources but, considering the authors to be unimportant, he was inclined to underrate the necessity to take their views — a mistake which was to have serious consequences. Resentful of the Western Arabia policy, he was ready to believe that Sharif Husain's inordinate ambition, that England's golden sovereigns and the Arabs' love of plunder were the sole motives behind the movement in the West. He shut his eyes to the other factors. His contacts with the Middle East had hitherto been primarily in India, Persia and the Persian Gulf.[2] His first-hand acquaintance with Arabs and his knowledge of their character had been limited to the lower Tigris. He had no personal knowledge of the deep hold which Independence and Nationalism, as abstract ideas, had upon the 'Iraqī participants in the Arab Movement. He could not realize, therefore, that the motives which had helped to sustain them during months of desert warfare would continue to do so, even if their enemies were France or Britain.

He did not seem to realize that, however much the dignitaries of Baghdad might repudiate the officers as men of

[1] Reference to Sir Percy Cox in Tehrān, found him unprepared to return without complete authority.

[2] He had spent about ten days in Baghdad, July, 1911: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1911.

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importance and position,[1] many of the latter had been the life of the pre-war Arab Movement and had been instigators of several disturbances in the Turkish army.[2] Moreover, they had created positions for themselves by their ability, first in the Turkish Army and then in the Arab Movement and, in consequence, had acquired a reputation in popular opinion equalling their actual importance. In addition, the 'Iraqīs had in Mōsul, Basra, Baghdad and outlying districts, families, relatives and friends who cast up, at their instigation, waves of increasing size in the sea of 'Iraqī Nationalism.

Outwardly paying lip-service to Arab participation, his real opinion, not only of Arabs but also of those who advocated their wide participation in the government and administration of 'Iraq, came out in his memorandum on Miss Bell's note on Syria.[3] He disagreed with her fundamental assumption that 'an Arab State in Mesopotamia . . . within a short period of years is a possibility, and that the recognition or creation of a logical scheme of government on these lines, in supersession of those on which we are now working in Mesopotamia, would be practical and popular'. He declared:

> My observations in this country and elsewhere have forced me to the conviction that this assumption is erroneous, and although I am aware that in holding this view I differ from authorities and observers both at home and abroad . . . I venture, probably for the last time in my present capacity, to lay before H.M.'s Government the considerations which have led me to this conclusion. . . .
>
> I therefore regard the creation of an Arab Government

[1] Practically every 'Iraqī who served under Faisal has occupied, upon his return to 'Iraq, positions of responsibility in the 'Iraq Government. Their enemies declare that this monopolization of high office has been due to British influence, and to the fact that they have constituted themselves a ruling clique. Their friends maintain their position has been due to their ability and experience.

[2] As in Baghdad, from March to July, 1913: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March, April and July, 1913.

[3] Letter No. 34436, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, November 15th, 1919.

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Meanwhile, no further action should be taken on announcement made. I hope to be able to send you fuller instructions shortly.[1]

The reply of the Interdepartmental Committee filled the Acting Civil Commissioner with apprehension. The reference to 'framing the mandate' seemed to presage new and disheartening delays at a time when action was imperative. The failure to approve of the Bonham-Carter Report left him little with which to combat the growing unrest in 'Iraq. His telegrams to H.M. Government were, however, not without results. At the second of the two meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee to re-examine the draft Mandate in the light of recent developments, Mr. Montagu's suggestion of the establishment of a provisional Government with Sir Percy Cox in charge, on the lines proposed by the Bonham-Carter Committee but with increased Arab participation, was approved. The Interdepartmental Committee agreed that Mr. Montagu should draft the telegram along these lines.

Events had now begun to move more swiftly towards an announcement of intentions of the British Government towards 'Iraq. They were not swift enough, however, to prevent open conflict between the inhabitants of 'Iraq and the forces of Great Britain.

Excitement had been running high in Baghdad following the announcement of the Mandate. Meetings organized by the Nationalists had been held in the mosques where orators in the name of independence, race and religion had urged their listeners to rise against the British. Clashes between Nationalists and the authorities had already taken place, and it had been necessary to patrol the streets with armoured cars. The group of fifteen Baghdad Nationalists, known locally as the *Mandubīn* or Delegates, had approached the Acting Civil Commissioner asking for an opportunity to lay their proposals before

[1] Telegram No. P. 3839, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad May 20th, 1920.

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him for transmission to H.M. Government. He had tried to avoid giving the interview. He did not wish to give any opportunity for a demonstration and he felt that he had nothing definite with which to counter their demands. He held, moreover, that the *Mandubīn* were unrepresentative, referring to them in his dispatches as self-elected Delegates, although they had received the approval of a public meeting held in one of the principal mosques. Realizing, however, that they had a large popular following and that they could sway great masses of public opinion, he finally gave them an appointment for the morning of June 2nd, at the Turkish *Sarai* or Government headquarters. He took the precaution, however, of inviting by name about forty other dignitaries of all religions, supposed to be favourably disposed to the British regime. To cope with possible demonstrations or disorder among the expected crowds, special police arrangements were made, troops were held in readiness at the barracks and R.I.M.S. *Comet* with steam up and trained guns was stationed on the Tigris opposite the *Sarai*.

At the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner explained the desire of H.M. Government to give a National Government and the difficulties which had been encountered. He declared that they were then about to make an announcement along the lines proposed in the Bonham-Carter Report of which he gave an outline. He reminded his hearers that nothing was to be gained by hasty action, and that with the best will in the world an indigenous National Government could not be set up at once. He warned them that any attempts at disorder or violence would be met with force and that the military authorities would be called in if necessary.[1]

The Delegates professed themselves unsatisfied with the proposals and presented their own petition asking for the immediate formation of a National Arab Convention for 'Iraq,

[1] Text: Telegram No. 6583, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

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elected according to Turkish Electoral Law. The Convention would be empowered to draw up proposals for a National Government as promised in the Anglo-French Declaration. They also asked for freedom of the Press. With these demands a number of the invited notables, contrary to the Acting Civil Commissioner's expectations, associated themselves and declared that 'Iraqi independence was the concern of the entire Arab people.

The meeting itself, although feeling ran high, had been conducted with dignity. As those attending began to disperse, the immense crowd which filled the Court of the *Sarai* hissed and shouted abuse at the British officials. The *Mandubin* were cheered and several of the leaders were carried out on the shoulders of the crowd. No clashes occurred, however, between the crowds and the police.

In forwarding the petition and an account of the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner threw the entire blame for the 'movement reaching its present uncompromising form, backed as it is by skilfully fomented public excitement' on the failure of H.M. Government to allow him to make the announcement of the Bonham-Carter proposals before the beginning of Ramadhan as he had requested on May 8th.

He then declared:

> It is probable that in the present temper a proposal that the country should submit even for a limited period to a provisional Constitution as to which they had not been consulted would be met on the part of the Nationalists by a Declaration of Independence. Such proposals would be represented as contrary to the Anglo-French Declaration, the real meaning of which is little understood and widely misrepresented, and would harden public opinion against us, while if the present temper continues the proposed Legislative Assembly would on being summoned convert itself into a Constituent Assembly though not so authorized.[1]

[1] Telegram No. 6584, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

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arise which will lead to the High Commissioner seeking his authority to bring to the notice of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq any action on your part which he may regard as detrimental thereto.

The terms of service upon which you are engaged have been set forth in a contract which has been given to you by His Majesty the King of 'Iraq.[1]

Ratification of the Treaty by the Council of Ministers

By the time of Major Young's departure for England, in early 1922, the main lines of the Treaty had been settled. The King and his Prime Minister had been consulted, but the task had remained throughout in British hands. Not until after the Council meeting of February 19th, 1922, when the Naqīb announced that neither H.M. King Faisal nor he felt able to continue the negotiations alone, was the Treaty, which had already received the approval of the Colonial Office, placed before the Council of Ministers. During the eight months the Treaty was before it, the Council suggested numerous amendments, but their main objection was that made by the King and the Nationalists: the Treaty did not specifically abrogate the Mandate relationship.

The Naqīb, in particular, agreed with the King that the interests of 'Iraq and of Great Britain required a treaty but he joined him in pointing out that the attempt of Great Britain to pose as an ally to 'Iraq and as the mandatory Power to the League of Nations was irreconcilable, as well as unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq. He hesitated to put his name to a treaty which did not satisfy national ambitions and which would displease the Muslims of India with whom he was intimately in touch and whose good opinion he valued greatly.

The evident reluctance of the King and his Ministers to ratify the Treaty as it stood was not uninfluenced by the increasing intensity of anti-Mandate sentiment, skilfully fostered by the

[1] Cited *Progress of 'Iraq*, pp. 289-90.

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Nationalists, to whom the King was inclined to turn for support.[1] The great gathering of Sunnī and Shī'a Nationalists from all parts of 'Iraq, at Karbalā, April 12th and 13th, 1922, summoned by Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, ostensibly to consider measures of defence against the Wahhābīs, whose raids in early March had thrown 'Iraq into a furore of nervous excitement,[2] had been hailed as a body greater than the prospective National Assembly since it had met at the wish of the nation without the influence of the Government.[3]

Although the formal sessions actually came to little, moderate petitions replacing the original extreme demands,[4] the private meetings were more productive. From them developed the organization of much of the later agitation. The vernacular newspapers, which had steadily maintained during the spring that 'Iraq would not accept the Treaty so long as it contained a shadow of the Mandate,[5] were also to increase their virulence after the meetings.

The Residency attempted to counter this propaganda by inserting articles in the local English papers. These articles, placing the mandatory system in its most favourable light,[6] insisting that the misunderstandings of the Nationalists arose from the use of the wrong Arabic word for Mandate[7] and urging as a diversion, that 'Iraqīs should support their new army as a quick means of achieving independence,[8] merely stirred the Arabic press to fresh denunciations. The papers retorted, in unison, that the word Mandate, however translated, meant the same thing: subjection and colonization.[9] *Al-'Iraq*

[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

[2] *Al-Mufīd*, April 17th, 1922. The King was believed to be giving his support to the Conference. See his telegram of thanks to the Conference, April 13th, 1922; *Al-Dijla*, April 16th, 1922; also *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, April 7th, 1922; but cf. *Al-Mufīd*, same date.

[4] *Lisān al-'Arab*, February 24th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, March 1st and 9th, 1922; *Al-'Iraq*, March 3rd, 1922; *Al-Jazīra* (Mōsul), April 4th, 1922.

[5] *Baghdad Times*, May 26th; July 5th, 6th, 1922.

[6] Ibid., May 27th, 29th; June 10th, 20th, 1922.

[7] Ibid., July 12th, 1922.

[8] *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-Rāfidan*, June 5th, 1922; also *supra*, pp. 261-3.

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pointed to Syria as a typical example of what the Mandate de-
noted.[1] *Al-Mufīd* declared that the Mandate, 'even if veiled
under financial control, assistance to the army and 'Iraq repre-
sentatives abroad' must be abrogated.[2] 'Iraq must be created
independent before treaties could be made, since treaties were
only possible between independent nations.[3] In answer to the
statement that Great Britain could not, even if she wished,
divest herself of her obligations to the League, *Al-Istiqlāl*
replied:

> We cannot imagine that the League has power to force Great Britain to accept the yoke of the mandate. Everyone has the right to return any responsibility prejudicial to him and his friend. Suppose the League asked Great Britain to put her fleet at its disposal. Would Great Britain agree as she has agreed to the yoke of the mandate?[4]

Al-Mufīd declared:

> If weak nations are by terrorism and enticement to sign a document that means slavery and oppression, weak nations will find means to release themselves from responsibility.[5]

British officials themselves were not immune from newspaper criticisms; Major Yetts, Adviser for the Muntafiq *Liwā*, in particular being singled out for attack on account of his alleged pro-Mandate activities.[6]

Mr. Churchill's declaration in the House of Commons, May 23rd, 1921, to the effect that H.M. King Faisal and the 'Iraq Government had not refused to accept the Mandate,[7] added fresh fuel to the flames. At a gathering in Kādhimain, a programme of further meetings in the mosques, of monster petitions and of telegrams to the British Government and to all foreign governments was drawn up. A great gathering was planned for the evening of May 28th, in the Haidar Khāna

[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 7th, 1922.
[2] *Al-Mufīd*, May 20th, 1922.
[3] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 24th, 1922.
[4] Ibid., June 23rd, 1922.
[5] *Al-Mufīd*, June 28th, 1922.
[6] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 18th; *Al-Mufīd*, June 19th; *Al-Rafidān*, June 21st, 1922.
[7] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLIII (1922), p. 995.

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mosque, a special edition of *Al-Istiqlāl* being published to urge the population to attend.[1] Prompt action by King Faisal prevented disturbances at the mosque, but a committee was appointed to approach the King with protests against Mr. Churchill's statement.[2] Telegrams of protest to foreign governments, to the value of Rs. 1,500 (£115), were prepared but were held up at the instance of the High Commissioner, whose action was later confirmed by King Faisal.[3]

In the provinces, anti-Mandate and pro-Mandate petitions were producing a heated atmosphere, while revenue payment in the Euphrates area ceased, on the assurance of the Nationalists that the British would soon leave 'Iraq. In 'Amāra and Kūt, the great landowners viewed these assurances with great dissatisfaction. Many shaikhs, resenting the scant consideration already shown them by the Arab Government, feared the time when British control should be completely removed. On the other hand, a large body of shaikhs, including Shaikh 'Abdul Wahīd of the Fatla,[4] and tribesmen, mainly Shi'is and therefore under the influence of the *'Ulamā*, sought the overthrow of the British-controlled regime.

Tension was not lessened by the fact that in administrative circles, as early as the end of 1921, a distinction had been made, as by the *Qaimmaqām* of Abū Sukhair, between those who had taken part in the Insurrection of 1920 and those who had been and still were pro-British. The former, particularly in Hilla *Liwā*, by the special orders of the *Mutasarrif*,[5] were given light revenue assessments, facilities for payment and prompt attention to their complaints. The latter were faced with

[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 28th, 1922. *Al-Istiqlāl* was suppressed July 7th, when the license of *Al-Tauhīd* (founded Baghdad, June 24th, 1922) was withdrawn.

[2] Ibid., May 31st, 1922; *Al-Mufīd*, June 1st, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 4th, 1922. When the telegrams were held up in Baghdad, the Nationalists chartered a motor to take them to Persia, but the King was persuaded to bring pressure to bear on those concerned, to abandon the scheme.

[4] Chief instigator of the tribal revolt against the 'Iraq Government in 1935.

[5] The Mutasarrif's campaign, which he carried even into Karbalā *Liwā*, was based on (*a*) Rejection of the Treaty; (*b*) Resignation of the Cabinet; (*c*) Removal of the British provincial Advisers.

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unprecedented estimates and with demands for immediate payment, while their petitions received scant consideration. In Baghdad, the division extended to the Council where heated discussions occurred, as at its meetings of June 12th and 22nd. Ja'far abū Timman, Minister of Commerce, led the attack on the Treaty, declaring that all the Holy Saiyids and the pillars of Islam were opposed to it. His resignation, on June 26th, was taken as evidence of his sacrificial patriotism,[1] but in British official circles it was maintained that, realizing his post was about to be abolished, he resigned in order to win popularity among the Nationalists.[2]

Although the Council of Ministers resolved, on June 25th, to ratify the Treaty with a proviso which the High Commissioner had repeatedly urged them to drop, that the Treaty must be approved by the Constituent Assembly,[3] it was clear even before the critical days of August, that political antagonisms had received sharp definition. It was apparent that they were likely to increase in bitterness with the prospect of settlement by force only. Both sides had burned their bridges behind them. The *'Ulamā*, opposed to the Mandate, had spent heavily on propaganda and were in debt for their taxes. If they were unsuccessful in removing British control, they would be financially ruined. The moral forces on the side of the Government were stronger than in 1920 but the actual forces for repressing disorders were far smaller than two years before. Moreover, the forces included the 'Iraq army, which under the circumstances was an extremely doubtful element.

An early publication of the Treaty, together with a clear statement of the alternatives between which 'Iraqīs would be forced to choose, would have cleared the air.[4] In the absence

[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 27th, 1922; *Al-Tauhīd*, July 2nd, 1922.

[2] *Report on 'Iraq Administration, April, 1922—March, 1923*, Colonial No. 4 (1924), p. 14.

[3] Ja'far abū Timman signed the resolution, dissenting, however, with most of the articles.

[4] Mr. Churchill's threat in the House of Commons, July 11th (*Parl. Debates*, Vol. CLVI (1922), p. 1121), 'to wash our hands of the whole business', only aggravated public feeling in 'Iraq. *Al-Mufīd*, July 23rd, 1922.

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of a clear pronouncement of policy from H.M. Government, the demand for withdrawal from 'Iraq made by the British Press and by Parliament,[1] duly reported in 'Iraq, encouraged the Nationalists to believe that continued agitation would force the British to withdraw.

The difficulties facing the High Commissioner and the 'Iraqīs favouring the Treaty were not decreased by the attitude of H.M. King Faisal. He recognized the necessity for a treaty in accordance with the conditions of his enthronement, yet he continued to rely on the Nationalists for support in opposition to the terms of the Treaty as placed before him. Prominent Nationalists, such as Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī,[2] Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, and others had access to him. Within the palace, Fahmī al-Mudārris and Saiyid Mahdī al-Bāsīr had his private ear. Ja'far abū Timman had been his agent in reporting the Karbalā meetings.[3] Although differences of opinion had grown up between the King and the Naqīb, both of them had 'proclaimed to the listening Universe that they will never, so help them God, accept the Mandate'.[4] The undoubted opposition of the King, together with his telegram to the Karbalā Conference, his favourable reception to the Nationalists, on May 30th, and his relations with the leaders to whom presents of money were known to have been given, confirmed popular opinion that to oppose the Treaty was not to oppose the King.

As a result of his association with the Nationalists, it has since been maintained that the King had been won over to their side.[5] Such an assertion implies that he embraced Arab Nationalism

[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CLI (1922), pp. 1554 ff.; Vol. CLVI (1922), pp. 1085, 1092, 1098-102, 1107 ff.

[2] By early August, however, a breach between Shaikh Mahdī and the King seems to have been complete. The latter regarded the former as pro-Turk.

[3] This did not prevent him from holding a meeting at his house, August 2nd, when the dethronement of King Faisal was put forward.

[4] Bell, op. cit., p. 643; also *Al-Mufīd*, June 26th, 1922.

[5] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IX. (1922), pp. 235-7; Hooper, C. A.: *L'Iraq et la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1928), p. 33.

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only at the instigation of the 'Iraqī Nationalists, overlooking the fact that he had, in effect, early dedicated his life to the Arab cause. It disregards his previous work for Arab independence at every conceivable opportunity; at Constantinople; in Syria after the outbreak of the war at the risk of his life; in the Arab revolt; in Damascus in the attempt to set up an Arab State; and at the Peace Conference in Paris. The rejection of Arab claims at Paris and his ejection from Syria had neither curbed nor broken his ardour, as his unpublished *Memoirs* amply confirm. He remained the Arab patriot with dreams of an Arab Federation stretching from the Taurus to the Indian Ocean.[1]

In 'Iraq he found himself the point of balance between his British mentors and his own subjects. To the former, he owed his throne, as well as support for it. To them, he owed the prospect of future development for the country, but on their own terms. To his fellow Arabs, from whom only could come the moral support and the sympathetic public opinion on which he hoped to build the 'Iraq nation, he owed loyalty to the Arab cause. Only by joining forces with the Nationalists, whose ideas rather than those of the British, more closely approximated his own, could he win from H.M. Government the concessions which would give 'Iraq real independence and would place more power in his hands to meet the responsibilities which had been thrust upon him by the Treaty.

If he turned to the extreme Nationalists and to the *'Ulamā*, therefore, it was because he sought to adjust the balance in favour of Arab Nationalism. If he descended to indirect methods of obtaining his ends, it was because he held that the end merited the means, and because his better judgment was at times swayed and warped by influences within his palace.

[1] In spite of official denials of his anti-French sentiment, Faisal never renounced his ambition of recapturing Syria for the Arab Federation, making 'Iraq his base of attack.

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INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY

So definitely had the King's alliance with the extreme Nationalists affected the situation, that a prediction was made in British official circles in the middle of August that, unless he turned to the moderates, it would be impossible to foresee the outcome of the next six weeks.

The Council of Ministers itself felt that the King, in allying himself with the Nationalists outside the Cabinet, and in apparently approving of their actions, which had included denunciations of the Council, had failed to give it his confidence. These misgivings the Council expressed in a resolution on August 9th, when it requested 'His Majesty to co-operate with this persevering Government in conducting affairs, in order to convince the people that the Government of His Majesty can rely on the confidence of His Majesty'. By stating in his reply that he saw no reason to alter his policy, the King indicated, contrary to the advice of the High Commissioner, that he personally wished the Cabinet to fall. The Ministers, therefore, resigned on August 14th.[1] Their fall was hailed as a blow to the pro-Treaty party, the extreme Nationalists openly declaring that Ja'far abū Timman, Hamdī Pāchahjī and Maulūd Pasha would replace the fallen Ministers, that Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr would be Prime Minister and that the Mandate would be abrogated. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr immediately issued a manifesto to the people, advising them, among other things, to persevere towards complete independence and to reject the British Mandate by all legal means.[2]

King Faisal himself added to the critical state of affairs by writing to the High Commissioner, on August 20th, and stating that, in view of the existing uncertainties of policy and lack of definition of responsibilities between himself and the High Commissioner on matters of internal administration, he felt compelled to inform the High Commissioner and through him the

[1] The Naqīb remained in office for a few days longer.
[2] Full text of Manifesto: *Al-Mufid*, August 19th, 1922; summary: *Baghdad Times*, August 23rd, 1922.

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Colonial Office that, in the event of a rising, which was confidentially to be expected, His Majesty disclaimed all responsibility. He begged the High Commissioner either to assume the conduct of administration or to give himself a free hand to direct affairs on such lines as he saw fit.

The High Commissioner immediately drafted a strong reply, pointing out the responsibility of the King in the situation. The letter was withheld, however, in order that it might not mar the approaching anniversary of King Faisal's accession.

[665] The two Nationalist political parties, *Hizb al-Watanī*,[1] (National Party), and *Hizb an-Nahdha*[2] (Renaissance Party), which, with the *Hizb al-Hurr*[3] (Independent Party), had been formed in early August to take part in the prospective elections,[4] thought the moment opportune to add their weight to the protests against the Mandate. At a joint meeting, on November 20th and 21st, under the presidency of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr. the parties drew up an address which they presented to the King.[5] The address culminated in three demands:

1. Immediate termination of the present policy and of British influence.
2. Selection of a Cabinet, members of which were to be sincere patriots, possessing the confidence of the people.
3. Suspension of treaty negotiations until the meeting of the constituent Assembly, its members having been freely elected.[6]

Arrangements were also made by the parties for a joint public protest on August 23rd at the anniversary celebration.[7]

On the morning of the 23rd, when the High Commissioner

[1] Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 8th, 1922.
[2] *Al-'Iraq*, August 10th, 1922; Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 21st, 1922.
[3] *Baghdad Times*, August 11th, 1922.
[4] The Law of Associations, under which the parties were strictly regulated had been approved, after much delay, by the Council on June 29th, and promulgated on July 2nd, 1922. *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 56-8.
[5] *Al-Mufid*, August 22nd, 1922.
[6] *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufid*, June 23rd, 1922.
[7] *Al-'Iraq* and *Al-Mufid*, August 25th, 1922.

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and his staff arrived at the Palace, they found the courtyard packed and an address being delivered from a balcony. As the High Commissioner passed up the stairs, shouts from the crowd were heard, followed by loud applause. After the audience at which the King appeared to be somewhat nervous,[1] the High Commissioner, on inquiry, learned that the demonstration as arranged by the *Hizb al-Watanī* and *Hizb an-Nahdha* had been directed against the Mandate. The next day, he sent a strong protest, demanding an apology and the arrest of those responsible for the affair. The apology was immediate and ample.[2] Unfortunately the King, about noon on the same day, was stricken with appendicitis, an operation being performed early the following day. The necessary papers, however, had not been signed by him. The High Commissioner approached His Majesty shortly before the operation, but the King refused to sign, protesting that he would not put his signature to the condemnation of any of his subjects as an act which might well be his last.

The High Commissioner at once issued a proclamation, taking over the reins of government into his own hands and stating that the absence of a Cabinet, the King's illness and the seditious disturbances in the country left him no other alternative.[3] Hamdī Pāchahjī, Saiyid Mahdī al-Basīr, Amīn al-Chārchafī and 'Abdul Rasūl al-Kubba were deported to Henjam. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr and Shaikh Muhammad Māhdī al-Khālisī were advised by the High Commissioner that 'if they did not go, he would be forced to take measures which, out of respect to the *'Ulamā*, he did not want to take'. They crossed the Persian frontier, August 29th. Notice was served that any further attempts at sedition would be promptly and severely dealt with.[4]

From the provinces disquieting news had been reported. In

[1] Cf. Bell, op. cit., p. 649.
[2] *Baghdad Times*, August 26th, 1922. No Arabic papers printed these letters.
[3] Ibid., Special Edition, August 26th, 1922.
[4] Ibid.

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Shamīya, the chiefs were defiant; in Dīwānīya, tribal lawlessness had broken out, while in Nāsirīya and Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, public order trembled in the balance. In Diyālā, unrest had increased to such an extent that had any rising taken place elsewhere, the tribes of Dīltāwa, Shahrābān and Delli 'Abbās would unquestionably have risen. Prompt and strong measures restored administrative authority on non-party lines, however, the Nationalist officials being summoned to Baghdad where the outstanding offender, the *Mutassarif* of Hilla, was tried and adjudged to be unworthy of future employment. Revenue was collected, land cases settled and incipient revolt checked, aerial action being necessary in four cases to re-establish the authority of the Government.

Whether or not the actual incident on August 23rd required the stern and, in the case of the deportations, even harsh measures employed, there can be no question that the High Commissioner, as responsible for peace and order, considered his measures, vigorously and promptly taken, to be essential for the well-being of the country as well as for the eventual success of British policy. His actions restored prestige to the Government, the country as a whole settling down to 'an era of reconstruction'.[1]

In order that the measures taken by the High Commissioner should appear to be constitutional, it was essential that they should be ratified by the King. Both British and 'Iraqī officials were aware of the grave situation which might result if the King should refuse to give the required ratification. On September 10th, the High Commissioner approached King Faisal. His Majesty was told plainly that the British Government would not tolerate his connection with future Nationalist agitation nor any further delay in ratifying the Treaty. The King agreed to invite the Naqīb to form a new Cabinet, after the receipt of a declaration from the Secretary of State for the Colonies which would form the basis of an announcement of his

[1] *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, p. 21.

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embracing the State. Not yet had a sense of loyalty and duty to the nation arisen to surmount the differences between tribesmen and townsmen, between Sunnī and Shī'ī, and between Muslims and minority communities or to replace personal opportunism. Patriotism still denoted independence without obligations to the State.

In his impatience with these materials at hand for the creation of the new State, King Faisal may have gone farther than he was justified in attempting to mould the political institutions to his own will. On the other hand, it seems possible that had he not assumed the role of a benevolent despot, the political system of 'Iraq might have faltered and even collapsed entirely and the stable government insisted upon by the League of Nations as one of its criteria of 'Iraq's readiness for independence[1] would have been absent in 1932. It is equally probable that without King Faisal's guiding influence, supported by Great Britain, the 'Iraqī people in their impatience would have refused to agree to the obligations imposed by Great Britain as the price of her assistance. In the latter circumstance, Great Britain would have been forced to resume direct control or to withdraw from 'Iraq. Either course would undoubtedly have retarded for many years the entrance of 'Iraq into the League of Nations and her acceptance as a member of the international community.

Upon the accession of King Ghāzī I, September 9th, 1933, the young King, barely turned twenty-one and not less of a Nationalist nor less mindful of his position than his father, attempted to use the immense popularity he had acquired as the result of his openly displayed approval of the campaign against the Assyrians,[2] to exert the power of the crown and to take the reins of control into his own hands, after the example of his late father. The Prime Minister, Rashīd 'Alī al Gailānī, although

[1] *Official Journal*, November, 1931, pp. 2057 ff.

[2] *The Times*, September 1st, 11th, 1933. 'Iraqī-Assyrian relations are held to be outside the scope of this study. See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934 (1935), pp. 135 ff.

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

would know the difference.' They went on to point out large numbers of sheep dotted around the horizon and they explained that had there been a large number of camels with a few sheep, then bedouin would have been indicated. Instead there was a large number of sheep with a few camels, indicating Arabs. They had to go on to explain that by Arabs they meant the great landowning Shia tribes, who are in the main cultivators of rice, dates, barley and a variety of other crops, but they send out their sheep on long treks through the desert in charge of some of their families in search of grass.

Most of the Arab tribes are dwellers in houses or clean, cool huts made of reed matting, which allows for a constant current of air through the hut, and prevents the temperature from rising to that of an oven in the hot sun, like a house. Many of these stories were told in a large guest house or tent pitched amongst the houses, with a background of sound varying from that of the cooking of a meal of several roast sheep to the powerful thump, thump, thump, of the great pumps. These pumps deserve mention, since they are often a tribe's principal pride and source of wealth. At one place I was surprised to hear that a boy's name was Rustam, since this name is more common amongst Persians and Kurds than amongst Arabs, but it was explained to me that he was named after the pump, and I understood when I saw the name Rustom stamped on an iron plate on the great cylinder.

The Arab tribes have a great military history of which they are justly proud. It is long and somewhat complicated, and to give in full the history of a single tribe as told by the sheikhs would fill a book greater in size than this. I will, however, give a précis of the history of that great group of tribes which were known as the Muntafiq.

3sRoyal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
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his nomination, accepted at the Cairo Conference of 1921, was approved, in spite of some opposition, by the Iraqi Council of State and confirmed in a referendum, and he was enthroned on 23 August 1921. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, through which the mandatory Power had decided to embody its obligations towards the League of Nations, was signed by the Iraq Government on 10 October 1922 against the determined opposition of nationalist elements, who insisted that the Treaty should terminate the Mandate and British influence, whereas it in fact incorporated the provisions of the Mandate, gave guarantees on judicial matters to make up for the abolition of the Capitulations, and guaranteed Great Britain's special interests in Iraq. Its period of validity, twenty years, was reduced the following year to four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey, which followed in July 1923; this, and the subsequent evolution of the British Government's attitude towards Iraq, were due largely to the increasing demand in Great Britain to terminate British commitments there. In March 1924, in spite of nationalist and Shii threats to boycott the elections, a Constituent Assembly was elected and was induced, in the face of considerable political and popular resentment, to accept the Treaty (June 1924), and later ratified it and the Organic Law, which had been drawn up on the basis of an Iraqi draft, after considerable disagreement between the King and the British Government on one side and Iraqi political opinion on the other over the royal powers.

In November the Council of the League of Nations awarded the major part of the Mosul vilayet to Iraq. In the same year a treaty between Turkey, Great Britain, and Iraq accepted the new frontiers as definitive and inviolable, while Iraq agreed to pay to Turkey 10 per cent on Mosul oil royalties on condition that the mandatory regime, as expressed in the Treaty, should continue for twenty-five years unless Iraq were previously admitted as a member of the League; this provision was embodied in a new Treaty in 1926. In September 1929 the British Government undertook to support Iraq's candidature for membership in 1932 and in 1930 a further new Treaty was signed, which provided for a close Anglo-Iraqi alliance, to last for twenty-five years from the admission of Iraq to the League. There was to be full and frank consultation between the parties in matters of foreign policy which might affect their common interest; mutual assistance in the event of war, including Iraq's provision of communications and all other facilities and assistance and the right of passage to British troops; and lease of sites for air bases near Basra and west of the Euphrates at which

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forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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Afghanistan, which provided for consultation in all disputes that might affect the common interests of the four states.

Relations with Great Britain

During the period of independence the hostility of Iraqi nationalists towards Great Britain in no way diminished. The mandate had been replaced by a treaty that they had from the first opposed as denying full independence and their sentiments were strengthened by Syrian and Palestinian nationalists, deeply critical of British policy in Palestine, who took refuge in Iraq. A further stimulus was provided by Axis propaganda, which produced among nationalist groups not only hostility to Great Britain but a positive admiration for the totalitarian states. When King Ghazi killed himself in a motor accident in April 1939, to be succeeded by his infant son Faisal II, with the Amir Abdul-Ilah, Ghazi's cousin and brother-in-law, as Regent, there was a violent outburst of anti-British feeling in the belief that the accident was British-inspired.

Consequently, although the Iraqi Government severed diplomatic relations with Germany in September 1939, political opinion was divided on the measure of assistance to be granted to Great Britain under the Treaty; nationalists, especially in the all-important army, demanded non-belligerency and even the resumption of relations with Germany; and diplomatic relations with Italy were maintained. In 1941 the routine of political intrigue combined with nationalist and anti-British feeling and the effect of allied reverses, five years of Axis propaganda, and the presence of the Mufti of Jerusalem in Baghdad, to produce a chain of events which culminated in April 1941 in the last of the coups d'état. Rashid Ali al-Gailani seized power with the support of an army group more violently nationalist and anti-British than himself and formed a Government which was pledged to maintain Iraq's non-belligerency and displayed considerable sympathy towards the Axis. The Regent and several senior statesmen quitted the country. Relations were strained between the new Cabinet and the British Government, which was reluctant to recognize it, and on 2 May a disagreement over the passage of British troops through Iraq, on the basis of the Treaty, led to Anglo-Iraqi hostilities. These were terminated, after the introduction of further British forces and the Transjordan Arab Legion, on 29 May; by this time the Regent had returned to Iraq, the Rashid Ali Government had fled, and armistice negotiations were in progress. Shortly after the outbreak of Anglo-Iraqi hostilities the Iraqi Government had been in touch with

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
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tonishing the nature of those golden days, now only ten years and less in the past.

The fundamental difficulty is that the new régime, with all its virtues, is essentially an alien system imposed upon the country from without by virtue of superior military power. Thus it shares the unpopularity of alien systems the world over. The opposition to the present ruler and his British advisers is not simply the frothing of irresponsible and ambitious nationalist agitators. It is all that, but there is something far more significant underneath. I was once entertained for an afternoon by a rabid nationalist of Mesopotamia who attempted to show that the system of education introduced by the British was inferior in curriculum and in number of students to the pre-war system of the Turks, which proposition was about as reasonable as that two and two make twenty. But it would have been a great mistake to conclude that the man was primarily concerned to vindicate the Turks. He was not even primarily concerned over the educational system of Mesopotamia. Nor was he simply a fool. The thing that troubled him was the fact that his country was ruled by aliens. The tremendous following that such men have is not due to any outstanding ability they possess and still less to any profound insight into the various problems of the day, but rather to the fact that the average Arab. the man in the street in Mesopotamia, also resents that alien domination very intensely. It is hard for the unimaginative Westerner to realize that what the Arab wants is not efficient government or even good government. What he wants is self-government.

On the whole, in spite of many encouraging signs of progress, a more intimate acquaintance with affairs in

65:Landshut S-4 (no date)1950 M1 Middle East
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if that were true, how would it be possible to explain the excellence of 661
the relations between the communities but a few years ago and the 563
obvious recognition in former years of the Jewish population as an integral part of the nation?

The answer must be sought in the workings of the Eastern mind. There would be no room in a survey of this kind to attempt a description of the subtle blend of human passions, age-old habits, and deep-seated prejudices which have gone into the forging of the Oriental tradition of thought or to estimate how that tradition of thought has reacted to the impact of Western civilisation, with its conception of law and human rights. It is, however, necessary to draw attention to certain points.

To begin with, the Arab States which emerged from the First 186
World War represented an attempt to create the whole fabric of the Western nation-state out of a galaxy of various semi-independent tribes, self-conscious and self-centred city populations, rival clans, powerful landowners, interspersed with minorities of different races and religions. This complex had no common tradition beyond the allegiance of the majority to Islam.

The consequence was that from the beginning the Arab States rested on social foundations of the most insecure kind. Symptoms of this have been a very characteristic shrill aggressiveness of national outlook and an almost comic attachment to national dignity, coupled with an exaggerated anxiety lest the State's new-found independence should be threatened in any way or its sovereignty infringed.

In the case of Iraq, no sooner had the new State come into existence than this excessive national sensitiveness resulted in a wave of feeling against its very creator and helper—Britain. And when King Faisal, whose great ability and authority had succeeded in surmounting many initial difficulties, died just at the end of the mandatory period (1933), the struggle for key positions in the Government was intensified, thereby adding a new element of insecurity.

Rival tribal chieftains, with their dependants and hangers-on, began competing with each other for the favours of extremist parties, and contributed to making every change of Government an event of greater or lesser violence. Rashid Ali's *coup d'état* in April, 1941, was merely one of a series of such changes; it was only the most striking because of its dangerous political and strategic implications in the middle of a world war.

This ever-present latent tension was aggravated by the inability of succeeding Governments to cope with urgent problems of social reform, agricultural development, finance, and administration. As early as 1942, the budget showed a deficit of £1,334,733, despite the big royalties paid to the Government by the oil companies for the exploitation of the oilfields. During the first six months of 1948, imports exceeded exports by £17,000,000, while the country's whole foreign trade amounted to only £27,000,000. Hence the prevailing nervousness

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in official circles of Communist propaganda, a fear which frequently reached hysterical proportions.

To cap everything, there has been the problem of minorities. The absence of ethnical homogeneity has always been the weak spot of newly created States; the more so when religious and racial differences alienate the minorities from the majority, making the latter—rightly or wrongly—always suspicious of the minorities.

Ever since the formation of the State of Iraq, the Kurds, a close-knit minority numbering more than 700,000 in the mountains of the North, have repeatedly revolted against the Government in Baghdad—and not without grounds.

The unsatisfactory nature of the State's relations with the minorities was made worse by a shocking event in 1933. In that year, a large group of Christian (Nestorian) Assyrians, who had crossed into Syria and wanted to re-enter Iraq, was brutally massacred by a detachment of the Iraqi Army.

The event sent a wave of horror among all the Christian minorities dwelling in the country. (Under considerable official pressure, the Christians—coreligionists of the victims—and, of course, the Jews, were forced to contribute large sums towards a fund in aid of the survivors, whereas the amount of money subscribed by the Muslim majority was, in the absence of any such pressure, small.)

In any case, the position of any minority dwelling amongst a Muslim population must always be delicate. Constitutional guarantees and protection by law will never induce the Muslim masses, with their innate conservatism and lack of education, to abandon their inborn distrust of the non-believer.

In the case of Iraq, whose rise as a nation-state was threatened at the outset by minority troubles, this factor was particularly important, especially as the predominance of British influence for many years had made the populace hyper-sensitive about the country's national independence.

As for the Jews, so long as general attention was not focused on them specifically, their position was no worse than was normal for any non-Muslim minority in an Islamic country. If anything, their age-old connection with the country, their important economic and social position, and the obvious absence of any separatist tendency among them made their position rather better than that of most of the other minorities.

But the steadily growing atmosphere of political insecurity and distrust was bound in the long run to bring about a deterioration. That deterioration became serious as soon as it became possible for the Muslims to suspect any sense of solidarity between Iraqi Jews and those in Palestine.

On balance this much can be said: the nature and extent of recent persecution does not mean that, in altered circumstances, there can

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be no ultimate return of the peaceful relationship which existed between Muslims and Jews in Iraq formerly.

Indeed, once the fever of the anti-Jewish campaign had passed its peak—that is, by the end of 1948—there is plenty of evidence to show that many educated Muslims had begun to have second thoughts. Here and there Jewish officials who had been dismissed were asked to resume their posts. The return to the premiership of Nuri Pasha al-Said (the most experienced and esteemed of all Iraqi politicians) raised hopes of better relations, especially as the fanatically nationalist Minister of Defence, Sadiq al-Bassam—the man largely responsible for the sinister activities of the courts martial—was forced to resign.

It was then that the Jewish representative in the Senate, the universally respected Ezra Danyiel, was able to appeal to the Government for justice and to remind the Senate of the long-standing loyalty of the Jewish community. On the whole, this speech had a favourable effect, and resulted in official assurances that in future the rights of the Jews to treatment as citizens enjoying equal rights with other citizens would be respected. Since then, Jews have been able to reopen their businesses.

Yet the future must remain uncertain. As this Survey goes to press, reports are being published to the effect that the Iraqi Government has now decided to allow Iraqi Jews to emigrate—on condition that they give up their Iraqi citizenship. It is not clear, at the time of writing, whether there are any other conditions attached. In view of what has happened in recent years, however, there can be little doubt that a large-scale exodus from Iraq to Israel is to be expected in the near future.

As for those who remain, it would be idle to pretend that their future prospects are bright. In so far as they can expect a measure of stability and security, this must—to a large extent—depend on the Governments of Israel and Iraq reaching, if not agreement, at any rate a satisfactory *modus vivendi*. At the present time there is not even an armistice agreement between the two countries; and Iraq, which does not border upon Israel territory, has shown no anxiety to improve relations.